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ABSTRACT 
MARKETS, NETWORKS AND INTERNAL MOBILITY: THE ALLOCATION OF 
HUMAN RESOURCES WITHIN CONTEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS 
JR Keller 
Peter Cappelli 
Despite the fact that more than half of all jobs are filled internally, we know surprisingly 
little about the organizational process used to facilitate internal mobility. This 
dissertation addresses this gap by examining the different ways by which current 
employees are allocated to new jobs within organizations. Using personnel records and 
job application data from a large services organization, I examine how posting and 
sponsorship – the two mostly commonly used internal hiring processes – shape outcomes 
of importance to firms and workers. Posting is a formal, market-oriented process in 
which a manager posts a job and interested employees apply. Sponsorship is an informal, 
relationship-oriented process in which a manager fills a job with a candidate known 
through a personal connection. In the first study, I examine how posting and sponsorship 
shape value creation and capture, arguing that while posting will generate higher quality 
of internal hires by helping managers overcome challenges associated with identifying 
and evaluating internal candidates, the competitive nature of the process will lead 
workers to negotiate for higher salaries, limiting the value a firm is able to capture 
through improved decision-making. Consistent with these arguments, I find that posting 
results in better hires but at a higher cost, highlighting important tradeoffs associated 
with allocating human capital formally though markets or informally through managerial 
networks. In the second study, I examine how posting and sponsorship shape the 
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organizational careers of women, arguing that posting has the potential to reduce gender 
inequalities in advancement and pay by overcoming structural barriers imposed by job 
segregation and minimizing gender differences in negotiating behaviors. I also argue, 
however, that the posting process is gendered in such a way as to discourage women 
from applying for posted jobs. In finding empirical support for these arguments, this 
study highlights how the ability of organizational processes to remediate gender 
inequalities depends on the extent to which they account for both gender differences in 
structural constraints and gender differences in preferences and behaviors. Packaged 
together, these studies provide a more complete understanding of the mechanisms 
facilitating worker mobility in contemporary labor markets. 
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CHAPTER 1: JOB MOBILITY WITHIN AND ACROSS ORGANIZATIONS: A 
SELECTIVE REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Job mobility refers to the movement of individuals between jobs (J. E. 
Rosenbaum, 1979b; Rosenfeld, 1992). A job is a particular set of activities to be carried 
out within a particular employer and few people hold the same job for the entirety of their 
career. Rather, people routinely move between jobs, occupying one job for a given length 
of time before moving to a different job1. According to recent statistics, the average US 
worker currently stays in a job for just over 4 years (BLS, 2014; Kamenetz, 2012). 
Millennials, who will compose more than 75 percent of the workforce by 2025, tend to 
stay in a job for around 3 years and expect to work until they are at least 70 years old 
(BLS, 2014; Meister, 2012), which would equate to holding nearly 17 different jobs over 
the course of a typical career.  
 Understanding job mobility is important not only because of its frequency, but 
also because of its central role in shaping the fortunes of workers, firms and society. For 
workers, mobility generates the sequence of matches which constitute a career (Sullivan 
& Baruch, 2009). As workers move across jobs, they accumulate human capital, social 
capital and other career resources that enable them to move into subsequent jobs. 
(Bidwell & Briscoe, 2010). As the majority of workers in an industrialized society obtain 
                                                            
1 People may also move out of employment. Analyses of CPS data from the US Census has 
shown that the rate of job-to-job transitions is two to three time larger in magnitude than 
transitions from employment to unemployment (Fallick & Fleischman, 2004; Nagypal, 2008), 
though this difference is likely understated by as much as half, as these figures include only 
moves across firms and not moves to new jobs within firms.  
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income and other rewards in exchange for work (Althauser & Kalleberg, 1981), job 
mobility is a key avenue through which individuals accumulate income and status (Bills, 
1992; Molloy, Smith, & Wozniak, 2013; Topel & Ward, 1992),  
 Workers represent repositories of skills, routines, and knowledge that can be 
carried from one job to another (Argote & Darr, 2000; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010). 
Worker mobility therefore facilitates the transfer knowledge, human and social capital so 
critical to organizational learning and performance (Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010; 
Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010; Lounsbury, 2001; Rao & Drazin, 2002). As a result, the 
strategic acquisition and deployment of human assets is increasingly seen as a potential 
source of competitive advantage for firms (Argote & Ingram, 2000; Edmondson, 2012; 
Michaels, Handfield-Jones, & Axelrod, 2001), consistent with the long-held maxim that 
managers generate value by discovering and creating uniquely valuable combinations of 
resources and activities (Lippman & Rumelt, 2003; Penrose, 1959; Zenger, Felin, & 
Bigelow, 2011, pp. 93–94).  At the societal level, access to high paying jobs shapes the 
distribution of rewards and levels of income inequality (McCall & Percheski, 2010) and 
the diffusion of knowledge within and across firms stimulates the growth of intellectual 
capital and innovation (Ng, Sorensen, Eby, & Feldman, 2007, p. 364).  
 In this chapter, I selectively review the literatures on two specific types of 
mobility – internal mobility and external mobility, paying particular attention to work 
exploring the allocative processes which facilitate the movement of workers to new jobs 
within and across firms. In doing so, I highlight an important gap in our current 
understanding of job mobility in contemporary labor markets: Despite the fact that more 
than half of all jobs are filled internally, we know surprisingly little about the 
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organizational processes used to facilitate internal mobility. I begin to address this gap by 
describing the two most commonly used internal hiring processes in contemporary large 
organizations and then outlining two empirical studies designed to explore how these 
processes shape a variety of outcomes of consequence to workers, firms, and society. 
MOBILITY TYPES & PROCESSES 
 There are multiple types of job mobility. Mobility can occur along multiple 
dimensions (Ng et al., 2007). Nicholson and West (1988), for example, identify three 
dimensions – employer (internal or external), status (up, lateral, down), and function 
(same or different) – resulting in twelve types of mobility. Others have highlighted 
additional dimensions, including occupation (Louis, 1980; Tolbert, 1996) and geography 
(Parnes, 1954). For simplicity, this chapter focuses on the employer dimension, 
selectively reviewing the history and recent developments in research on internal and 
external mobility, with internal mobility defined as a move between jobs within the same 
organization and external mobility defined as a move to a new job in a new organization.  
 The processes which facilitate job mobility are referred to as allocative processes; 
they allocate resources to opportunities (Bradach & Eccles, 1989), with workers 
representing the resources and jobs representing the opportunities or activities to which 
they are matched. Though both fall under the broader conceptual umbrella of allocative 
processes, most theoretical accounts of mobility tend to focus on either the supply-side or 
demand-side mechanisms which generate new person-job matches (Fernandez & Sosa, 
2005), Supply-side accounts focus on the behaviors of job seekers while demand-side 
accounts focus on organizational processes and structures (Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997; 
Granovetter, 1981; Sorensen & Kalleberg, 1981).  
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 In the following sections, I trace several key theoretical and empirical 
developments on mobility and allocative process over the past three decades. Much of the 
early literature in this area examined mobility within highly bureaucratic internal labor 
markets, detailing how an array of organizational structures and administrative rules 
shaped advancement within firms. In contrast, recent work has focused almost 
exclusively on mobility across firms, detailing the process by which workers and firms 
search for potential matches in the external labor market. As a result, while we know 
quite a lot about how internal mobility used to work and how external mobility currently 
works, we know very little about how internal mobility currently works.   
HISTORICAL INTERNAL MOBILITY 
 Our understanding of internal mobility remains largely grounded in the 
foundational research on traditional, hierarchal internal labor markets and a closely 
related literature on intraorganizational careers, literatures which emerged largely in 
response to the rise of large corporations in the 1950s.  
Emergence of Bureaucratic Internal Labor Markets  
 Prior to the growth of the major railroads in the late nineteenth century, the 
typical firm had a simple structure where the owners were the managers (Chandler, 
1977).  Even then there was often little to manage, as organizations typically outsourced 
much of the work, from sales and distribution at companies such as DuPont (Zunz, 1990), 
to actual production tasks, which were often outsourced to contractors who found their 
own workers and managed them how they saw fit (Clawson, 1980, pp. 72–80). Starting 
with the railroads, organizations began to expand to the point where the need for 
standardization and coordination became paramount, leading to the creation of what we 
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would now call middle management jobs. These new positions were filled through 
external hiring. In fact, during World War I, the Manpower Commission, which was 
established by the government to ensure that companies had the workers and skills 
needed to maintain wartime production, had the specific goal of reducing the ubiquitous 
pirating of workers by competitors. This led to the rapid establishment of personnel 
departments to develop and execute workforce planning practices focused on filling jobs 
internally throughout the 1920s (Jacoby, 1985).  Yet these efforts were short-lived, as the 
Great Depression lessened the need for managers (Melman, 1951) and with it the need to 
develop workers internally. World War II further stagnated these efforts, as most of the 
candidates who would have been hired into entry-level positions and subsequently 
developed into managers were serving in the military.   
The lack of hiring and development from the Depression through WWII led to a 
serious shortage of talent across nearly all industries (Whitmore, 1952). Organizations 
responded just as they had at the beginning of the century – by raiding competitors for 
talent.  A prominent retail executive noted that “to go to another store for assistant 
buyers, buyers, and other executives” was the approach “almost universally used . . .” to 
meet their human capital needs (Carden, 1956).  Yet external hiring proved insufficient in 
meeting the demand for talent, as pension plans with onerous vesting requirements, high 
marginal tax rates, and a lack of housing decreased the attractiveness of switching 
employers, even when competitors were able to offer higher salaries (Cappelli, 2010).  
The difficulty in finding external talent led companies to the realization that they 
needed to develop talent internally. With precious little experience doing so themselves, 
they turned to the military for help.  Recognizing the need for a huge expansion of its 
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officer ranks in a short period of time leading up to WWII, the Navy began what was 
arguably the first truly systematic effort at large scale succession planning, resulting in 
the publication of “Personnel Administration at the Executive Level” in 1948, which the 
Industrial Relations faculty at Princeton (1949) summarized as: 
A principally graphic report of the composite practices of 53 companies in regard to 
executive inventory control.  In these companies, reserves of trained executives are 
built up through five basic steps: (1) organization analysis, (2) selection, (3) 
evaluation, (4) development, and (5) inventory control. 
 
This document was widely used by many companies as the basis for building their 
own internal development programs (Business Week, 1949). These programs, in turn, 
served as the basis for the Organizational Man model of the 1950s in which expectations 
of lifetime employment and steady advancement opportunities emerged (Whyte, 1956). 
In 1943, the Conference Board could not find enough employers offering internal 
development programs to study them, yet by 1955 they were present in 60% of 
companies with 10,000 or more employees. Newcomer’s (1955) study of corporate 
executives found that 80% had been developed from within by 1950, compared to half in 
1900. As large companies came to increasingly rely on internal development to fill jobs, 
scholars became increasingly interested in understanding the operation of these new (at 
the time) internal labor markets. 
Internal Allocative Processes 
 The classic research on internal labor markets drew sharp distinctions between the 
bureaucratic processes for allocating human capital operating within the firm and the 
market processes operating outside the firm. Doeringer and Piore (1971) first defined 
internal labor markets in direct opposition to external labor markets. They describe an 
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internal labor market in “which the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of 
administrative rules and procedures . . . is to be distinguished from the external labor 
market of conventional economic theory where pricing, allocating, and training decisions 
are controlled directly be economic variables” (Doeringer & Piore, 1971, pp. 1–2).  
 This work described mobility within an internal labor market as occurring within 
a closed system, with jobs above entry level not freely available to outsiders (Althauser & 
Kalleberg, 1981; Sorensen & Kalleberg, 1981). Shielding workers from external 
competition encouraged the development of firm-specific skills, which in turn gave rise 
to an unprecedented level of employment stability for both workers and firms. As 
workers advanced within the firm, they developed firm specific human capital, examples 
of which include “familiarity with unique routines and procedures, tacit knowledge 
embedded in interpersonal relationships and corporate culture, skills specific to internal 
networks (team production), and the content of in-house training programs and on-the-job 
experience peculiar to the firm” (Groysberg, Lee, & Nanda, 2008, p. 1214). The nature of 
firm specific human capital – it is highly valued by the worker’s current employer but not 
transferrable to other firms (Becker, 1962) – created incentives for both firms and 
workers to develop employment systems supporting long-term employment. The lack of 
portability encouraged firms to invest in training and consequently to make a concerted 
effort stabilize employment and reduce turnover in order to capture the value created by 
those investments. Combined with a lack of external opportunities for advancement 
arising from limited ports of entry in other firms, the lack of portability likewise 
encouraged workers to value opportunites for steady upward advancement within a single 
firm (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Williamson, Wachter, & Harris, 1975). 
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 This dual desire for stability gave rise to bureaucratic (or administrative) rules 
governing mobility within internal labor markets. Bureaucratic rules refer to the criteria 
used to determine which workers are eligible to be considered when a vacancy arises as 
well as the criteria used to select among eligible workers. These rules, which emerged 
from a combination of union bargaining, customary practices, and efficiency 
considerations (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Kalleberg & Sorensen, 1979; Williamson et al., 
1975), limited the extent to which individual workers or managers could affect allocative 
decisions. As a result of supervisory, technical and other relations that existed among 
jobs, workers were expected to advance through a series of narrowly defined jobs located 
along clearly defined job ladders (Sorensen, 1983). Individual managers had little room 
to exert discretion, as allocative decisions were largely handled by centralized personnel 
offices and restricted by detailed selection criteria that often favored seniority over 
ability. These rules created stability in part by limiting conflicts among workers through 
reducing internal competition for advancement opportunities, increasing retention 
through promises of future advancement and removing disincentives for senior workers 
to withhold valuable on-job-training from more junior workers. A long line of literature 
has also documented how these rules played a central role in generating and sustaining 
gender inequalities in terms of pay and advancement by segregating women into 
marginalized jobs with limited opportunities for advancement  (Barnett, Baron, & Stuart, 
2000; Bridges & Nelson, 1989; Petersen, Saporta, & Seidel, 2005; Rosenfeld, 1992). 
 Of course, detailed examinations of mobility within organizations often revealed 
that actual internal labor markets operated in ways that differed from the ideal-type 
internal labor markets described by theory.  Hiring into various levels of the 
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organizational hierarchy, for example, was not uncommon, though it was not widespread 
(Rosen, 1988).  Advancement was not so severely restricted along well-defined job 
ladders (Diprete, 1987; J. E. Rosenbaum, 1990), nor were all jobs were located on job 
ladders (Baron, Davis-Blake, & Bielby, 1986). Managers took advantage of opportunities 
to influence allocative decisions even in the presence of bureaucratic rules governing 
advancement (Jacoby, 2004; Miner, 1987). However, even if bureaucratic rules did not 
perfectly shape mobility, they were shown to place considerable constraints on the set of 
internal moves available to workers and candidates considered by hiring managers. As 
Diprete noted, even in organizations where significant internal boundary crossing 
occurred, “the boundary crossing itself [was] structured” (1987: 442).  
The notion of structured advancement was also a central feature of much of the 
literature on intraorganizational careers, though this work paid more attention to 
organizational structures than allocative processes. Vacancy chain models of internal 
mobility were built on the assumption that advancement largely occurred through a series 
of vertically linked jobs (Chase, 1991; Sorensen, 1983; Stewman & Konda, 1983; 
Stewman, 1986). Tournament models of internal mobility in sociology revealed clear 
promotion patterns within organizations, with workers advancing along different paths 
depending on whether they won or lost promotion contests early in their organizational 
career (J. E. Rosenbaum, 1979a, 1979b). Tournament models of internal mobility in labor 
economics similarly assumed steady upward advancement in theorizing that wages can 
be optimally set in such a way that the size of gap between successive hierarchical levels 
will motivate individuals to exert maximum effort in order to “win” the competition for 
the next job (Lazear & Rosen, 1981).   
10 
 
 A key takeaway from this literature is that internal mobility was (and remains) 
largely understood as almost entirely a product of bureaucratic rules. Because these rules 
typically created “a limited and usually well-defined set of candidates” (Sorensen, 1983, 
p. 207) for open positions and allocative decisions were largely centralized, neither 
workers and managers had to actively seek out opportunities for advancement. For 
managers, the set of candidates to be considered was essentially pre-identified and for 
workers, advancement opportunities were limited by seniority and location on a well-
defined promotion hierarchy. These models, however, appear to bear little resemblance to 
contemporary internal labor markets in which “candidates as well as employers now 
actively seek information and opportunities to make good short-term matches inside the 
firm and to assemble them in ways that meet talent needs and lead to meaningful careers” 
(2008: 206–7).  
CONTEMPORARY EXTERNAL MOBILITY 
 Dramatic changes in the external competitive environment over the past quarter 
century have brought about equally dramatic changes in the organization of work and 
employment within firms (Cappelli, 1995, 1999; Jacoby, 2005). Rapidly shifting 
consumer demands, technological advancements, increasing global competition, and 
shareholder pressures to minimize costs have led organizations to place a premium on 
labor market flexibility, which has in turn led to the gradual dismantling of the structures 
and processes supporting the traditional, bureaucratic internal labor markets described 
above (Cappelli & Keller, 2014; Cappelli, 1999b; Osterman & Burton, 2005). While 
these changes have undoubtedly transformed nature of mobility within contemporary 
organizations, the most visible consequence has been a dramatic increase in mobility 
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across organizations. As a result, recent research has focused almost exclusively on 
external mobility, as described below. 
 The steady decline in job tenure (particularly in the United Sates) over the last 
thirty-plus years has been particularly well documented (Bidwell, 2013; Farber, 2008; 
Hollister, 2011). One way scholars have responded is by detailing the evolution of new 
career structures spanning multiple organizations. The two most prominent models of 
contemporary careers are boundaryless and protean careers (Briscoe & Hall, 2006), both 
of which emphasize that individuals, rather than firms, are in control of their careers. 
Career typically span multiple employers and change in response to individual desires as 
well as shifting market conditions (Sullivan & Baruch, 2009). Bidwell and Briscoe (2010: 
16) demonstrate that external moves often follow a coherent, structured logic, “as 
workers link together jobs across different kinds of organizations to match their evolving 
career needs”.  Contract employment arrangements – in which workers perform work for 
an organization without being employed by that organization – have also gained 
prominence in both high skill (e.g. IT) and low skill (e.g. clerical) occupations (Abraham 
& Taylor, 1996; Stephen R Barley & Kunda, 2004), with a related body of literature 
exploring how workers stitch these arrangements into a cohesive career tapestry (S.R. 
Barley & Kunda, 2006; Handy, 1989; O’Mahony & Bechky, 2006).  
 Others have highlighted the negative consequences of shorter tenure for workers, 
noting that decreasing tenure is not merely a result of changing worker preferences. 
Rather, workers have had to take control of their careers because firms are no longer 
willing or able to provide any assurance of continued employment, employers have 
encouraged workers to take control of their careers (Cappelli, 1999a). This work has 
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explored, for example, the myriad ways in which increased job insecurity has the 
potential to undermine social stability (Cappelli, 1999b; Davis, 2009), change household 
dynamics (Nelson, 2010), and exacerbate the unequal distribution of rewards (McCall & 
Percheski, 2010). 
 Strategy researchers have identified several ways in which external hiring can 
benefit firms, viewing “mobile employees [as] repositories of skills, routines, and 
knowledge that they carry with them from their prior employer to their new employer . . . 
[and] tends to find that hiring firms gain from importing these employees” (Corredoira & 
Rosenkopf, 2010, p. 159)2. Firms gain by acquiring knowledge (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 
2003; Song, Almeida, & Wu, 2003), implementing strategic changes (Kraatz & Moore, 
2002), and increasing the rate of innovation (Rao & Drazin, 2002). Hiring is also a key 
mechanism through which firms gain access to and leverage social capital for influence 
(Dokko & Rosenkopf, 2010); acquire new business (Somaya, Williamson, & Lorinkova, 
2008); and weaken competitors through poaching (Chacar & Coff, 2000; Somaya et al., 
2008). At the top of the organization, hiring is an exercise in impression management 
(Graffin, Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011)and thus may provide status and legitimacy benefits 
through its effect on how the firm is perceived by external stakeholders (Finkelstein, 
Hambrick, & Cannella, 2009; Khurana, 2002). 
External Allocative Processes 
In addition to those literatures documenting the increase in external mobility and its 
causes and consequences, a particular stream of research has focused on illuminating the 
                                                            
2 This is not a universally held view among strategy scholars, however. For example, a foundation 
of the knowledge-based view of the firm is the notion that “hiring new workers is not equivalent 
to changing the skills of a firm” (Kogut & Zander, 1992, p. 383). 
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processes by which workers and firms search for potential matches in the external labor 
market. This work tends to conceptualize external hiring as the outcome of a two-sided 
search. Because “there is simply no such thing as a centralized market for buyers and 
sellers of labor to meet and trade at a single price” (Rogerson, Shimer, & Wright, 2005), 
firms and workers must actively seek out alternatives, with firms searching for workers 
and workers searching for job openings. On both the supply and demand side, these 
search processes tend to fall into two broad categories, those which are more market-
oriented and those which are more network-oriented. In terms of understanding their 
effects on a variety of labor market outcomes, the hiring processes of firms have received 
considerably more attention than have the job search strategies of workers.   
Supply-side processes. Empirical investigations of worker’s job search behaviors 
reveal that the two main processes by which workers search for jobs are through personal 
connections, including friends (and friends of friends), relatives, classmates and 
colleagues, other members of their personal network, and by directly applying to open 
jobs (Addison & Portugal, 2002; Holzer, 1987). Using a personal network is typically 
classified as an informal, network-oriented search process, while direct applications are 
classified as a formal, market-oriented search process. About half of all US workers find 
their jobs through their personal network (Crispin & Mehler, 2013; Topa, 2011).  
Though scholars have long recognized the distinction between network and market 
job search strategies, the vast majority of research has compared the outcomes of workers 
with different network structures (or different levels of social resources) as opposed to 
comparing the labor market outcomes of job seekers that obtained their jobs via personal 
contacts with job seekers that found their jobs through more formal means. A notable 
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exception is Granovetter’s (1974, 1982) seminal study of the strategies used by active job 
seekers, which suggested that network searches are more effective than market searches 
at navigating workers into better jobs characterized by high job satisfaction and earnings 
(Drentea, 1998). Though limited, there is also some evidence that conditional on its use, 
network search is more likely to result in a job offer (Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997; 
Holzer, 1988; Silliker, 1993) and slightly higher starting salaries3 (Burks, Cowgill, 
Hoffman, & Housman, 2013; Seidel, Polzer, & Stewart, 2000). Drentea (1998) compared 
the jobs obtained by men and women using different search processes and found that 
network search was more likely to steer women into lower status, female dominated jobs, 
but found that men were not more or less likely to be steered into male dominated jobs. 
Demand-side processes. The external recruiting and hiring practices of firms have 
received considerably more attention, with an abundance of literature demonstrating that 
a firm’s choice of hiring processes “can influence the interest of prospective job 
applicants in a job opening and the ability of the individuals it hires, their diversity, their 
job performance, and their retention” (Breaugh, 2013, p. 24). The two most commonly 
studied hiring process are the use of referrals and job postings. As above, the use of 
referrals is typically classified as an informal, network-oriented search process, while job 
postings are classified as a formal, market-oriented search process (Marsden, 1994).  
For firms, the use of referrals has several benefits. First, it is often substantially 
quicker and less expensive to hire through referrals as compared to engaging in a formal 
search (Marsden, 1994), even when accounting for referral bonuses (Fernandez, Castilla, 
                                                            
3 The evidence on starting salaries is decidedly mixed, with other studies finding minimal 
differences in starting salaries (Bridges & Villemez, 1986; Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988) 
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& Moore, 2000).  Second, due to the fact that referrals have access to better information 
about the job and the firm, they are more likely to receive and accept job offers (Burks et 
al., 2013; Fernandez & Weinberg, 1997). Third, both because the use of referrals allow 
firms to reach a richer, more qualified pool of candidates that might otherwise not apply 
and because referring employees are able to provide immediate social support to the new 
hires, referrals tend to outperform hires made though the formal posting process and are 
less likely to quit (Burks et al., 2013; Fernandez et al., 2000; Fernandez & Weinberg, 
1997).  
Employees can also use referrals to their advantage, as having a contact within an 
organization at the time of hire can provide access to information the job seeker can use 
to more effectively negotiate a higher salary (Seidel et al., 2000). However, because 
social networks are often homogenous (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), the use 
of referrals tends to replicate an organization’s demographic composition (Braddock & 
McPartland, 1987). Because women and minorities remain underrepresent in managerial 
roles and overrepresented in lower-level and marginalized roles, the use of referrals may 
substantially reduce the advancement opportunities available to women and minorities 
(Reskin & McBrier, 2000).  
 A key takeaway from this literature is that different external allocative processes, 
particularly those operating on the demand-side, play a central role in shaping a number 
of important outcomes, such as who gets hired, how much they are paid, how well they 
perform, and how long they stay. Below, I describe how this insight can be used to 
inform our understanding of internal mobility in contemporary organizations.  
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CONTEMPORARY INTERNAL MOBILITY   
 The same changes that have led to a dramatic increase in mobility across 
organizations have also transformed the processes used to facilitate mobility within 
organizations, with the use of bureaucratic rules being replaced by market- and network-
oriented process mirroring those operating in the external market. 
Changes in Internal Hiring Processes 
 The flattening of organizational hierarchies due to cuts in middle management 
(Rajan & Wulf, 2006) combined with broader job definitions (Grant & Parker, 2009) has 
led to the gradual disappearance of well-defined job ladders (Grimshaw, Ward, Rubery, 
& Beynon, 2001). Ports of entry are no longer restricted to lower-level jobs or 
occupations, as employers now hire externally into almost all kinds of jobs at all levels of 
organizations (Jacoby, 2005; Royal & Althauser, 2003). Personnel decisions have been 
largely decentralized, with decisions on promotions, transfers, and new hires being 
delegated to individual managers (Cappelli, 1999b). No longer willing or able to provide 
any assurance of stable employment, employers have encouraged workers to take control 
of their careers. Whereas bureaucratic rules were designed to reinforce organizational 
structures and ensure stability (Weber, 1958), organizations now operate in an uncertain 
environment where maintaining flexibility is seen as paramount. Piore (2002: 275) 
summarizes the cumulative effect of these changes quite succinctly in noting that “in the 
new environment, the mix of labor requirements was no longer stable; and the 
organizational structures began to shift in a direction which was no longer compatible 
with the bureaucratic rules of the internal labor market”. 
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 A notable consequence of these changes is that lacking clear rules or structures to 
guide advancement, it is unclear how employees should go about building careers within 
firms. Retention concerns and rapidly changing product markets have made employer 
investments in career development costly and uncertain, reducing their availability to 
workers. Employees, having gained significant control over their careers, “do not want to 
be ‘developed’ along the lines of the older model, in which the employer shaped careers 
to serve its own goals and the individuals had no choice in the matter” (Cappelli, 2008, p. 
206). Moreover, having long ago abdicated responsibility for developing workers, firms 
themselves have difficulty understanding how employees advance within their own 
organizations. As a result, firms and workers must now search for matches within the 
firm, just as they do in the external labor market. As Cappelli describes, in the absence of 
clear avenues for advancement, “candidates as well as employers now actively seek 
information and opportunities to make good short-term matches inside the firm and to 
assemble them in ways that meet talent needs and lead to meaningful careers” (2008: 
206–7).  
 Though detailed studies of internal hiring processes in contemporary 
organizations are scarce, a small handful of descriptive studies reveal that, absent 
bureaucratic rules governing internal mobility, matches are primarily generated through 
two demand-side processes - posting and sponsorship.  
Posting 
 Posting is a formal, market-oriented process in which a hiring manager posts an 
open job and interested employees apply. Though job posting systems have existed since 
the 1940s mainly in union workplaces (Slichter, Healy, & Livernash, 1960), their 
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widespread adoption is a recent phenomenon. Less than half of companies posted 
anything other than blue-collar jobs in the mid-1980s, a figure that rose to 60 percent in 
1999 before exploding to over 95 percent in the mid-to-late-2000s (Dobbin, Schrage, & 
Kalev, 2014; Kleiman & Clark, 1984; Taleo Research, 2005). 
 Moreover, the systems in place today look very different from their predecessors. 
In the early days of factory production, managers were able to exert direct control over 
workers and possessed the unilateral authority to pick who got what jobs (Cappelli, 2008, 
p. 207; Edwards, 1979). Hiring, promotion, and transfer decisions were largely 
determined by favoritism and prejudice as opposed to ability, a situation that was clearly 
disadvantageous to workers. Yet while unions were successful in earlier efforts to wrestle 
some control over the terms of employment from management, management retained 
near exclusive rights over promotion and transfer decisions until the period just before 
and after World War II. Early collective bargaining agreements permitted workers to file 
grievances against discrimination, favoritism, and nepotism, but the burden of proof 
rested with the union, making such claims difficult to substantiate. Unions eventually 
sought to curtail managerial discretion over staffing decisions in an effort to combat 
perceived managerial abuses. This was accomplished, in part, through the establishment 
of job posting systems (Slichter et al., 1960). 
 Union desire for job posting systems stemmed from the belief that the 
transparency of the process, in combination with clear advancement criteria, would make 
it more difficult for management to treat workers unfairly and that such instances would 
be easier to identify and challenge when they did occur. Management, not surprisingly 
saw such a system as requiring them to relinquish a long-held right, so they fought to 
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limit its scope. As a result, bidding was frequently limited to a narrowly defined set of 
workers, often those within a specific department or unit, and employees were often 
allowed to bid for promotions but not transfers. Even in manufacturing plants where 
employees were aware of the existence of job posting systems, the available methods for 
posting jobs – posting on bulletin boards and in cafeterias, elevators and mailrooms and 
the use of public address announcements – did little to ensure eligible workers across the 
organization were made aware of them (O’Farrell, 1980; Shaeffer & Lynton, 1979).  For 
those jobs that were covered, detailed selection criteria were established and often 
privileged seniority over ability, providing individual managers with little choice over 
whom to hire (Jacoby, 1985; Slichter et al., 1960).   
Contemporary job posting systems are much more encompassing and, as a result, 
have the potential to create a true market for talent within firms. Managers post 
information about open jobs located throughout the organization to an internal job board 
and invite interested candidates to apply. While C-suite jobs are rarely if ever posted, 
managerial jobs up to and including the level just below the executive suite often are. 
Restrictions governing who can apply are increasingly rare (e.g. tenure requirements or 
requiring permission from a current manager). Candidates are free to evaluate available 
opportunities and pursue those that meet their needs and preferences by submitting an 
application. The listed qualifications are likely to shape who applies, though candidates 
who lack one or more qualifications but nevertheless would like to be considered are still 
able to submit an application. The hiring manager extends an offer to their preferred 
candidate, who then has the option of negotiating, accepting, or declining the opportunity. 
Once the manager and worker agree to the terms of exchange, an internal hire is 
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completed. In many ways, the posting process closely resembles a market-based external 
hiring process, with the notable difference that it is typical for unsuccessful internal 
candidates to be notified and provided with the opportunity to learn why they were not 
selected (R. A. Miller, 1984; Pinfield, 1995).  
Many organizations have developed policies encouraging managers to post open 
positions internally, in large part to protect themselves from allegations of discrimination 
(Grensing-Pophal, 2006; Strum, 2001). However, because internal staffing policies are 
rarely enforced and often allow for flexible interpretations (Pinfield, 1995; Wallrapp, 
1981) managers can and often do bypass the posting system. In fact, as noted in an 
influential white paper published by the Society of Human Resource Management, the 
leading professional association for human resource professionals, “even if you have an 
internal process for posting available jobs, there may be times when you decide not to 
follow this process” (SHRM, 2000: 7).   
Sponsorship 
The primary alternative to posting is a relational process I refer to as sponsorship4. 
Social networks are a central feature of organizational life, as interactions among 
individuals inevitably lead workers to develop networks of personal relationships 
(Kanter, 1977; McEvily, Soda, & Tortoriello, 2014; Podolny & Baron, 1997). A 
sponsoring manager uses their personal social network to identify potential candidates 
and then appoints their preferred candidate to the job absent open competition. Though it 
                                                            
4 I adopt the term sponsorship from the classic literatures on intra-organizational mobility 
(Rosenbaum, 1979a) and upward social mobility more generally (Turner, 1960), in which it is 
used to describe systems in which individuals selected for advancement are shielded from 
competition. 
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is possible for sponsoring managers to exhaust their personal connections as they search 
for potential candidates, the vast majority of internal hires made through sponsorship 
involve the consideration of a single candidate with a direct connection to the hiring 
manager, typically a current or previous colleague (Pinfield, 1995). 
Like posting, sponsorship has a long history in organizations, though it looks 
quite different today than in its previous incarnations. As noted above, in the early days 
of factory production, individual managers had nearly unlimited discretion over 
promotion and transfer decisions and often filled those jobs with workers they knew 
personally or workers of the same race or ethnicity (Jacoby, 2004). Once bureaucratic 
rules were put into place5, centralized personnel departments created shortlists for hiring 
managers to use to pick internal candidates. Provided a manager had a personal 
connection with one or more of these candidates, they had some, albeit limited, discretion 
to fill jobs with a preferred member of their social network.  The notion of a sponsorship 
process whereby hiring managers create their own list of candidates, however, appears to 
be rather new.   
 It is important to note that while posting and sponsorship are conceptually distinct 
internal allocative processes, sponsorship may sometimes masquerade as posting in 
practice. That is, it is possible that a manager may post a job having already identified the 
candidate they are going to select through their social network, a practice referred to as a 
“wired search” (Bielby, 2000).  However, the prevalence of “wired searches” and other 
practices that might artificially restrict the openness of the posting process, such as 
                                                            
5 This process actually dates back as far as the 1920s in some large companies, such as General 
Electric (Cappelli, 2010; Loth, 1958) 
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shaping job requirements around a single candidate or discouraging employees from 
applying for certain jobs, are largely mitigated by concerns about allegations of 
discrimination (Strum, 2001) as well as the possibility that employees who feel they were 
mistreated or misled will simply leave the organization (Billsberry, 2007). 
 An abundance of evidence suggests that posting and sponsorship operate side-by-
side within firms, as equally viable ways to fill jobs. Marsden and Gorman (1999) 
examined survey data on a representative sample of US work establishments and found 
that posting and sponsorship were widely used in combination for filling vacancies with 
internal candidates. Pinfield’s (1995) ethnographic study of internal hiring in a forest-
products company revealed that more than half of all positions were filled through 
sponsorship despite company policy that all jobs be posted. Moreover, though the vast 
majority of firms post at least some open jobs, research continues to demonstrate the 
importance of relationships on internal advancement (Ibarra, 1995; Podolny & Baron, 
1997).  
Importance of Internal Hiring and Mobility  
From the descriptions above, it is clear that posting and sponsorship differ in 
several ways. Yet while recent work has explored differences in internal and external 
hiring (Bidwell & Keller, 2014; Bidwell, 2011) and variations among external hiring 
processes (e.g. Fernandez et al., 2000), this work has tended to treat internal hiring as a 
homogeneous process, unintentionally obscuring potential variations in the processes 
used to move workers to new jobs within firms. Exploring how these different processes 
shape outcomes such as who gets hired and the quality of the matches created within 
firms seems like a promising line of inquiry given the recent research showing that 
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market and network search process affect these outcomes in the context of external 
hiring.  
 Moreover, a substantial amount of mobility takes place within organizations. A 
decade of data on organizational hiring practices reveals that firms have been and 
continue to rely on a nearly equal combination internal and external hiring to fill open 
jobs, with external hiring dominating at lower levels and internal hiring dominating at 
higher levels. Figures are difficult to come by, but a handful of survey data suggest that 
about a third of  non-managerial jobs, half of managerial jobs, and three-quarters of 
executive jobs are filled internally (Crispin & Mehler, 2013; Jacoby, 2005; Taleo 
Research, 2005). Though recent work has focused almost exclusively on external 
mobility, it is clear that internal and external mobility represent equally important 
building blocks of individual careers and firm talent management strategies.  
 Furthermore, there are reasons to expect that the strategic importance of internal 
hiring will continue to increase. Though strategy scholars have extolled the myriad 
benefits associated with external hiring, fully realizing their potential value can be quite 
difficult. Information asymmetries result in external candidates being paid a significant 
premium compared with internal candidates at all levels of the organization (Agrawal, 
Knoeber, & Tsoulouhas, 2006; Bidwell, 2011). Firms require stronger signals of 
observable ability from external candidates, but these signals often fail to translate into 
higher levels of performance (Bidwell, 2011). It takes substantial time for external hires 
to build the intrafirm social networks so often critical to performance (Groysberg et al., 
2008; Huckman & Pisano, 2006).  Socio-cognitive barriers also attenuate the 
performance of new hires, as individuals often have trouble overcoming institutional and 
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cognitive rigidities developed at prior employers (Dokko, Wilk, & Rothbard, 2009). 
Moreover, filling strategic jobs through external hiring may be perceived as a negative 
signal by external stakeholders, leading to negative stock market reactions (Groysberg et 
al., 2008).  
 This work suggests that internal mobility represents a critical yet overlooked 
source of value creation, enabling managers to generate greater value from their existing 
stock of human resources by creating complementary matches between people and jobs. 
For example, internal mobility facilitates the transfer of existing knowledge across 
internal boundaries (Argote & Ingram, 2000), motivates employees by signaling 
opportunities for future advancement (Bidwell & Keller, 2014), encourages the 
development of firm-specific skills (Campion, Cheraskin, & Stevens, 1994), increases 
worker satisfaction, performance and productivity (Jackson, 2013), and decreases 
dysfunctional turnover (Allen, Bryant, & Vardaman, 2010). Given the difficulties 
associated with creating value through external hiring as well as the benefits associated 
with internal hiring, it is not surprising that firms have begun to make substantial 
investments in developing their internal hiring capabilities (Murthy, 2013; Schawbel, 
2012).   
THEORY AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In an effort to provide a more complete understanding of labor markets and 
mobility, I use this dissertation to explore how key difference between posting and 
sponsorship shape the fortunes of firms and workers. Specifically, I highlight the 
mechanisms by which posting and sponsorship affect the ability of firms to create and 
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capture value and the impact of these process on gender inequalities in advancement and 
pay within organizations.   
Value Creation and Value Capture 
 In the first study, I extend recent work in the field of strategy seeking to 
understanding how firms create and capture value through the strategic allocation of 
resources (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007; Sirmon, Hitt, Ireland, & Gilbert, 2011), which 
include an organization’s current stock of human capital (Campbell, Coff, & Kryscynski, 
2012; Coff & Kryscynski, 2011). I develop theory to explain how key differences 
between the market-oriented posting process and relationship-oriented sponsorship 
process affect two outcomes with implications for value creation and value capture: 
quality of hire – as revealed by job performance, turnover, and subsequent advancement 
– and compensation. Specifically, I highlight that posting is characterized by two market-
like features – self-selection and formality – that are largely absent in sponsorship, which 
instead involves active managerial search and a reliance on personnel connections for 
gathering information. 
 I argue that introducing these two market features into the firm improves hiring 
decisions by helping managers to overcome challenges associated with generating and 
evaluating alternatives. Specifically, self-selection should generate a larger pool of 
alternatives, reducing the likelihood and exceptional alternative will be overlooked. 
Formality, on the other hand should encourage managers to both incorporate relevant 
information and avoid irrelevant information as they evaluate candidate qualifications 
against the requirements of the jobs. Moreover, employees hired through the more 
competitive posting should be less likely to adopt a relational orientation to salary 
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negotiations and therefore more likely to both initiate a negotiation and adopt a more 
effective, competitive approach when doing so.  
 Consistent with this account, I find that posting results in better hires by managers 
and higher salaries for workers. Posting enables firms to both create and capture 
substantially more value than sponsorship, as the combined performance and retention 
benefits associated with better internal hires are likely to far exceed the higher salary 
costs. The posting premium suggests that workers also share in the increased value 
creation, earning higher salaries for equivalent work. On the whole, the results suggest 
that from a value creation and value capture perspective, posting is far superior to 
sponsorship for both firms and workers. 
Gender Inequality 
While women have made substantial gains in the labor market, they continue to 
occupy a disproportionate number of  low-level and undervalued jobs (Cohen, 2013) and 
are still paid less than men for similar work (Goldin, 2014; Petersen & Morgan, 1995). A 
small but influential body of work has emerged to explore whether and how the many 
recent changes to employment structures and processes have been successful in reducing 
longstanding gender inequalities in the workplace (Castilla, 2008, 2012; Dencker, 2008; 
Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Kalev, 2009). In the second study, I extend this literature 
by exploring how posting and sponsorship shape the organizational careers of women.  
I first argue that by providing unrestricted access to information about potential 
advancement opportunities and providing a formal mechanism through which women can 
make their qualifications known to potential hiring managers, posting will enhance 
women’s opportunities for advancement overcoming the limited visibility and access to 
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informal strategic networks imposed by the segregation of women into marginalized jobs. 
Indeed, I find that workers in lower status, less visible female dominated jobs are 
significantly more likely to advance via the formal, market-oriented posting process than 
they are the informal, relationship-oriented sponsorship process.  
I also argue that the transactional nature of the posting process should help to 
reduce within-job gender wage disparities by reducing women’s reluctance both to 
initiate salary negotiations and to negotiate competitively when they choose to negotiate. 
Consistent with this reasoning, I find that when observationally equivalent men and 
women are hired into the same job through sponsorship, women are paid almost 2% less 
than men, but that this gender gap disappears entirely when a job is filled through 
posting. Together with the findings related to advancement, the theory and results suggest 
that posting has the potential to reduce longstanding gender inequalities in both 
advancement and pay.  
However, there are reasons to expect that posting may fail to live up to this 
promise. I argue that despite appearing to be gender-neutral, the posting process is 
implicitly gendered, constructed on assumptions about appropriate behavior that are 
likely to discourage women from applying to posted jobs. Specifically, the posting 
process requires employees to enter into a competition, engage in self-promotion, and 
make judgments about the extent to which they are qualified for an open job. These very 
attributes may discourage women from participating in the posting process because 
research has demonstrated that women are more reluctant than men to enter competitions 
and engage in self-promotion, and are more likely than men to follow rules. Indeed, I find 
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that a woman occupying the same job as an equally qualified man is 10 to 20 percent less 
likely to apply for a posted job. 
Taken together, these studies provide a more complete picture of modern job 
mobility and demonstrate the value in paying closer attention to the dynamics of internal 
mobility in contemporary organizations.   
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CHAPTER 2: HOW MANAGERS CREATE VALUE THROUGH INTERNAL HIRING 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Amid conversations about boundaryless careers, free-agent workers and hired 
guns, it is easy to forget that a substantial amount of mobility still takes place within 
organizations. In fact, nearly half of all open jobs in large organizations - and 
substantially more at the executive levels - are filled internally (e.g. Crispin & Mehler, 
2013). Internal hiring is the primary process used to allocate human resources within 
firms and creates opportunities for internal mobility, which serves many useful functions. 
It facilitates the transfer of knowledge across internal boundaries (Argote & Ingram, 
2000), motivates employees by signaling opportunities for future advancement (Bidwell 
& Keller, 2014), encourages the development of firm-specific skills (Campion et al., 
1994), increases worker satisfaction, performance and productivity (Jackson, 2013), and 
decreases dysfunctional turnover (Allen et al., 2010). With human resources now 
representing the most important resource in most firms (Powell & Snellman, 2004) and in 
light of recent research demonstrating the high costs and even higher failure rates 
associated with external hires at all organizational levels (e.g. Bidwell, 2011; Groysberg, 
Lee, & Nanda, 2008), the ability to find and create complementary matches between 
people and jobs within the firm represents a key source of value creation in modern 
organizations (Zenger et al., 2011).  
While scholars have explored how other key resources, such as financial capital 
(e.g. Stein, 1997) and managerial attention (e.g. Ocasio, 1997), are allocated within firms, 
we know surprisingly little about the contemporary internal allocation of human 
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resources. Recent work has documented how job characteristics shape both whether a job 
is likely to be filled internally (Bidwell & Keller, 2014) and the qualifications (e.g. 
experience) of the candidates likely to be placed into the job (Drazin & Rao, 2002). Yet 
internal hiring processes – that is, the ways in which managers search for, evaluate, and 
select among potential internal candidates – have received little systematic attention. 
However, research has shown that the use of formal versus informal external hiring 
processes (e.g. the use of referrals versus job postings) shapes not only who is hired, but 
also their pay, performance, and turnover (Burks et al., 2013; Fernandez et al., 2000; 
Seidel et al., 2000), as has recent research comparing internal versus external hiring 
(Agrawal et al., 2006; Bidwell, 2011). We therefore might expect any variations among 
internal hiring processes to have similarly significant consequences for both workers and 
firms. 
Studying internal hiring also promises to contribute important insights to ongoing 
conversations about the changing nature of internal resource allocation more generally. 
As firm have transitioned away from hierarchical structures characterized by centralized 
decision-making and towards flatter, leaner structures characterized by decentralized 
decision-making,  bureaucratic internal labor markets have gradually disintegrated 
(Cappelli & Keller, 2014), internal markets and social networks have emerged as the 
primary mechanisms through with current workers are matched to new jobs, echoing 
broader changes in how resources are allocated within organizations. Indeed, the failures 
of bureaucratic planning systems in contemporary firms have received considerable 
attention (Cowen & Parker, 1997; McEvily et al., 2014; Mintzberg, 1994), with recent 
work identifying internal markets and network forms of coordination as the two primary 
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substitutes for bureaucratic control over the allocation of key resources. Work on internal 
markets has generally emphasized how the use of market pricing within the firm may 
lead to improved managerial decision-making regarding resource allocation, as all of the 
information regarding the resource being considered is reflected in its price (Ellig, 2001; 
Felin & Zenger, 2011). Other work on internal markets has explored how high-powered 
incentives can be designed to reduce coordination costs by aligning the interests of 
managers making allocative decisions with the interests of the firm (Zenger & Hesterly, 
1997; Zenger, 2002). Work on network forms of coordination has emphasized how the 
social relationships among actors within the firm can lead to improved allocative 
decisions by providing managers with opportunities to share information on resources 
that would be otherwise unavailable to centralized, higher-level decision-makers 
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). Because internal markets and social 
networks have been presented as alternatives to bureaucratic control, much of the current 
literature has either compared internal markets with bureaucratic control (e.g. Stein, 
1997) or compared social networks with bureaucratic control (e.g. Tsai, 2002). Much less 
work has explored the tradeoffs associated with using internal markets or personal 
networks to allocate internal resources, despite the fact that market mechanisms and 
social networks are likely to operate simultaneously within firms.  
Contemporary internal labor markets represent a particularly fruitful context for 
exploring these tradeoffs. Much of our understanding of internal hiring and mobility is 
grounded in the foundational research on traditional, hierarchal internal labor markets and 
a closely related literature on intraorganizational careers, which drew sharp distinctions 
between the bureaucratic processes for allocating human capital operating within the firm 
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and the market processes operating outside the firm. This work described how internal 
hiring decisions were centralized in personnel offices and governed by strict bureaucratic 
rules used to maintain lines of progression along clearly defined job ladders, with 
employees exerting little control over their careers within the firm (Althauser & 
Kalleberg, 1981; Glaser, 1968; Diprete, 1987; Doeringer & Piore, 1971; Rosenbaum, 
1990). Contemporary internal labor markets look dramatically different: hiring decisions 
having been largely decentralized, with authority over promotions, transfers and external 
hiring delegated to individual managers; organizational delayering, broader job 
descriptions, and the rise of project-based work have all but eliminated clear paths for 
advancement; and employees have been tasked with taking control of their careers. The 
cumulative effect of these changes has rendered the use of bureaucratic rules for 
allocating human resources obsolete (Piore, 2002).  
Absent bureaucratic rules, the allocation of workers to jobs now takes place 
through two very different processes (Marsden & Gorman, 1999; Pinfield, 1995). Posting 
is a market-oriented process. A manager creates an internal market for an open job by 
broadcasting information about the position throughout the organization via an internal 
job board and inviting current employees to apply. The use of internal job posting 
systems is widespread, with 95% of organizations posting jobs internally (Taleo 
Research, 2005). Sponsorship is a more relational process. A manager identifies a 
candidate through her personal network and appoints that candidate to the job without 
others being formally considered. Not only are posting and sponsorship the two most 
commonly used internal hiring processes, they often operate concurrently within firms, as 
managers have been granted substantial discretion both over the hiring decision and the 
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hiring process (Marsden & Gorman, 1999; Pinfield, 1995). With little if any work 
examining internal hiring in contemporary organizations, it is unclear whether a market-
oriented or relationship-oriented allocative process is more likely to generate more 
valuable internal matches and what tradeoffs, if any, might be associated with the use of 
posting versus sponsorship.  
In this paper, I shed light on these tradeoffs by developing theory to explain how 
key differences between the market-oriented posting process and relationship-oriented 
sponsorship process affect two outcomes with implications for value creation and value 
capture: quality of hire – as revealed by job performance, turnover, and subsequent 
advancement – and compensation. Though the informational benefits associated with 
social networks have received considerable attention (Borgatti & Cross, 2003; Bradach & 
Eccles, 1989; R. Cross, Parker, Prusak, & Borgatti, 2001; Granovetter, 1985), I predict 
that the market-oriented posting process will improve managerial decision-making 
relative to the more relational sponsorship process, creating more value though higher 
quality internal hires. In doing so, I describe how posting brings two features of markets 
into the firm that are largely absent in sponsorship – self-selection and formality. The 
behavioral theory of the firm highlights two key challenges facing boundedly rational 
decision makers, identifying a set of alternatives and evaluating the consequences of 
those alternatives (Cyert & March, 1963; Simon, 1955). I argue that in contrast to the 
active managerial search required in sponsorship, allowing workers to self-select into the 
consideration set for an open job reduces the likelihood an exceptional internal candidate 
will be overlooked.  Moreover, when compared to the relative informality of a 
relationship-oriented allocative process, the formality of the market will encourage 
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managers to seek out information that allows them to better evaluate the fit between a 
candidate’s qualifications and the requirements of the job, while also limiting the use of 
irrelevant information that may lead to poor hiring decisions.  
However, I also predict that these same market features will lead to higher salaries 
though their effect on salary negotiations, limiting the amount of value a firm is able to 
capture through better internal hiring decisions. Self-selection and formality introduce 
open competition into the internal hiring process. While competition often drives down 
prices in external markets, I argue that it will serve to increase prices for human capital 
within the firm, as candidates who are hired though a competitive process are more likely 
to both initiate and adopt a competitive approach to salary negotiations.  
Taken together, these predictions suggest that there are important tradeoffs 
associated with allocating human capital formally though markets or informally through 
the use of a manager’s social network, with posting resulting in better hires but at a 
higher cost. However, with the performance and retention benefits associated with better 
internal hires likely to far exceed the higher salary costs, posting is likely to allow firms 
to both create and capture substantially more value. These arguments suggest that a 
market-oriented process will also benefit workers, who similarly capture more value 
through higher salaries.  
I use multiple modeling strategies in testing these predictions, which are largely 
supported using five years (2008-2012) of personnel records covering all employees of a 
large health insurance provider, as well as data on more than 350,000 internal and 
external job applications. While personnel records have been previously used to identify 
which employees move to which jobs (Bidwell, 2011; Dencker, 2008), data on the 
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processes by which workers move jobs is rare. These data are distinctive in that they 
clearly identify the mechanism used to facilitate each of the 11,000+ internal hires made 
during this period, allowing me to conduct what is, to my knowledge, the first detailed 
study of the differences in outcomes associated with these two very different internal 
hiring processes.  
In unpacking the processes used to allocate workers to jobs within contemporary 
organizations, this study helps to provide a more complete understanding of labor 
markets and mobility. While robust literatures are developing to explore outcomes 
associated with different external hiring processes (e.g. Fernandez et al., 2000) as well as 
the cost and quality tradeoffs associated with internal versus external hiring (e.g. Bidwell, 
2011), this work has tended to treat internal hiring as a homogeneous process, 
unintentionally obscuring potential variations in the processes used to move workers to 
new jobs within firms. More broadly, this study contributes to a growing body of 
literature exploring how resources are bundled and deployed within contemporary 
organizations (Sirmon, Gove, & Hitt, 2008; Sirmon & Hitt, 2009) by highlighting the 
tradeoffs associated with using  markets versus network approaches for allocating 
internal resources. This study extends recent work exploring the effects of introducing 
market mechanisms into firms (Felin & Zenger, 2011) by showing how mechanisms 
other than prices and high-powered incentives can be leveraged to improve managerial 
decision-making, while also adding to a small but important collection of studies which 
highlight the potential limitations of relational exchange (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008; Rogan 
& Sorenson, 2014; Sorenson & Waguespack, 2006).  Moreover, in identifying the micro-
level mechanisms (decision-making and negotiations) through which these two distinct 
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organizational processes shape outcomes  which link directly to value creation and value 
capture (quality of hire and compensation), this study contributes to a burgeoning 
literature focused on identifying the micro-foundations of human-resource based 
competitive advantage (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011; Ployhart & Hale, 2014). 
THEORY & HYPOTHESES 
Internal hiring occurs when a manager fills an open job by hiring a worker 
currently employed by the organization in a different job, resulting in the reallocation of 
that worker to a new set of organizational activities. In developing theory to understand 
the tradeoffs between the two internal hiring process at the center of this study, I 
highlight the fact that posting is characterized by two market-like features, self-selection 
and formality, that are largely absent in sponsorship, which instead involves active 
managerial search and using personnel connections to gather information. I then explore 
the effects of the difference on quality of hire and salary a worker receives upon entering 
a new job within the firm.  
Bounded Rationality and Quality of Hire 
A key facet of behavioral theories of the firm is the presumption that decision-
makers are boundedly rational. Because decision-makers are cognitively limited and have 
limited time, information, and resources at their disposal, neither the complete set of 
alternatives from which a decision maker can choose is known ex ante, nor are the 
consequences involved in choosing among the available alternatives (March & Simon, 
1958). As a result, failures in generating and evaluating alternatives have been identified 
as two of the chief reasons why managers fail to optimally allocate available resources 
(Afuah & Tucci, 2012; Knudsen & Levinthal, 2007).  
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Self-selection and generating alternatives. Because the complete set of 
alternatives is not known ex ante, boundedly rational decision-makers must engage in 
search to generate alternatives. Search not costless, however, and one of the ways 
decision-makers economize is by considering only a small portion of available 
alternatives (Hauser & Wernerfelt, 1990; Shocker, Ben-Akiva, Boccara, & Nedungadi, 
1991). While considering more alternatives does not guarantee a better decision (Iyengar 
& Kamenica, 2010), decision-making success does tend to improve when more 
alternatives are considered (Alexander, 1979; Gemünden & Hauschildt, 1985; Nutt, 
1998), in part because it lessens the odds that a superior alternative will be left out of the 
consideration set.  
Markets facilitate resource allocation by providing a common platform for widely 
dispersed buyers and sellers to exchange information about their needs and preferences 
(Zenger et al., 2011).  Self-selection refers to the ability of market participants to choose 
which available opportunities to pursue based on this information rather than have those 
matches determined by managerial authority. One way managers (as buyers) are able to 
harness the power of self- selection is by broadcasting information about an opportunity 
and allowing interested sellers to self-select into the set of alternatives to be considered 
by the manager. Rather than the manager assuming the responsibility for generating 
alternatives through active search, sellers search for opportunities that match their 
preferences, enabling managers to generate more alternatives without incurring many of 
the costs associated with a broader search (Afuah & Tucci, 2012). Moreover, because 
sellers have more information on their preferences than managers and are likely to seek 
out alternatives that meet those preferences, searches that may be considered distant from 
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the perspective of the manager may often be considered local from the perspective of the 
seller. By essentially transforming local search into distant search (Afuah & Tucci, 2012), 
self-selection should be expected to expand the number of alternatives considered by a 
manager – and more alternatives reduces the risk that a quality alternative will be 
overlooked.  
The posting process enables managers to harness the power of self-selection by 
broadcasting information about an open job and allowing internal candidates located 
throughout the organization, including those in in more distant areas, such as workers 
located in a different location, department or function, to self-select into a queue of 
candidates competing for the job. In contrast, sponsorship provides no formal mechanism 
for employees to express their interest in an open job. Rather than broadcast information 
about the opening and allow interested candidates to self-select into the candidate pool, 
the manager actively searches for alternatives (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Théorêt, 1976) 
through their personal network. The pool of potential candidates is therefore restricted by 
a manager’s previous experience and connections. While information about internal 
candidates residing outside a manager’s immediate network is likely accessible (e.g. 
through human resource information systems, talking with HR, etc.), obtaining this 
information takes time and effort and the likelihood of finding a superior alternative is 
uncertain. Moreover, managers are more likely to place a higher value on information 
obtained through their social network, further discouraging the search for candidates 
residing outside of it. As a result, sponsoring managers typically only consider those 
candidates with whom they are already familiar (Pinfield, 1995; Podolny & Baron, 1997), 
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and even the most well-connected managers in large organizations are unlikely to be 
familiar will all potential internal candidates.  
In sum, by enabling candidates located both within and outside a hiring manager’s 
social network to self-select into the consideration set, posting should be expected to 
generate a larger set of candidates than would otherwise be accessible through a 
manager’s personal network, reducing the likelihood that an exceptional internal 
candidate will be overlooked. 
Formality and evaluating alternatives. In addition to the challenges associated 
with generating alternatives, boundedly rational managers also face difficulties evaluating 
alternatives. In particular, recent work has called attention to the problems associated 
with bounded awareness, which refers to the propensity of boundedly rational individuals 
to fail to seek out or incorporate relevant and accessible information into their decision-
making process, instead relying on less relevant information. Bounded awareness is one 
symptom of intuitive thinking, which often fails to allow for the possibility that evidence 
needed to make a good decision is missing. As a result, decision-makers tend to make 
decisions based on a subset of available information (Brenner, Koehler, & Tversky, 1996; 
Kahneman, 2011). This “misalignment between the information needed for a good 
decision and information included in the decision-making process” (Bazerman & Chugh, 
2005, p. 10) can lead to costly errors. Such errors are problematic in the hiring context, 
where managers are notorious for their “stubborn reliance on intuition and subjectivity” 
(Highhouse, 2008, p. 333). 
Research suggests that interpersonal networks serve as conduits for information 
exchange within organizations, providing managers with ready access to information that 
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is richer, more complete, and perceived as more trustworthy than information obtained 
from other sources (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Granovetter, 1985; Podolny & Baron, 
1997). While this information might be expected to improve decision-making, access to 
information alone is not enough to ensure a good decision; managers must still select 
which information to use and which information to ignore. In fact, studies spanning 
different contexts and levels of analysis, from those examining individual hiring 
decisions6 to firm-level decisions about selecting merger and acquisition partners (Rogan 
& Sorenson, 2014), show that managers routinely struggle to objectively evaluate 
alternatives with whom they have an existing connection.  
A market-oriented allocative process may therefore actually be superior to an 
information-rich relational process in helping managers to overcome problems associated 
with bounded awareness by shaping the information used to evaluate alternatives. 
Markets are institutions supported by a system of rules and conventions designed to 
facilitate exchange among buyers and sellers (Casson, 1982; Menard, 1995; Polyani, 
1957).  These rules and conventions – which I refer to as formality – are both impersonal 
and non-arbitrary, thereby providing a stable framework for transactions to take place 
                                                            
6 There is ample evidence that managers rely on irrelevant information when making hiring 
decisions. For example, managers often give substantial weight to performance in a previous job 
despite the fact that is often a poor predictor of future performance (Cascio & Aguinis, 2008) and 
frequently allow attributes such as gender, race, attractiveness, and weight to influence hiring 
decisions (e.g. Agerström & Rooth, 2011; Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2004; Marlowe, Schneider, 
& Nelson, 1996). There is also an equal amount of evidence that hiring managers fail to seek out 
relevant information, even when it is easily accessible. For example, managers routinely bypass 
proven selection aids in favor of unstructured interviews (Highhouse, 2008) and use interviews to 
confirm their first impressions of candidates at the expense of gathering job-relevant information 
(Dougherty, Turban, & Callender, 1994). 
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(Menard, 1995: 1967). These rules and conventions serve several functions, two of which 
are establishing the terms of exchange and defining what constitutes legitimate behaviors 
(Loasby, 2000). In establishing the terms of exchange, the market generates at set of 
evaluation criteria; in defining what constitutes legitimate behaviors, the market imposes 
accountability on buyers.  
Evaluation criteria and relevant information. For markets to function, there must 
be a mechanism for managers (as buyers) to broadcast information to potential sellers 
about the good or service they are looking to procure (Zenger et al., 2011). Though 
managers may have difficulties fully articulating their needs (Nickerson & Zenger, 2004), 
this initial information helps to establish the terms of exchange both by serving as the 
initial criteria against which sellers evaluate their interest in pursuing the opportunity and 
by servings as the initial criteria against which the buyer evaluates those sellers who self-
select into the consideration set. As a result, buyers are likely to seek out, and sellers are 
likely to provide, information enabling buyers to evaluate alternatives against a set of 
established criteria.   
One way posting introduces the formality of markets is through the use of formal 
job descriptions. The posting process requires a manager to create a formal job 
description, necessary for broadcasting information about an open job to potential 
candidates. Though it can be difficult to develop accurate, comprehensive job 
descriptions (Backhaus, 2004; Sanchez & Levine, 2012), the requirements defined at this 
initial stage nevertheless serve as a set of formal criteria against which potential 
candidates are evaluated. In contrast, sponsorship does not require the manager to create 
a formal job description prior to evaluating candidates. A manager must possess a 
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reasonable understanding of the job requirements as well as desirable candidate 
attributes, but because the manager does not have to broadcast information about the 
open job, a formal job description is not necessary. This allows the manager to informally 
mold the job requirements around their preferred candidate rather than evaluating the 
candidate against the requirements of the job (Miner, 1987; Sanchez & Levine, 2012).  
When compared to sponsorship, the presence of formal evaluation criteria in posting is 
therefore more likely to prompt managers to recognize and seek out relevant information 
– information enabling them to evaluate a candidate’s ability to perform well in the job.  
Accountability and irrelevant information. Mechanisms that impose responsibility 
and accountability ensure the continued participation of market participants by instilling 
confidence that future transactions will be completed in a fair, honest, and orderly 
manner. Of particular note, perceptions of the process by which firms make allocative 
decisions in a market can effect perceptions of fairness, with decisions that appear to be 
free of bias and based on objective criteria perceived as more fair and legitimate (Bies, 
Tripp, & Neale, 1993; Williams, 1987). Market-based accountability should therefore 
encourage managers to avoid using information that would lead their decisions to be 
perceived as biased or subjective.   
Posting embeds a market-like accountability in the hiring process through the 
custom of requiring managers to explain to unsuccessful internal candidates why they 
were not selected. For every successful internal candidate there are likely to be multiple 
unsuccessful candidates. Because these unsuccessful internal candidates remain 
employees, it is important to clearly communicate the reasons why they did not get the 
job in order to minimize any sense of unfairness that may decrease motivation, 
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performance, and potentially lead to dysfunctional turnover. By ensuring that hiring 
decisions have to be communicated and defended, the custom of explaining to employees 
why they were not selected embeds accountability into the internal hiring process 
(Tetlock, 1992).  
Sponsoring managers informally search for candidates through their personal 
network, so workers are often unaware they are being considered (Pinfield, 1995). As a 
result, accountability is more limited than it is in posting, though it is not entirely absent. 
Managers are required to communicate their decision to a supervisor but because 
supervisors typically grant managers substantial discretion over who is selected, those 
decisions do not have to defended to a broader audience. The higher level of 
accountability generated though the competitive posting process should therefore guard 
against managerial use of irrelevant information, as managers are more likely to use 
objective criteria in justifying their hiring decisions to a broader audience. 
Taken together, these arguments suggest that infusing self-selection and formality 
into the internal hiring process will help boundedly rational managers overcome 
problems associated with generating and evaluating alternatives. Self-selection is likely 
to be more effective than active managerial search in reducing the likelihood that an 
exceptional candidate will be overlooked, while the formality of the market is likely to be 
more effective at disciplining managers to avoid costly errors associated with bounded 
awareness. As a result, I expect posting to create more value than sponsorship by 
generating higher quality internal hires, as revealed by worker performance, turnover and 
subsequent advancement. Specifically, I predict that when compared to sponsored 
internal hires: 
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H1: Workers hired through posting will have higher performance ratings in the 
new job. 
H2: Workers hired through posting will be less likely to exit the firm. 
H3: Workers hired through posting will be more likely to subsequently be 
promoted. 
Competition, Negotiation and Compensation 
Quality of hire is only part of story, as the value a firm is able to capture from 
even the highest quality hire is largely contingent on how much they are paid. It is 
therefore important to understand how posting and sponsorship shape compensation. To 
do so, it is useful to explore different approaches to salary negotiations from the 
perspective of the employee7. 
Markets are characterized by open competition, with sellers aware that they are 
competing for buyers with other sellers (Menard, 1995). Self-selection and formality are 
two of the key mechanisms supporting the competitive nature of markets. Self-selection 
allows sellers to pursue the opportunities they are interested in while formality facilitates 
the exchange of information that ultimately allows buyers to compare information on 
widely dispersed alternatives and make a selection (Zenger et al., 2011).  
Posting is characterized by open competition. Interested candidates self-select into 
the consideration set when they apply for an open job. In doing so, they form a labor 
                                                            
7 I take the perspective of the worker (and thereby minimize the role of the manager) in the salary 
negotiations because of the way compensation is set at InsureCo. Like many other large 
organizations, the HR department at InsureCo sets the pay for the job when the requisition is 
created rather than after the candidate is selected. That is, the amount of salary a manager can 
offer any candidate is determined before the hiring process begins. As a result, any effort to 
increase salary are likely to be initiated by the worker.     
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queue – a set of workers competing for a specific job at a specific time (Reskin & Roos, 
1990). The formality of the posting process underscores the competitive nature of 
posting, as the fact that employees have to actively submit an application makes them 
aware that they are entering into a competition they are not assured of winning. In 
contrast, to the extent there is competition in sponsorship, it lacks structure and 
transparency. Because search is costly, managers routinely consider a small pool of 
internal candidates (often just a single candidate). Moreover, because managers gather 
information on potential candidates informally, in those cases where multiple candidates 
are considered, those who are not selected are often unaware of being considered 
(Pinfield, 1995).  
While competition is often seen as a way to lower prices by pitting multiple 
suppliers against one another, recent work exploring the social psychological aspects of 
negotiation provides reason to expect the opposite in the internal hiring context. A key 
premise in this literature is that situational factors prime individuals to place more or less 
emphasis on the importance of dyadic relationships in negotiations. The more emphasis 
an individual places on the dyadic relationship in a negotiation context, the more likely 
they are to adopt a relational orientation to negotiation, and individuals adopting a 
relational orientation to negotiation are more likely to forgo economic gain in an effort to 
develop relational capital (Curhan, Elfenbein, & Xu, 2006; Curhan, Neale, Ross, & 
Rosencranz-Engelmann, 2008, p. 193; Gelfand et al., 2006).  
Sponsorship is much more likely to cue a worker to focus on their relationship 
with the hiring manager. Because the hiring manager personally appointed the worker to 
the job absent any formal competition, the relationship with the hiring manager is likely 
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to be particularly salient and highly valued at the time an initial job offer is presented. 
This is unlikely to be case in posting, with the competitive nature of the process 
emphasizing the transactional nature of the employment relationship. As a result, workers 
hired through sponsorship are more likely to adopt a relational orientation when 
negotiating compensation. 
Adopting a relational orientation is likely to result in a lower salary for two 
reasons. First, he or she is less likely to initiate a salary negotiation. Focused on 
developing relational capital, they will want to avoid appearing self-interested and 
therefore feel uncomfortable with the idea of asking for more money (Gelfand et al., 
2006). They are also more likely to perceive the initial offer as fair; being more attuned to 
other party’s goals should reduce the likelihood they will assume the other party’s 
interests are opposed to their own, a common error in negotiations (S. E. Cross, Bacon, & 
Morris, 2000; Gelfand et al., 2006; Leigh Thompson & Deharpport, 1998). Second, an 
individual adopting a relational orientation is more likely to employ an accommodative 
negotiation strategy whereas an individual adopting a transactional orientation is more 
likely to negotiate competitively (Curhan et al., 2008), and accommodative approaches to 
salary negotiation have been shown to result in lower raises than competitive approaches 
(Marks & Harold, 2011).  
These arguments suggest that relative to sponsorship, the competitive nature of 
the posting process will increase the likelihood that workers both initiate salary 
negotiations and adopt a more economically beneficial approach when they do choose to 
negotiate, leading me to predict that: 
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H4: Internal candidates hired through posting will receive higher starting 
salaries than sponsored employees entering equivalent jobs.  
This suggests that there is an important tradeoff between the quality and costs 
associated with different internal hiring processes. Though posting is likely to create 
more value, the firm does not capture all of that value, with workers capturing a portion 
through higher compensation.  
DATA & METHODS 
I test these hypotheses using monthly personnel records covering the years 2008 
to 2012 from the US operations of a large insurance company, which I call InsureCo. The 
primary data for my analyses consist of more than 9,000 internal hires made during the 
observation period, which are identified from a larger dataset consisting of 1,914,519 
monthly observations covering 56,811 individual workers.   
While using data from a single firm limits the confidence with which I can 
generalize my results, these data are particularly well suited to test my hypotheses. The 
distinguishing feature of these data is that the way in which InsureCo has linked their 
various human resource information systems allows me to clearly identify whether 
posting or sponsorship was used to facilitate each and every internal hire. I am also able 
to link these personnel records to a companion dataset with information on more than 
350,000 internal and external job applications submitted during 2012, allowing me to 
conduct several robustness checks. Using personnel data from a single organization has 
several other advantages, including the fact that my performance measures are 
standardized across jobs and that I am able to control for the effects of job content and 
the location of different jobs (and therefore different attributes of moves between jobs), 
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all of which would pose substantial empirical difficulties in a multi-firm study. Moreover, 
obtaining this type of data from even a single firm is quite challenging; many firms fail to 
systematically record any data related to employee mobility (ERC, 2010; Oracle, 2012) 
and for those that do, the fear of sanctions were internal analyses to reveal previously 
unrecognized patterns of illegal discrimination has the perverse effect of discouraging 
firms from exploring these processes (Strum, 2001). The setting itself reduces at least 
some concerns about generalizability, as InsureCo mirrors other large contemporary 
organizations in several respects: hiring decisions are delegated to individual managers, 
employees are explicitly encouraged to actively manage their careers amid a lack of well-
defined advancement paths, and there are substantial amounts of lateral and vertical 
mobility across broadly defined jobs.  
Identifying Internal Hires 
 An internal hire occurs when a manager fills an open job with a current 
employee8, as indicated by a change in an employee’s job code, department, or both from 
one month to the next. An employee who changes job codes takes on a new set of tasks 
and responsibilities. A move to a new department is a move to different area of the 
business, as departments are organized around products, geographic markets, and 
customers (internal and external). Entry-level jobs are filled through external hiring; 
internal hiring is used alongside external hiring to fill jobs above entry-level.  
It is important to emphasize that a change in job code does not simply represent a 
change in title, with little change to the work actually performed (Miner, 1987). Jobs at 
                                                            
8 InsureCo has a vacancy-driven hiring process, meaning that all hires – internal and external – 
are preceded by an open job. 
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InsureCo are broadly defined by hierarchical level, function, and role. In an average year, 
approximately 34,000 employees were distributed across 462 job codes. Jobs are 
organized into nine different levels [(1) Entry-level, (2) Team Lead, (3) 
Supervisor/Analyst, (4) Manager/Professional, (5) Director/Technical Leader, (6) Vice 
President, (7) Senior Vice President, (8) Executive Vice President, (9) CEO] and thirty 
functional areas, including those common to most large firms (e.g. Sales, 
Finance/Accounting, HR, and Marketing) as well as several more specific to the 
insurance industry. Roles indicate the specific competencies needed to perform the job. 
For example, “Creative Developer” is a Level 3 role in Marketing; “Recruiting Lead” is a 
Level 3 role in Human Resources; and “Architect”, “Applications Consultant” and 
“Project Manager” are all Level 3 roles with IT, each linked to different competencies. 
As a result, a change in job code reflects a meaningful change in the work a person does. 
Dependent Variables  
Quality of hire and compensation are the two primary outcomes of interest in this 
study. Researchers have used a wide variety of post-hire outcomes to assess quality of 
hire (e.g, see Breaugh & Starke, 2000; Zottoli & Wanous, 2000). In an effort to provide a 
holistic accounting of the quality of internal hires with InsureCo, I test my hypotheses 
using multiple indicators of quality: performance ratings, relative performance, turnover, 
and subsequent advancement.     
Performance ratings and relative performance. I use five measures of job 
performance from InsureCo’s annual performance evaluation as a first set of quality 
indicators.    
50 
 
Contribution score. A worker’s contribution score assesses their contribution to 
the success of the organization. In jobs with a less direct impact on organization-level 
outcomes (e.g. those at lower levels), the contribution score is typically used to assess 
their contribution to the department or line of business. It is measured on a 0 to 4 scale 
[0=not contributing (0%), 1=low contribution (3.2%), 2=moderate contribution (19%), 
3=full contribution (66.8%), and 4=exemplary contribution (11%)]. 
Competency score. A worker’s competency score assesses their skills relative to 
what is required for the job. Each worker receives a separate score for each of the eight 
competencies assigned to their job code9. Each competency is measured on a 1 to 4 scale 
[1=Learning, 2=Exhibiting, 3=Demonstrating, 4=Modeling]. I average these individual 
scores to compute an overall competency score [1-2 (11.4%), 2-3 (66.2%), 3-4 (12.4%)]. 
Relative performance. Managers also rank workers in similar jobs as part of an 
annual calibration process (described below). However, workers are not simply ordered 
according to their contribution and competency scores; rather, this is intended to be a 
measure of overall value to the organization that takes into account both previous 
performance and future potential. Although there are no formally established guidelines 
dictating how finely managers should distinguish among workers, these calibration 
sessions typically create “buckets” of employees; a group of 100 employees may not be 
ranked from 1 (highest) to 100 (lowest), but rather the top five employees may receive a 
1, the next ten a 2, the next twenty-five a 3, and so on. I use these ranking to create three 
dichotomous measures of relative performance: whether a worker is ranked in top the 
                                                            
9 Selected from an overall library of 124 competencies customized for InsureCo. 
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quartile (top 25%), bottom half (bottom 50%), or bottom quartile (bottom 25%) of her 
cohort in her first year in the new job. 
While all of these are subjective measures of performance, several researchers 
have argued that subjective ratings are among the most valid measures of performance 
despite concerns about the potential for managerial bias to affect ratings (Cascio, 1998). 
Subjective ratings enable managers to take into consideration a variety of behaviors and 
outputs relevant to the job (Medoff & Abraham, 1981) as well as account for factors 
affecting performance outside the control of the individual worker (J. P. Campbell, 
McCloy, Oppler, & Sager, 1993). However, it is also important to note that InsureCo’s 
annual evaluation process helps to reduce potential concerns about supervisory bias 
affecting individual performance ratings. Managers who supervise workers in similar 
jobs meet in person to review and discuss their ratings of individual workers – a process 
known as calibration. These calibration discussions are intended to ensure that managers 
are evaluating workers against a common standard and to identify and correct instances 
where managers may have rated employees too harshly or leniently. Research has shown 
that calibration tends to reduce subjectivity and bias in performance ratings both because 
ratings are likely to be more consistent across employees when managers share a 
common view on rating standards (Mclntyre, Smith, & Hassett, 1984; Pulakos, 1984) and 
because “fellow managers do not do not usually let each other off easily if they believe an 
employee has been rated unfairly, creating peer pressure that provides a powerful 
incentive to make accurate ratings” (Pulakos & O’Leary, 2011, pp. 152–3). 
Turnover. Turnover is a second indicator of match quality (Jovanovic, 1979; 
Mortensen, 1988). I create two dichotomous measures of turnover indicating whether a 
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worker exits the organization with the first 12 months (turnover12) or 24 months 
(turnover24) of moving to a new job. I do not distinguish between voluntary and 
involuntary turnover for two reasons. Conceptually, both are indicators of poor matches, 
with the worker and firm both more likely to terminate an ill-fitting employment 
relationship. Empirically, while the data do indicate whether turnover was voluntary or 
involuntary, managers and HR staff at InsureCo both told me not to trust these indicators 
as reflecting the actual reasons an employee left the organization. Consistent with 
research showing that turnover rates are relatively low among internal hires in non-entry-
level jobs (Bidwell, 2011), approximately 5% of internal hires exited the firm within 12 
months, while 13% exited within 24 months.  
Promotion.  Subsequent promotion is a third indicator of quality. Promotions are 
internal hires that result in the employee moving into a higher level job. Because time to 
promotion varies across jobs, I create two dichotomous measures of subsequent 
advancement: whether a worker was promoted within 24 months (prom24) or 36 months 
(prom36) of moving into a new job. Approximately 14% of internal hires were 
subsequently promoted within 24 months, while 31% were promoted within 36 months.  
Starting salary. The starting salary is the natural logarithm of the salary a worker 
receives in the first month in a new job. Salary accounts for the vast majority of 
compensation for most workers at InsureCo. Sales workers represent the main exception 
and their bonuses, which are tied to clearly defined sales targets, can account for a 
substantial portion of their total income. However, the bonus amount these workers are 
expected to receive based on their targets are factored into the annual salary figures 
recorded in InsureCo’s personnel records. For example, if a salesperson is hired into a job 
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with a base salary of $80,000 and expects to earn a bonus of $40,000, for a total expected 
annual compensation of $120,000, her salary in the monthly personnel record from which 
I pull this figure will be $120,000. This means that the salary figure I use represents the 
total compensation she should expect to earn during the year, which is the figure upon 
which she will be negotiating.   
Independent Variable 
The independent variable is a dichotomous indicator of whether posting (1) or 
sponsorship (0) was used to fill the job, identified through an unambiguous indicator in 
the first monthly observation of a worker in her new job. 3,841 (43%) of internal hires 
were made through posting and 5,458 (57%) through sponsorship. 
Control Variables 
An important concern when using non-experimental data is the potential for 
omitted variables to create spurious correlations between the independent and dependent 
variables. Hiring managers at InsureCo are able to choose whether to fill a job through 
posting or sponsorship. A particular concern in this study is that there may be variables 
that both affect a manager’s decision of which process to use as well as the outcomes of 
interest. In the absence of existing empirical evidence, it seems likely that the choice to 
use posting or sponsorship might be affected by three factors. First, it could be that there 
are certain jobs that are always posted and others that are always filled through 
sponsorship. Second, it could be that managers are different; that the choice is driven by 
attributes of individual managers that may also affect the performance and pay of the 
candidates they hire. Third, it could also be the case that managers only post jobs if they 
have been unable to or assume they will be unable to identify qualified candidates 
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through their personal network; if so, the choice may be driven by the nature of the 
candidate pool visible to a specific hiring manager.   
Empirically, I leverage the level of detail in my data to address the first issue, 
which enables me to control for many of the job characteristics that might be expected to 
have an effect on the choice between posting and sponsorship. To address the second and 
third issues, I run a series of robustness checks, including using an instrumental variable 
approach which I describe in more detail later in the paper.    
In addition to the empirical strategies described in more detail below, it is also 
useful to report what various HR staff and hiring managers had to say about why a 
manager may choose to fill a job through posting or sponsorship. I interviewed ten 
members of the human resources department, including three managers responsible for 
making hiring decisions within this department, as well as three hiring managers residing 
in other functional areas. These conversations revealed that to the extent there are any 
variables which systematically shape a manager’s decision10, the choice of internal hiring 
process is likely driven by whether or not a manager is already aware of a potential 
candidate. Five of the six hiring managers reported that they were likely to use 
sponsorship if a candidate they felt was qualified was readily identifiable. That is, these 
managers would choose to post the job if they had to engage in much more than minimal 
effort to identify potential candidates on their own. In addition, four of the six hiring 
managers, and nearly all of the HR staff supporting multiple hiring managers, noted that 
                                                            
10 The majority of the HR staff answered by questions with an initial caveat such as, “I’m not sure 
what leads a manager to choose to post or sponsor, but I suppose it is possible that . . .” Similarly, 
the hiring managers themselves stated something along the line of, “I’ve never really though 
much about this before, but now that you ask, I think my previous choices might have been 
influenced by . . .”  
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even among departments with similar jobs, managers in some departments were more 
likely than others to post jobs. That is, the process use to filled job within a department 
was sometimes driven by custom rather than a result of a systematic evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of each approach or the attributes of individual managers11.  The HR 
staff also reported that hiring managers frequently asked them how other hiring managers 
within the organization had filled similar jobs in the recent past, an observation which 
helped inform my choice of an instrumental variable. 
Job attributes. In order to compare the outcomes associated with different 
processes used to staff similar jobs, I control for several job-level attributes. I include 
dummy variables to control for hierarchical rank, functional area and the state a job is 
located in (51% of job are located in the headquarters state). In order to control for fixed 
propensities of different jobs to be filled by posting or sponsorship, I also include 
separate dummies for each of 266 job codes filled though internal hiring during my 
observation period. Importantly, the data reveal no systematic differences in the types of 
jobs that are filled through posting or sponsorship. Of all the job codes filled internally 
from 2008-2012, 84% were filled by both posting and sponsorship, and moves into those 
jobs codes accounted for 99% of all internal hires. Of the job codes filled exclusively 
through either posting or sponsorship, none were filled more than six times and the vast 
majority were filled only two or three times. It is therefore likely that even those job 
codes filled exclusively through one process are nevertheless open to being filled through 
                                                            
11 In fact, in unreported analyses looking at the decision to use posting or sponsorship, the only 
individual-level variable that had any predictive power was how a manager entered their current 
job, with managers who entered their current job through posting 30% more likely to fill open 
jobs through posting themselves. 
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both processes, with the apparent exclusivity an artifact of so few hires having been made 
into those job codes during the sample period.  
 Job transition attributes. Another concern is that the outcomes may be affected by 
the types of moves workers are making rather than how those moves are made. For 
example, we might expect that sponsored workers are more likely to come from similar 
jobs (because managers are more likely to have personal connections to workers doing 
similar work) and that those will workers will have higher levels of initial performance as 
a result. To account for this possibility, I include dummies for whether an internal hire 
resulted in a worker moving into a new job in the same function or same department. 
Similarly, I include dummies indicating whether an internal hire resulted in a promotion 
(a vertical advancement; n=4,843), an expansion (a lateral advancement which results in 
an expansion of the worker’s competencies; n=3,594), or a transfer (a lateral move to the 
same job in a different department; n=1,122), which may affect pay and/or performance. I 
include the worker’s salary in the final month of their previous job in some models to 
account for the possibility that internal salary adjustments may be based on an 
employee’s previous salary even when moving across very different jobs. 
Individual attributes.  I also include controls for a variety of individual attributes. 
Demographic characteristics include gender, age and age-squared, and ethnicity. Tenure 
and tenure-squared are calculated as the number of months (squared) a worker has been 
employed by the firm. I include a worker’s contribution and competency scores in their 
previous job as a rough indicator of pre-hire quality. InsureCo does not include years of 
education or highest degree completed in their personnel records.    
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Additional controls. I include dummies for each year in the sample to reflect 
changing labor market conditions. In models predicting relative performance, I control 
for the size of a worker’s performance rating cohort (e.g. the number of workers in their 
forced ranking group).  
Sample Restrictions 
The samples used for each of my analyses vary according to a number of 
restrictions I placed on the data. In the analyses where performance ratings are used as 
dependent variables, I dropped observations with missing performance data, which 
occurred when a worker had been hired too recently to assess or exited the firm before 
being assessed (n=2,484). In both the turnover and advancement models, the samples are 
restricted to those workers who were hired early enough for me to calculate the 
dependent variables of interest (e.g. to be included in the model predicting turnover in 12 
months, a worker either had to have exited the firm within 12 months of moving into 
their new job or occupied the job for 12 months). Finally, in the compensation models, I 
excluded observations with missing salary data (n=28).  
ANALYSIS & RESULTS 
Table 2.1 provides means, standard deviations, and correlations for the main 
dependent and independent variables, with each observation representing an internal hire. 
Of particular interest are the correlations between the multiple measures of quality of 
hire. The correlation between the contribution and competency scores (r = .67) indicates 
that these two measures pick up different aspects of performance. The correlations 
between these two measures and the relative ranking variables covary in the expected 
directions while also suggesting that they are picking up different aspects of performance, 
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as they are positively correlated with a worker ending up in the top quartile (r = .43, .45) 
and negatively correlated with a worker ending up in the bottom half (r = -.46, -.50) and 
bottom quartile (r = -.40, -.46). The low correlations among the performance rating 
variables and the turnover and subsequent promotion variables (none exceed r = +/- .13) 
similarly suggest that each of these variables are capturing a different element of 
performance.  
It is also important to note the low correlations between salary and each of the 
performance measures (none exceed r = +/- .16), which underscore the notion that salary 
does not simply reflect a manager’s expectations about performance in the new job, but is 
instead largely determined by a negotiation process which occurs prior to a manager 
observing actual performance (Jovanovic, 1979). This is important in interpreting the 
results, as I argue that while posting results in both higher quality hires and higher 
salaries, the higher salaries are not a result of the manager expecting a higher level of 
performance. In fact, the robustness checks suggest that, if anything, managers expect 
sponsored hires to perform better.       
Performance 
Table 2.2 presents analyses of each of the five performance measures. I use 
ordinary least squares regressions in models using competency and contribution scores as 
the dependent variables. Competency score is a continuous variable and though 
contribution score is a discrete, ordinal measure, the OLS model is easier to interpret than 
an ordered logit model (and both provide similar results). I use a logit specification for 
models where relative performance is outcome of interest, as the dependent variables are 
binary. The unit of analysis in all models is an internal hire and the performance 
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measures reflect performance in the first year on the job. I cluster the errors by individual 
to account for non-independence among the errors. 
Using contribution and competency scores as the dependent variables, Models 1 
and 2 provide support for Hypothesis 1, with the significant positive coefficient for 
posting in both models indicating that internal hires made through posting outperform 
internal hires made through sponsorship. The effect sizes are relatively small, however, 
with posting resulting in an increase of approximately one-tenth of a standard deviation 
on each measure of performance, an issue I return to in the robustness checks. Model 3 
provides additional support for Hypothesis 1 in demonstrating that internal hires made 
through posting are approximately 13% more likely to be rated in the top quartile of their 
respective performance/potential distribution than sponsored internal hires. Models 4 and 
5 further reveal that internal hires made through posting are less likely to have poor 
performance ratings in the new job. The significant negative coefficients for posting 
indicate that internal hires made through posting are approximately 13% less likely to fall 
in the bottom half of the ratings distribution and approximately 15% less likely to fall in 
the bottom quartile. Taken together, these results strongly suggest that posting leads 
managers to make better internal hiring decisions. 
Turnover 
 Models 1 and 2 in Table 2.3 use logit models to test Hypothesis 2, that internal 
hires made through posting are less likely to exit the firm. Both models provide support 
for this hypothesis, with the significant negative coefficients for posting indicating that 
internal hires made through posting are around 20% less likely to exit the firm within 12 
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months (Model 6) and around 18% less likely to exit the firm within 24 months (Model 
7).   
Subsequent Advancement 
Models 3 and 4 in Table 2.3 use logit models test Hypothesis 3, that internal hires 
made through posting are more likely to be subsequently promoted. I find very limited 
support for this hypothesis. The coefficient for posting in not significantly different from 
zero in Model 3, indicating that there is no difference the 24 month promotion rates of 
internal hires made through posting or sponsorship. The coefficient for posting is positive 
but only marginally significant in Model 4, providing some indication that posting may 
be more likely lead promotion over a 36 month period, but nothing conclusive. 
Salary  
 Models 5 and 6 in Table 2.3 test Hypotheses 4, that internal hires made through 
posting will receive higher starting salaries than sponsored hires entering equivalent jobs. 
The significant positive coefficient for posting in Model 10 provides support for this 
hypothesis, revealing that posted hires receives nearly 4% higher salaries, on average, 
than sponsored hires. The 4% posting premium remains after controlling for performance 
in the previous job (Model 11)12. 
                                                            
12 My data do not allow me to measure negotiations directly. However, as noted in Footnote 7, the 
salaries for individual jobs are set by HR in advance of a candidate being hired. As a result, 
differences in starting salary across equivalent jobs are likely to result from differences in 
negotiation. My discussions with a compensation analyst at InsureCo revealed that individual 
workers are often able to negotiate small salary increases (rarely more than 5%) from their initial 
offer, consistent with posting premiums in my analyses.   
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Mobility Patterns and Within Department Hires 
In theorizing about the effects of self-selection and formality on quality of hire, I 
made two complementary arguments, one suggesting that self-selection improves quality 
by expanding the pool of potential candidates and another suggesting that formality helps 
to shape the information managers use when evaluating candidates. The regression results 
above, however, do not allow me to whether one or both of these mechanisms are driving 
the results. To examine this issue in more detail, I present descriptive statistics on internal 
source of hire (Table 2.4), which reveal that posting is significantly more likely to result 
in hires from different departments, functions, cities and even different buildings, 
consistent with my argument that self-selection lessens the likelihood that manager will 
overlook an exception candidate by allowing managers to more readily identify 
candidates widely dispersed throughout the organization. I then ran a series of regressions 
restricting the analysis to internal hires made within departments (Table 2.5). Because 
managers are likely to be aware of and have access to much more detailed information on 
candidates located within their own department, this provides a stronger test of my 
argument that, beyond providing more alternatives, posting improves decision making by 
disciplining what information they use in evaluating candidates. Consistent with my 
theorizing, the results are nearly identical to those presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3. In fact, 
if we assume that managers not only have ready access to, but already possess detailed 
information (both relevant and irrelevant to their ability to do the job) on candidates 
within their department13, we might conclude that markets are particularly beneficial in 
                                                            
13 I discussed this assumption with the hiring managers I interviewed and they uniformly agreed 
that hiring managers are aware of potential candidates within their department that are likely to be 
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helping managers to avoid the use of irrelevant information when evaluating well-known 
alternatives, a commonly cited reason for hiring errors (Highhouse, 2008). 
Supplementary Analyses and Robustness Checks 
As noted above, a potential concern with my use of ordinary least squares and 
logit models above is potential endogeneity arising from the manager’s choice to fill the 
job through posting or sponsorship. While earlier analyses controlled for the fixed 
propensities for certain jobs to be filled by posting or sponsorship, they were unable to 
account for either (a) differences among hiring managers which may affect both the 
choice of hiring process and the performance and pay of the candidates they hire, or (b) 
the possibility that managers only post jobs if they are unable to first identify qualified 
candidates through their personal network.  
In order to address individual differences among managers, I reran the analysis on 
the set of hires made by hiring managers who hired candidates through both posting and 
by sponsorship during the sample period and included managerial fixed effects. In order 
to address the concern that managers only post if they are not able to personally identify 
an exceptional candidate, I adopt an instrumental variable approach. Before describing 
this approach, however, it is important to note that if this were indeed the case, we would 
expect the endogenous nature of this choice to affect the quality of hire results in the 
opposite direction of what I find; if managers are most likely to use sponsorship when 
they are able to personally identify an excellent candidate, sponsored hires should be 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
candidates for open jobs.  In fact, they considered identifying talent employees and developing 
their skills to be one of their key roles as a managers. This is reflected in the performance ratings, 
as the ability to “Build Human Capital” is a central competency against which the vast majority 
of managers are evaluated.  
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expected to outperform hires made through posting. Empirically addressing this potential 
endogeneity nevertheless seems prudent.  
An instrumental variable should correlate strongly with endogenous variable 
(posting) but not with the second stage error term (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003; 
Semadeni, Withers, & Certo, 2014). A variable that appears to meet these two conditions 
is the percentage of similar jobs filled by posting in other departments in the preceding 
two months. My discussions with both hiring managers and HR staff at InsureCo 
confirmed that managers regularly, (a) ask other managers how they recently filled 
similar jobs, or (b) contact HR and ask how similar positions have been filled recently. 
While both mechanisms should be expected to influence the manager’s decision on how 
to fill the job, how similar jobs are filled in other parts of the organization should have 
little direct effect on post-hire outcomes or salary.  
 Table 2.6 compares the results for competency and contribution scores across 
several different models.  Models 1 and 2 report the OLS results from the original 
analyses. Models 3 and 4 include managerial fixed effects and are limited to hires made 
by managers utilizing both posting and sponsorship. Models 5 through 8 report the results 
using both a traditional 2SLS approach (Models 5 and 6) and a 2SLS treatment approach 
which accounts for the binary nature of my endogenous variable (Models 7 and 8). The 
first stage estimates (not reported) reveal that I do not have to worry about instrument 
weakness.  As can be seen by comparing the results of the two sets of OLS models, the 
results are consistent even after controlling for unobservable characteristics of individual 
managers, including a potential preference for posting or sponsorship. The instrumental 
variable model results are also consistent with the original OLS results. In fact, after 
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controlling for endogeneity bias using the IV approaches, the effect of posting of both 
competency and contribution scores are substantially stronger, increasing from an 
increase of around one-tenth of a standard deviation to nearly four-tenths of a standard 
deviation for contribution and over half a standard deviation for competency.   
Table 2.7 presents the results for relative performance using manager fixed effects 
(Models 4-6) and using instrumental variable probit models (Models 7-9). Aside from the 
change in coefficient magnitudes, the only difference is that there is no significant 
relationship between how a worker enters a job and their likelihood of landing in the top 
quartile of the performance distribution using the IV approach. Taken together, the 
interpretation of these results remains unchanged – posting disciplines managers to make 
better internal hiring decisions, in part by avoiding hiring mistakes. 
Table 2.8 presents the results for turnover using manager fixed effects (Models 3 
and 4) and using instrumental variable probit models (Models 5 and 6).  Table 2.9 
presents the results for subsequent advancement using manager fixed effects (Models 3 
and 4) and using instrumental variable probit models (Models 5 and 6). Table 2.10 
presents the results for salary using manager fixed effects (Models 3 and 4) and using a 
traditional 2SLS approach (Models 5 and 6). Again, the results lead to similar 
interpretations as the main analyses, with the primary difference being the magnitude of 
the coefficients. The one substantive difference is that the IV probit specification 
indicates that while internal hires are less likely to exit the firm within 12 months, they 
are not more or less likely to exit the firm within the longer 24 month time period (Model 
6 in Table 2.8). 
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Wired Searches 
While posting and sponsorship are conceptually distinct, it is possible for a 
manager to post a job having already decided who they are going to select. Though these 
jobs are posted, they are actually filled through sponsorship. If this was a common 
occurrence and/or these instances were difficult to identify empirically, it would be 
difficult to interpret my results. These so-called “wired searches” are likely to be most 
common in firms that require managers to post all jobs. Because InsureCo has established 
formal systems for filling jobs through both posting and sponsorship, managers are able 
to avoid posting jobs when they already have a candidate in mind and thereby avoid the 
potential negative consequences that emerge from other employees having felt they 
participated in an unfair selection process (Billsberry, 2007). I nevertheless conducted 
two additional robustness checks to rule of the possibility that my results are affected by 
the inclusion of wired searches. First, I reviewed each of the 1,695 internal hires made in 
2012 for which I have detailed application data. Those instances where there was only a 
single internal applicant (and no external applicants) could potentially be wired searches, 
with managers either tailoring the job description around a particular candidate and/or 
discouraging others employees from applying. Less than 5% of internal hires meet these 
criteria and of those, two-thirds were open for more than a month, suggesting that the 
hiring manager was hoping to find additional candidates. A total of 30 posted internal 
hires (1.4%) are potentially wired searches, leading me to believe that such searches are 
not driving my results. Second, I identified all of the postings during this period which 
were open a week or less (n = 45), another potential indication that the hiring manager 
created the posting for a specific candidate and therefore wanted to limit the number of 
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other candidates who would apply. In both cases, dropping these observations from the 
analyses does not substantively change the results.   
External Candidates as an Alternative Explanation 
I ran an additional series of robustness checks to ensure that the results for posting 
were not driven by external market forces. When posting a job, a manager has the option 
of restricting the competition to internal candidates by only posting the job internally, or 
opening the competition to both internal and external candidates. An alternative 
explanation for the performance findings might be that the inclusion of external 
candidates allows managers to benchmark internal candidates against the market, leading 
to better hires when an internal candidate is selected (Billsberry, 2007). Perhaps more 
importantly, an alternative explanation for the higher starting salaries associated with 
posting might be that mere exposure to the external market drives up the starting salaries 
for posted jobs, with the results driven by those instances in which external candidates 
were considered but an internal candidate was selected.  
In order to rule out these alternative explanations, I use data from 2012 that 
allows me to identify the number of internal and external candidates that applied to every 
posted job and how far they made it through the hiring process. This allows me to 
identify which job postings were restricted to internal candidates and which were open to 
external candidates. Table 2.9 reveals the result of analyses including a dummy variable 
equal to one if external candidates were considered for the position. Because this data 
begin in 2012, I am unable to calculate results for turnover and subsequent advancement. 
Of the 869 internal hires for whom I have both performance ratings and salary data, 578 
(66%) were hired without considering an external candidate; 291 (34%) internal hires 
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competed against at least one external candidate. The results indicate that opening the job 
to external candidates has no effect on performance (Models 1-5) or starting salary 
(Models 6-7). 
DISCUSSION 
This research advances our understanding of how human resources are allocated 
within firms by shedding light on the processes used to facilitate internal hiring within 
contemporary organizations. Despite the prevalence of internal hiring and its impact on 
the fortunes of firms and workers, our current models of internal hiring are still largely 
based on literatures exploring advancement with highly bureaucratic internal labor 
markets that bear little resemblance to their more contemporary counterparts. This study 
provides a much-needed update to these earlier models, identifying and describing the 
two most commonly used internal hiring processes – market-oriented posting and 
relationship-oriented sponsorship. I develop theory predicting the relative effects of 
posting and sponsorship on quality of hire and compensation by highlighting that posting 
is characterized by two market-like features, self-selection and formality, that are largely 
absent in sponsorship, which instead involves active managerial search and a reliance on 
personnel connections for gathering information.  
I argued that introducing these market features would improve decision-making 
by helping managers to overcome challenges associated with generating and evaluating 
alternatives. Self-selection should generate a larger pool of alternatives, reducing the 
likelihood and exceptional alternative will be overlooked, while the formality of the 
market should encourage managers to both incorporate relevant information and avoid 
irrelevant information as they evaluate candidate qualifications against the requirements 
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of the jobs. Consistent with these arguments, I found that employees hired through 
posting outperform their counterparts hired through sponsorship and are less likely to exit 
the firm, though there is no discernable difference in their likelihood of subsequent 
advancement.  These performance results are particularly notable given that social 
exchange theory would predict that sponsored workers should feel more gratitude to the 
hiring manager and therefore perform better (Emerson, 1976). 
However, this improved decision-making comes at a price. I argued that 
employees hired through the more competitive posting would be less likely to adopt a 
relational orientation to salary negotiations and thus more likely to initiate salary 
negotiations and adopt a more effective, competitive approach when doing so. Though I 
am unable to test this mechanism directly (I do not observe the difference between initial 
and final salary offers), the results are consistent with this account, as employees hired 
through posting are paid 4% more than sponsored employees hired into equivalent jobs.  
Despite this posting premium, the overall results suggest that posting enables 
firms to both create and capture substantially more value than sponsorship. 
Unfortunately, my data do not allow me to directly measure the value created by higher 
levels of individual performance or the savings associated with higher retention rates. 
However, with the costs of replacing an employee alone running anywhere between 20% 
and 200% of an employee’s annual salary (Boushey & Glynn, 2012), the combined 
performance and retention benefits associated with better internal hires are likely to far 
exceed the higher salary costs. Moreover, the posting premium suggests that workers also 
share in the increased value creation, earning higher salaries for equivalent work. The 
posting process therefore appears to benefit both firms and workers. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE IMPACT OF INTERNAL HIRING PROCESSES ON WOMEN’S 
CAREER ADVANCEMENT AND PAY 
  
INTRODUCTION 
 Dramatic changes in the external competitive environment over the past quarter 
century have brought about equally dramatic changes in the organization of work and 
employment within firms. Rapidly shifting consumer demands, constant technological 
advancements, increasing global competition, the decline of unions, and shareholder 
pressures to minimize costs have led organizations to place a premium on labor market 
flexibility (Bidwell, 2013; Cappelli, 1995; Jacoby, 2005; Piore, 2002). A notable 
consequence has been the gradual dismantling of the structures and processes supporting 
traditional, bureaucratic internal labor markets (ILMs) (Cappelli, 1999b; Osterman & 
Burton, 2005). For all of the benefits bureaucratic ILMs provided workers, namely the 
sense of stability and security associated with the implicit promises of lifetime 
employment and steady upward advancement, a long literature has also documented their 
central role in generating and sustaining gender inequalities by allocating women to 
marginalized jobs with limited opportunities for advancement  (Barnett et al., 2000; 
Bridges & Nelson, 1989; Petersen et al., 2005; Rosenfeld, 1992). As a result, the 
dismantling of bureaucratic ILMs and the subsequent introduction new work structures, 
policies and practices designed to support more flexible employment systems represents a 
momentous opportunity for overcoming stubbornly persistent gender disparities in career 
advancement and pay within organizations. 
 However, we are only just beginning to understand which of the many recent 
changes to employment structures and process have been successful in reducing gender 
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inequality in the workplace. For example, while organizational delayering (Dencker, 
2008), broadly defined jobs and the adoption of cross-function teams (Alexandra Kalev, 
2009) have helped to increase women’s prospects for internal advancement, women 
remain underrepresented at the most senior organizational levels (Rafter, 2015). Other 
initiatives intended to remediate gender disparities, such as the introduction of merit-
based reward systems (Castilla & Benard, 2010; Castilla, 2008, 2012) or certain diversity 
initiatives (Kaiser et al., 2013; A. Kalev, F. Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006), may unintentionally 
introduce new sources of inequality while providing the illusion of equal treatment. 
Overall, women continue to occupy a disproportionate number of  low-level and 
undervalued jobs (Cohen, 2013) and are still paid less than men for similar work (Goldin, 
2014; Petersen & Morgan, 1995), highlighting the importance of identifying and testing 
the impact of  additional mechanisms with the potential to help to chip away at these 
longstanding gender disparities within organizations. 
 This study contributes to this effort by exploring the effect of contemporary 
internal hiring processes – the processes used to allocate current employees to new jobs 
within organizations – on the organizational careers of women. In bureaucratic ILMs, 
internal hiring was governed by strict administrative rules used to maintain lines of 
progression along clearly defined job ladders. While these rules, which placed significant 
constraints over which opportunities workers were eligible to pursue and limited 
managerial discretion over individual hiring decisions, were useful for maintaining stable 
employment systems based on long-term employment (Doeringer & Piore, 1971; 
Sorensen, 1983) they have proven to be largely incompatible with the current efforts to 
develop more flexible employment systems (Piore, 2002). This paper examines how 
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posting and sponsorship – the two process which have emerged as the primarily 
replacements for administrative rules in large organizations (Cappelli, 2008; Marsden & 
Gorman, 1999; Pinfield, 1995) – shape the career advancement and pay of women.  
 Posting is a formal, market-oriented process in which a hiring manager posts 
information about an open job to an internal job board and invites interested employees to 
apply. Though job posting systems have existed since the 1940s in union workplace 
(Slichter et al., 1960), their widespread adoption is a recent phenomenon. Less than half 
of companies posted anything other than blue-collar jobs in the mid-1980s, a figure that 
rose to 60 percent in 1999 before exploding to over 95 percent in the mid-to-late-2000s 
(Frank Dobbin, Schrage, & Alexandra Kalev, 2014; Kleiman & Clark, 1984; Taleo 
Research, 2005). However, the actual percentage of internal hires made through posting 
substantially lower than 95 percent. Though many companies have adopted policies 
encouraging managers to post open jobs, few require it (Grensing-Pophal, 2006; Strum, 
2001), and no state or federal laws require firms to post jobs internally. Managers 
therefore typically have the option of bypassing the posting process in favor of 
sponsorship, an informal, relationship-oriented process in which a hiring manager fills an 
open job with a candidate known through a personal connection (Pinfield, 1995). As a 
result, posting and sponsorship operate side-by-side as equally viable ways to identify 
potential internal candidates within most firms (Marsden & Gorman, 1999).  
 While the different ways in which external hiring process such as the use of 
referrals shape gender disparities in employment outcomes has received considerable 
attention (Fernandez & Mors, 2008; Petersen et al., 2005), internal hiring processes and 
their corresponding effects on the fortunes of women within firms have remained largely 
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unexplored. This lack of attention, however, does not reflect a lack of scholarly interest in 
the topic, as scholars have long-speculated, but have thus far been largely unable to test, 
how the use of markets and networks within firms might affect the fortunes of women 
(Bielby, 2000; Cannings & Montmarquette, 1991). Rather, this oversight can be partially 
attributed to the fact that the most visible consequence of the dismantling of bureaucratic 
ILMs has been a dramatic increase in mobility across organizations. Amidst the 
increasing attention paid to the rise of interorganizational careers, it has been easy to 
overlook the fact that internal hiring remains a key avenue of attainment. In fact, nearly 
half of all open jobs – and three quarters of executive-level jobs – in large organizations 
are currently filled internally (Chapelle, 2014; Crispin & Mehler, 2013) and firms across 
the globe are devoting increasing resources towards developing their internal hiring 
capabilities (Murthy, 2013). Access to data has also hindered efforts to develop and test 
theory. Variations in internal hiring processes operating within firms limit the insights to 
be gained from surveys of employer hiring practices, as simply having a posting system 
or policy in place does little to ensure that a majority of jobs are filled actually filled 
through posting (Dobbin et al., n.d.; Marsden & Gorman, 1999). Obtaining useful data 
from individual firms presents its own set of challenges; many firms fail to systematically 
record internal hiring data (ERC, 2010) and for those that do, the fear of sanctions were 
internal analyses to reveal previously unrecognized biases has the perverse effect of 
discouraging firms from exploring these processes (Strum, 2001, p. 461).  
 I unpack the different ways in which contemporary internal hiring process shape 
the organization careers of women using uniquely detailed personnel and internal job 
application data from a large service organization in the United States. In doing so, I 
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extend the equally rich but largely separate literatures detailing the structural and 
behavioral barriers facing women in contemporary organizations. Structural barriers 
refer to constraints imposed by the organization of work within the firm (Reskin & Roos, 
1990). A central argument in this literature is that gender inequalities arise in large part 
due to the jobs women hold, as women are often concentrated in marginalized roles. 
Behavioral barriers, in contrast, refer to constraints emerging from individual-level 
differences in preferences or behaviors that are either innate or the product of such early 
socialization processes that they operate as if they were innate (Hull & Nelson, 2000, p. 
232). This literature has documented, for example, how women’s reluctance to engage in 
negotiations (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991; Greig, 2008; Small, Gelfand, Babcock, & Gettman, 
2007), enter competitive selection environments (Kanthak & Woon, 2014) and engage in 
self-promotion (Moss-Racusin & Rudman, 2010) can lead to gender differences in 
advancement and pay. The central argument of this paper is that because organization 
processes such as internal hiring often facilitate the interaction of individual employees 
and organization structures (e.g. individual workers moving across jobs within a firm), 
the ability of such processes to remediate gender inequalities within organizations 
depends on the extent to which they account for both gender differences in structural 
constraints, such as the different types of jobs occupied by women and men, and gender 
differences in preferences and behaviors. 
 I build theory around a base of several structural and behavior barriers with well-
documented impacts on the organizational careers of women. My initial set of arguments 
suggests that posting holds tremendous potential for reducing inequalities in both 
advancement and pay. In terms of advancement, I expect that posting will be particularly 
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adept at facilitating the advancement of workers occupying low-status and/or 
marginalized jobs, and because women disproportionately occupy such jobs, posting 
should be support the internal advancement prospects of women. Workers in 
marginalized jobs have limited visibility to potential hiring managers as well as limited 
access to the informal networks though which information on potential advancement 
opportunities often flows (Ibarra, 1993, 1995; Alexandra Kalev, 2009; Podolny & Baron, 
1997). While sponsorship reinforces these structural barriers, posting should help to 
alleviate them by providing open access to information about potential advancement 
opportunities, as well as a mechanism though which employees are able to make 
themselves and their qualifications visible to hiring managers.  
In terms of pay, I expect to find smaller within-job gender gaps in pay when jobs 
are entered through posting as compared to sponsorship. Survey research and lab 
experiments have consistently demonstrated that women are significantly less likely to 
engage in salary negotiations and are less successful when they do, largely because 
women tend to adopt a more relational approach to such negotiations (Babcock & 
Laschever, 2003; Bowles, Babcock, & Lai, 2007; Marks & Harold, 2011). I argue that the 
transactional nature of the posting process, in contrast to more relational sponsorship 
process, will reduce gender differences in negotiating behavior by encouraging women 
both to initiate negotiations and to adopt a more competitive approach when they do 
negotiate. 
My second set of arguments, however, suggests that while the posting hold 
tremendous potential for reducing gender inequalities, the gendered nature of the posting 
process itself will limiting its effectiveness by discouraging otherwise qualified women 
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from applying to posted jobs. The effective functioning of market-based matching 
processes requires the active participation of both buyers (in this case, hiring managers) 
and sellers (candidates). I show that despite appearing to be gender-neutral, the posting 
process itself is constructed on underlying assumptions about appropriate behavior that 
discourage women’s participation (Acker, 1990). Specifically, the posting process 
requires employees to enter into a competition, engage in self-promotion, and make 
judgments about the extent to which they are qualified for an open job. Following recent 
research demonstrating women’s relative reluctance to engage in competition (Niederle 
& Vesterlund, 2007) and self-promotion (Rudman, 1998), and increased propensity for 
rule following (Villalobos, 2009), I hypothesize that women will be less likely to apply 
for posted jobs than structurally and observationally equivalent men (e.g. men occupying 
the same job and possessing the same qualifications).  
Taken together, my arguments suggest that posting has the potential to reduce 
gender inequalities in advancement by helping to overcome the structural barriers 
imposed by the segregation of women into marginalized jobs, as well as the potential to 
reduce gender inequalities in within-job pay by reducing gender differences in 
negotiating behavior. However, the effectiveness of the posting process in accomplishing 
these goals is severely limited by the implicitly gendered nature of the posting process 
itself, which reinforces a number of behavior barriers emerging from gender differences 
in preferences and behaviors that are likely to reduce women’s willingness to apply for 
posted jobs. 
I use multiple modeling strategies in testing these predictions, which are largely 
supported using five years (2008-2012) of annual personnel records covering all 
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employees of a large health insurance provider and detailed data on more than 20,000 
internal job applications. The personnel data are distinctive in that they clearly identify 
whether posting or sponsorship was used to facilitate each one of the more than 9,000 
internal hires (resulting in more than 4,600 internal advancements) made over this period.  
Together, these data allow me to conduct what is, to my knowledge, the first detailed 
study of the whether and how these two very different internal hiring processes affect 
gender inequalities in advancement and pay within contemporary organizations.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The central argument of this paper is that the ability of internal hiring process to 
remediate gender inequalities within organizations depends on the extent to which they 
account for both gender differences in structural constraints and gender differences in 
preferences and behaviors. In order to fully develop this argument, it is important to first 
define some key terms. 
Internal hiring occurs when a manager fills an open job by hiring a worker 
currently employed by the organization in a different job, resulting in the reallocation of 
that worker to a new set of organizational activities14. From the perspective of the worker, 
an internal hire results in an advancement when the move results in a substantive increase 
in responsibility, which is frequently accompanied by an increase in pay. I use the term 
advancement rather than promotion to more accurately represent changes the way 
workers and firms think about mobility within contemporary organizations. In the past, 
workers advanced primarily through promotions up a job ladder (Stewman & Konda, 
                                                            
14 Internal hiring is conceptually distinct from corporate restructurings, in which large groups of 
workers – often entire departments or lines of business – are redeployed, en masse, to new 
products or markets (Capron, Dussauge, & Mitchell, 1998; London, 1996). 
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1983). With the transition to flatter hierarchies, broadly defined jobs, and an emphasis on 
cross-functional experience (Grant & Parker, 2009; Rajan & Wulf, 2006; Sanchez & 
Levine, 2012), lateral advancements, in which a worker receives a substantive increase in 
salary and responsibility15 by moving to a job in the same hierarchical level, have become 
commonplace. These lateral advancements are distinct from transfers, which are lateral 
moves to similar jobs with similar pay.  
Structural Barriers to Equal Advancement 
A structural barrier to advancement is a constraint resulting from organization of 
work within the firm (Reskin & Roos, 1990). A number of personnel practices channel 
women into lower status jobs at all levels of the organization (Anderson & Tomaskovic-
Devey, 1995; Fernandez & Friedrich, 2011; Kmec, 2005; Petersen et al., 2005; Reskin & 
McBrier, 2000) and recent work has called attention to two informal structural barriers to 
advancement imposed on workers segregated into lower status or marginalized jobs – 
limited visibility and access to strategic networks (Kalev, 2009).  
Workers in lower status jobs tend to have limited interaction with others outside 
their work group, limiting opportunities for organizational decision makers to notice and 
evaluate their contributions (Acker, 1990; Kanter, 1977; McGuire, 2002). This limited 
visibility is further exacerbated by fact that these jobs are disproportionately occupied by 
women, and social scientists have long documented how organizations devalue the work 
– in terms of its relative importance to the goals of the organization – done in jobs 
                                                            
15 In the organization I study, vertical and lateral advancements and are virtually indistinguishable 
from the perspective of employees and managers; lateral advancement are officially recognized as 
advancements in the employee’s personnel records and are often accompanied with similar (and 
often larger) increases in salary and responsibility than promotions.  
78 
 
occupied primarily by women (Baron & Newman, 1990; Ridgeway, 2011; Tomaskovic-
Devey, 1993).  
Workers in lower status jobs also have limited access to strategic networks 
(Ibarra, 1993; McGuire, 2002). An individual’s selection of network members is 
constrained by the availability of potential alternatives (Ibarra, 1992, 1993) and job 
segregation leads workers to build networks composed of similarly situated others. As a 
result, the networks of workers in marginalized jobs tend to be composed of individuals 
with limited power and authority (Bielby & Baron, 1986; McGuire, 2000). Moreover, 
gender scholars have demonstrated that job segregation perpetuates negative stereotypes 
of worker’s competence (Ridgeway, 1997), reducing the attractiveness of workers 
occupying marginalized jobs as potential network partners to high-status others (Ibarra, 
1993).  
The limited visibility and access to strategic networks available to workers in 
lower status jobs limits their opportunities for internal advancement. In the absence of 
clear rules or structures to guide advancement, managers and workers must now actively 
search for internal matches that meet organizational needs and allow workers to assemble 
meaningful internal careers (Cappelli, 2008, p. 206).  For matches to take place, 
managers must be aware of potential internal candidates and/or potential internal 
candidates must be aware of potential opportunities. Managers are less likely to be aware 
of individual candidates occupying lower status jobs because of their limited visibility 
and candidates in these jobs are less likely to be aware of potential opportunities to 
pursue because information about such opportunities often flows through the informal 
networks they have difficulty accessing (Podolny & Baron, 1997).  
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Because women are disproportionately represented in lower status jobs, these 
arguments suggest that even if managers were completely gender neutral in their 
evaluation of candidates, women will be less likely than men to advance simply because 
of the jobs they occupy; by virtue of their position in marginalized jobs, women are less 
likely than men to enter a hiring manager’s consideration set.   
Sponsorship should be expected to reinforce these structural constraints to 
women’s advancement, while posting should be expected to alleviate them. A sponsoring 
manager’s consideration set is limited to internal candidates that manager is personally 
aware of and candidates recommended through the manager’s informal network. Workers 
in lower status jobs – who are less visible and have limited access to informal networks – 
are clearly disadvantaged. The opposite should be expected in posting. In allowing 
interested candidates to apply for an open position, posting provides a formal mechanism 
though which any employee is able to make themselves and their qualifications visible to 
hiring managers. Posting an open job on an internal job board accessible to all employees 
also ensures that information about potential advancement opportunities is made 
available to potential internal candidates regardless of the job they occupy and the 
composition of their network. When compared with sponsorship, posting should therefore 
be expected to provide more opportunities for advancement to workers with limited 
visibility and access to strategic networks (who are primarily female), leading me to 
predict that,  
 H1: Workers occupying lower status jobs are more likely to advance through 
posting as compared to sponsorship. 
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A Behavioral Barrier to Equal Pay 
 Aside from gender inequality in the form of advancement, we should not overlook 
gender inequality in pay. That requires shifting our attention to behavioral barriers 
resulting from individual-level differences in preferences or behaviors that are either 
innate or the product of such early socialization processes that they operate as if they 
were innate (Hull & Nelson, 2000, p. 232). Gender differences in negotiation are an 
important source of gender inequalities in pay, with lab and survey evidence indicating 
that women are less likely than men to initiate salary negotiations (Babcock & Laschever, 
2003; Bowles et al., 2007; Greig, 2008) are more likely to use ineffective negotiation 
strategies when they do choose to negotiate (Marks & Harold, 2011).  
 Much research in social psychology suggests that these differences arise because 
women are more attuned to the relational aspects of negotiation than men (Barron, 2003; 
Curhan et al., 2008). As a result, women are more likely to adopt a relation orientation to 
negotiation in which they are often willing to forgo economic gain in an effort to develop 
and maintain relational capital (Curhan et al., 2006, 2008, p. 193; Gelfand et al., 2006). 
Focused on developing relational capital, women are more likely avoid appearing self-
interested and feel uncomfortable with the idea of asking for more money (Gelfand et al., 
2006). They will also more be likely to perceive the initial offer as fair; being more 
attuned to other party’s goals should reduce the likelihood they will assume the other 
party’s interests are opposed to their own, a common error in negotiations (S. E. Cross et 
al., 2000; Gelfand et al., 2006; Leigh Thompson & Deharpport, 1998). Conditional on 
choosing to negotiate, women are also more likely to employ an accommodative rather 
than a competitive negotiation strategy (Curhan et al., 2008), and accommodative 
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approaches to salary negotiation have been shown to result in lower raises than 
competitive approaches (Marks & Harold, 2011). 
 Recent research on negotiation suggests that situational contexts, such as subject 
of negotiation and the likelihood of future interaction, will shape an individual’s 
relational orientation towards a specific negotiation, above and beyond individual 
differences (Curhan et al., 2008; Gelfand et al., 2006). In the case of internal hiring, the 
process itself is likely to be an important contextual variable. Sponsorship is much more 
likely to cue a worker to focus on their relationship with the hiring manager. Because the 
hiring manager personally appointed the worker to the job absent any formal competition, 
the relationship with the hiring manager is likely to be particularly salient and highly 
valued at the time an initial job offer is presented. This is unlikely to be case in posting, 
with the competitive nature of the process emphasizing the transactional nature of the 
employment relationship. As a result, sponsorship should be more likely to induce a 
relational orientation when the time comes to negotiate compensation, while whereas a 
worker hired through posting should be more likely to adopt a transactional orientation. If 
women are typically more inclined than men to negotiate relationally, this difference 
should minimized in the more transactional posting process, with women more likely to 
both initiate and adopting a competitive approach to negotiation. As a result, I expect 
that, 
 H2: Any gender gap in starting salaries associated with the move to a new job 
within the firm will be lower when jobs are filled by posting as compared to sponsorship.   
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Posting as a Gendered Process  
The arguments above suggest that the posting process has the potential to alleviate 
existing gender disparities in both advancement and pay. However, the posting process, 
like any market-based process, requires the active participation of buyers and sellers. In 
this case, a manager assumes the role of buyer by posting information about an open job 
to an internal job board and inviting interested candidates to apply. Current employees 
assume the role of seller by expressing their interest in and qualifications for the job by 
submitting an application. For posting to reach its full potential as a mechanism for 
reducing persistent gender inequalities, women must actively engage in the internal 
market by applying for open jobs. There are several reasons, however, to expect that 
women may be less likely than men to apply for posted jobs16.   
Feminist scholars of organizations have long argued that many organizational 
structures and process are implicitly gendered. That is, certain facets of organizations that 
appear gender-neutral often advantage men in subtle ways.  For example, Acker (1989, 
1990) has argued that job evaluation appears to be a gender-neutral process built on an 
objective comparison of the knowledge, skill, and abilities required to perform a job, with 
a job representing an abstract category that has no actual human occupant and is instead 
filled by a disembodied (and therefore genderless) hypothetical worker. Yet the concept 
of a “job” is implicitly gendered because the hypothetical worker filling a job exists only 
                                                            
16 A number of recent popular press articles have suggested that women are less likely than men 
to apply for open jobs (Kay & Shipman, 2014; Mohr, 2014; Sandberg, 2013), To date, however, 
little empirical evidence exists to support this claim, nor has the issue received much theoretical 
consideration. For example, the notion that women only apply for jobs if they are 100% qualified 
is based almost entirely on a single anecdote from a McKinsey interview with one executive from 
one company (Rice, 2014). 
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to fill that job, whose closest real world counterpart is the male worker whose life centers 
on his job.  Empirical support for this argument can be found in recent work by the 
economist Claudia Goldin (2014), who has argued that the remaining gender gap in pay 
can largely be attributed to expectations about the number of hours worked and what 
constitutes appropriate work hours that largely favor men. Consistent with the idea that  
“gender is a constitutive element in organizational logic, or the underlying assumptions 
and practices that construct most contemporary work organizations” (Acker, 1990, p. 
147), in the following sections I describe three specific ways in which the posting process 
is implicitly gendered, each of which discourages women from applying to jobs. 
Posting and competition. The first way posting is gendered is through its 
emphasis on open competition (Marsden & Gorman, 1999). When an employee submits 
an application, they join a labor queue – a set of workers competing for a specific job at a 
specific time (Reskin & Roos, 1990). The formal nature of the process – the fact that 
employees have to actively submit an application – sends a clear message to employees 
that they are entering into a competition that they are not assured of winning. 
The competitive nature of the posting process is likely to shape gender differences 
in participation, as multiple studies have demonstrated that women tend to be less 
competitively inclined than men. Behavioral economists, for example, have consistently 
found that women are less likely to choose to compete than men despite the fact that 
women who choose to compete tend to perform just as well as men (Andersen, Ertac, 
Gneezy, List, & Maximiano, 2013; Booth & Nolen, 2012; Croson & Gneezy, 2009). 
Additional studies have shown that women are consistently less likely to select into 
tournaments characterized by competitive compensation schemes (Brandts, Groenert, & 
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Rott, 2014; Mayr, Dave Wozniak, Davidson, Kuhns, & Harbaugh, 2012; Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007).  Perhaps most relevant to this study, Kanthak and Woon (2014) 
designed a lab experiment to test whether the competitiveness of the selection 
environment effect the decision of women to seek political office. They found that while 
men and women volunteered to represent their groups at equal rates when asked, 
women’s willingness to represent their group decreased substantially when women were 
told they would have to participate in an election, suggesting that women are indeed 
sensitive to the competitiveness of the selection process.   
The existing literature offers two explanation for women’s reluctance to enter 
competitions. One explanation attributes gender difference in competitiveness to 
biological differences that have evolved over time in response to ecological conditions 
(Colarelli, Spranger, & Hechanova, 2006; Wozniak, Harbaugh, & Mayr, 2014). Others 
attributes gender difference in competitiveness to early childhood socialization processes 
which dampen girls’ willingness to compete as early as kindergarten and persist until 
adulthood (Carpenter & Huston-Stein, 1980; Freeman, 2007; Sutter & Glätzle-Rützler, 
2014; Weinberger & Stein, 2008). Studies in behavioral economics showing that gender 
differences in competitiveness are stronger in patriarchal societies than in matrilineal 
societies (Andersen et al., 2013; Gneezy, Leonard, & List, 2009) as well studies in 
developmental psychology demonstrating the influence of parental and environmental 
influences over competitive behaviors among toddlers (Carpenter & Huston-Stein, 1980; 
Freeman, 2007; Weinberger & Stein, 2008) lend support to the socialization explanation. 
Whether women’s reluctance to enter competitions emerges from innate biological 
differences, socialized preferences, or both, we should expect that the competitive nature 
85 
 
of the posting process will discourage potential female candidates to from applying for 
posted jobs.   
Posting and self-promotion. The second way posting is gendered is that is 
requires interested internal candidates to engage in self-promotion. Self-promotion is a 
form of impression management that includes “pointing with pride to one’s 
accomplishments, speaking directly about one’s strengths and talents, and making 
internal rather than external attributions for achievements” (Rudman, 1998, p. 629). The 
simple act of putting together an application, including writing a resume, requires a 
worker to highlight their strengths and talents. The need to self-promote only increases 
throughout the hiring process, as the candidate passes the initial screening interview with 
an internal recruiter and then interviews with the hiring manager (and potentially several 
other decision-makers). Indeed, research on the hiring process has shown that applicants 
frequently engage in self-promotion during interviews (Stevens & Kristof, 1995) and that 
self-promotion frequently has a positive impact on perceived person-job fit and 
manager’s hiring recommendations  (Kristof-Brown, 2000; Proost, Schreurs, De Witte, & 
Derous, 2010).  
Requiring interested candidates to self-promote presents a particularly unique 
behavioral barrier for women. According to gender role theory, men are seen as agentic 
in nature and thus more likely to engage in independent, assertive, and more 
instrumentally-driven behaviors.  Women, on the other hand, are seen as communal in 
nature and thus more likely to engage in friendly and unselfish behaviors that 
demonstrate a concern for others (Eagly & Wood, 1991; Eagly, 1987).  Self-promotion is 
an agentic trait, and thus is "intuitively more normative and acceptable for men than for 
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women" (L. C. Miller, Cooke, Tsang, & Morgan, 1992; Rudman, 1998: 629). Women 
incur social costs for violating gender-stereotypic norm prescriptions (Eagly, 1987; 
Heilman, Wallen, Fuchs, & Tamkins, 2004) and thus may avoid self-promoting for fear 
of violating the prescriptive elements of their gender stereotype and being judged as 
unfeminine, pushy, and domineering. Indeed, a sustainable body of evidence has 
demonstrated that in order to avoid potential backlash, women often choose not to engage 
in self-promotion even when they are aware that self-promotion is likely to lead to more 
successful career outcomes, including opportunities for internal advancement (Catalyst, 
2007; Moss-Racusin & Rudman, 2010; Singh, Kumra, & Vinnicombe, 2002). I therefore 
expect that by virtue of the subtle requirement that interested internal candidates engage 
in self-promotion, the posting process will discourage potential female candidates to from 
applying for posted jobs.   
Posting and rule following. The third way posting is gendered has to do with the 
way in which potential candidates evaluate the qualifications listed in the job posting.  A 
typical job posting includes a list of job qualifications indicating the skills, knowledge, 
abilities, degrees, experience and personal characteristics (e.g. motivation, willingness to 
be team player) that an individual must have to perform the job. Job descriptions used to 
be based on a detailed job analyses, a process that rarely happens in contemporary 
organizations (Sanchez & Levine, 2012). Rather, individual hiring managers are likely to 
develop job extensive job descriptions that are developed based on a personal “wish list” 
rather than simply the characteristics a candidate needs to have to succeed on the job 
(Stybel, 2010).  Put differently, job postings often describe the manager’s ideal candidate, 
even when this ideal candidate is not likely to exist in reality (Cappelli, 2012).   
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This poses a potential barrier for women, as they are more likely than men to view 
the listed qualifications as a set of rules about who should apply for the job. While the 
propensity to follow rules can benefit women – researchers have attributed girl’s 
propensity to follow rules as key reason that girls routinely outscore boys on mathematics 
tests (Villalobos, 2009) – it may disadvantage them in the labor market. If it leads women 
take written job qualifications more seriously than men, as indicated by a recent survey 
data (Mohr, 2014), then women are likely to apply only when they meet all of the listed 
qualifications, while men may be likely to apply when they only meet a portion of the 
listed qualifications. This difference arises from the fact that girls are socialized both at 
home and in school to follow rules from an early age (Babcock & Laschever, 2003, p. 35; 
Carpenter & Huston-Stein, 1980; Fagot, 1978; McDonald & Rogers, 1995). As a number 
of gender scholars have observed, “despite the modern social milieu in which assertive, 
soccer ball-kicking girls are a socially accepted expression of adolescent femininity, there 
are myriad forces at play in a girl’s life which still disproportionately support rule 
following and carefulness” (Villalobos, 2009, p. 33). We should therefore expect that 
women will be less likely to apply for posted jobs than men in similar jobs and with 
similar qualifications, which presents a barrier to women’s advancement because 
managers frequently hire “imperfect” candidates.   
Taken together, these arguments suggest that subtle and implicit gendering of the 
posting process will discourage women from apply to internally posted jobs at the same 
rate as men occupying similar jobs and with similar qualifications.  More formally, I 
expect that  
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 H3: Women will be less likely than structurally and observationally equivalent 
men to apply for jobs posted internally. 
 While my data do not allow me to tease out the separate effects of competition, 
self-promotion, and rule-following, I am able to observe the qualification of internal 
applicants, which does allow me to test the rule following argument offered above. 
Specifically, if women are likely to apply only when they feel they meet all of the listed 
qualifications, while men apply even if they only meet a portion of the listed 
qualifications, I expect to find that women internal applicants will be more qualified than 
male internal applicants, which will be reflected in their performance ratings. 
Specifically. I predicate that: 
 H4: Women internal applicants will have higher performance ratings than men 
applying to the same job. 
DATA 
 The arguments above suggest that though the posting process has the potential to 
alleviate existing gender disparities within organizations by overcoming structural 
barriers to women’s advancement imposed by job segregation and by mitigating gender 
difference in negotiating behavior, its effectiveness in doing so will be limited by the 
implicit gendering of the posting process, which will discourage female candidates from 
applying for open jobs. I test these arguments using two different sources of data from a 
large health insurance company in the United States, which I call InsureCo. The first 
dataset, from InsureCo’s centralized talent management system, contains annual 
personnel records covering all fulltime workers employed by InsureCo from 2008 
through 2012, with the exception the very top (C-suite) executives. Each of the 68,018 
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person-year observations includes detailed demographic, pay, and performance 
information. The second data set, from InsureCo’s applicant tracking system, contains 
detailed information on each of the 20,694 internal applications (successful and 
unsuccessful) submitted to one of the 1,697 jobs posted internally in 2012, including the 
job applied for and how far in the hiring process the candidate progressed. I am able to 
link these two datasets together through the use of unique employee identifiers.   
While generalizability is always a concern when using data from a single firm, 
these data are uniquely suited to test my hypotheses due to the way in which InsureCo 
has linked their various human resource information systems. Hiring decisions at 
InsureCo are decentralized; individual managers are responsible for filling the jobs that 
fall under their supervision are given substantial latitude over who is hired as well as how 
those jobs are filled. To post a job, a manager submits a request though one system, and 
to sponsor a candidate, a manager submits a request through a different system. While 
both requests are routed to the same place for approval (typically the manager’s 
immediate supervisor) they create unique identifiers in the hired employees personnel 
record, allowing me identify whether the hire was made through posting or sponsorship. 
The setting itself reduces at least some concerns about generalizability, as InsureCo 
mirrors other large contemporary organizations in several respects: hiring decisions are 
delegated to individual managers, employees are explicitly encouraged to actively 
manage their careers amid a lack of well-defined advancement paths, and there are 
substantial amounts of lateral and vertical mobility across broadly defined jobs. 
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Internal mobility variables 
An internal hire results when a manager fills an open job with a current 
employee17, as indicated by a change in an employee’s job code or department. Each job 
code at InsureCo represents a unique set of tasks and responsibilities. As a result, a 
change in an employee’s job code reflects a meaningful change in the work a person 
does, as opposed to a change in title with little change to the work actually performed 
(Miner, 1987). A move to a new department represents a move to different area of the 
business, as departments are organized around products, geographic markets, and 
customers. In any given year, approximately 34,000 employees were distributed across 
450 job codes and 50 departments. 
I used the changes in job code to distinguish between advancements and transfers. 
Consistent with the way employees and managers think about mobility within InsureCo, I 
define an advancement as an internal hire resulting in a promotion or expansion, and a 
transfer as a lateral move to the same job but in a different department. During the five 
year observation period, there were are total of 4,635 advancements; 57 percent of which 
were made through posting and 43 percent through sponsorship. Over the same period, 
there were 3,610 transfers, 6,458 associates exited the firm, and 7,884 workers were hired 
externally.   
In addition to ascertaining the types of moves, I use the personnel records to 
identify several attributes of internal moves, including whether an employee moved to a 
job within the same department, same function or same state. Each job at InsureCo is 
                                                            
17 InsureCo has a vacancy-driven hiring process, meaning that all hires – internal and external – 
are preceded by an open job. 
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assigned a unique combination of eight competencies against which employees in that job 
evaluated on an annual basis, allowing me to create an objective measure of job 
similarity. I calculate the number of competencies a pair of jobs has in common, ranging 
from 0-8, with 8 indicating a move to an identical job (e.g. they transferred in the same in 
a different department) and a 0 indicating a move to completely different job.  
Performance and salary variables 
I constructed two different measures from InsureCo’s annual performance 
evaluations in order to control for differences in job performance and ability among 
current employees. A workers contribution score assesses their contribution to the 
success of the organization. In jobs with a less direct impact on organization-level 
outcomes (e.g. those at lower levels), the contribution score is typically used to assess 
their contribution to the department over the previous year. It is measured on a 1 to 4 
scale (1=low contribution; 2=moderate contribution; 3=full contribution; 4=exemplary 
contribution).  
Managers also rank workers in similar jobs as part of an annual calibration 
process (described below). Unlike the contribution score, which focuses on previous 
performance, calibration sessions are intended to provide an indication of an employee’s 
overall value to the organization that takes into account both previous performance and 
future potential. Managers supervising employees in similar roles create “buckets” of 
employees; a group of 100 employees may not be ranked from 1 (highest) to 100 
(lowest), but rather the top five employees may receive a 1, the next ten a 2, the next 
twenty-five a 3, and so on. I use these rankings to identify whether a worker falls into the 
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first (top 25%), second, third or fourth (bottom 25%) performance quartile of workers in 
similar jobs18.  
Despite concerns about the potential for managerial bias to affect ratings, both of 
these measures are likely to provide fairly accurate reflections of employee performance 
and ability. Several researchers have argued that appraisal ratings are among the most 
valid measures of performance (Cascio, 1998) as they enable managers to take into 
consideration a variety of behaviors and outputs relevant to the job (Medoff & Abraham, 
1981) as well as account for factors affecting performance outside the control of the 
individual worker (J. P. Campbell et al., 1993). InsureCo’s annual evaluation process 
further helps to reduce potential concerns about supervisory bias affecting individual 
performance ratings. Managers who supervise workers in similar jobs meet in person to 
review and discuss their ratings of individual workers. These calibration discussions are 
intended to ensure that managers are evaluating workers against a common standard and 
to identify and correct instances where managers may have rated employees too harshly 
or leniently. Research has shown that calibration tends to reduce subjectivity and bias in 
performance ratings both because ratings are likely to be more consistent across 
employees when managers share a common view on rating standards (Mclntyre et al., 
1984; Pulakos, 1984) and because “fellow managers do not do not usually let each other 
off easily if they believe an employee has been rated unfairly, creating peer pressure that 
provides a powerful incentive to make accurate ratings” (Pulakos & O’Leary, 2011, pp. 
152–3).  
                                                            
18 In some analysis, I also include measures of whether a worker falls into Top 10% or Bottom 
10% of their peer group. 
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Starting salary is calculated as the natural logarithm of the salary a worker 
receives in their first month in a new job. Salary accounts for the vast majority of 
compensation for most workers at InsureCo. The main exception are workers in sales job, 
where bonuses based on sales targets often account for a substantial portion of total 
compensation. Fortunately, expected bonus amounts19 are factored into the salary figures 
recorded in InsureCo’s personnel records. For example, if an employee moves into a 
sales job with a base salary of $80,000 and expects to earn a bonus of $40,000, her 
personnel record with indicate a salary of $120,000 (base + bonus). The salary figure 
reflect the total compensation she should expect to earn during the year and should 
therefore accurately reflect the results of any salary negotiations that may have taken 
place at the time of hire. 
I also include dummy variables for each year in the sample to account for 
changing labor market conditions that could potentially affect starting salaries and the 
supply of external candidates (and thus opportunities for internal advancement).  
Demographic variables 
The personnel records include information the gender, ethnicity (White, Black, 
Asian, Other) and age of each employee. I calculate firm tenure and job tenure based on 
hiring date and job start date, respectively. InsureCo does not include years of education 
or highest degree completed in their personnel records. 
                                                            
19 Expected bonuses are typically based on meeting a sales target calculated from the previous 
year’s sales, market growth, and other factors.  
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Job variables and job status 
Though I am able to include job fixed effects, I also create a vector of variables 
that reflect salient characteristics of different jobs within the firm in an effort to better 
pinpoint the specific mechanisms driving the results, including the relative status of 
different types of jobs within InsureCo.  
Jobs are organized into four broad job tiers composed of hourly (non-exempt) 
jobs, independent contributor jobs, managerial jobs, and executive jobs. Workers in 
hourly jobs are located in the lowest levels of the hierarchy (levels 1-2) while workers in 
executive jobs are located in the highest levels (6-9; Vice President to CEO). Independent 
contributor and managerial jobs are clustered primarily in the middle levels of 
organization (3-5). Individual contributors do not have any managerial responsibilities, 
but occupy jobs that directly contribute the goals of the organization (e.g. Zenger, 2014). 
These roles typically require minimal levels of teamwork and collaboration. Managers, in 
contrast, are responsible for directly supervising other workers. Among these tiers, 
executive jobs are those with the highest status and hourly jobs the lowest status by virtue 
of their location in the organizational hierarchy. Though independent contributor and 
managerial job are both clustered in the middle of the organizations hierarchy, 
independent contributor jobs are generally convey a higher level of status within the 
organization because individual performance and contribution to organization are both 
more visible and easier to evaluate.   
Jobs are further organized into six broad functional areas: sales, advisory, 
products, operations, and products. Workers in sales roles are responsible for developing 
and maintaining relationships with individual, employer and government purchasers of 
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the firm’s various product offerings. Workers in central office roles occupy a variety of 
“back office” functions, including human resources, compliance, technology, legal, and 
government relations. Workers in advisory roles provide guidance and advice to 
individuals and organizations covered by InsureCo’s insurance plans. Workers in product 
roles are responsible for the evaluation and improvement of the firm’s product offerings. 
Worker in operations roles are responsible for the day-to-day logistics of operating an 
insurance business, such as billing and enrollment. Among these functions, sales roles 
tend to occupy the highest status at InsureCo given that sales are the organizations key 
source of revenue. Though there is some variation in status within central office roles, 
these roles are generally considered to be high status role (though less so than sales) and 
include many of jobs designated as strategic/specialist roles by the organization (and thus 
key to organizational performance), including underwriting, financial, actuarial, and 
government relations jobs. The vast majority of advisory, product and operations role are 
considered to be support roles which, while critical to the day-to-day running of the 
business, are typically viewed as lower in status.   
Percentage female is the percent of females in a given job across the entire 
organization20.  While no one at InsureCo specifically mentioned that jobs with high 
percentages of females were lower status, previous research has consistently shown that 
work done in jobs occupied primarily by women is systematically devalued (Baron & 
Newman, 1990; Ridgeway, 2011; Tomaskovic-Devey, 1993). Moreover, the clustering of 
                                                            
20 I also calculated the percentage of females in a given job within a work group. These two 
measures are highly correlated and produce similar empirical results.   
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women in devalued jobs perpetuates negative stereotypes of women’s competence 
(Ridgeway, 1997), further diminishing the status of female dominated jobs.  
Work group size is calculated as the number of individuals occupying the same 
job code within the same department. Work group size is a further proxy for status, as 
more workers occupying the same job code within the same department downplays the 
value of any single worker’s performance to the organization. As a result, individual 
workers in larger work groups are likely to be less visible to hiring managers, even if the 
managers is aware that workers in a specific type of job might be a good fit for an open 
position.   
Additional jobs variables unrelated to job status include dummy variables 
indicating whether a worker reports to a female supervisor or is located job located at 
InsureCo’s headquarters. 
Job application variables 
In the analyses using the job application data, I create set of variable indicating 
whether the application represents a potential advancement, potential move to the same 
department, same function or same state, and the job similarity between the job a 
candidate currently occupies and the job they are applying for.  
The job application data allows me to identify how far along in the hiring process 
each candidate advanced. The recruitment process involves seven stages: (1) initial 
screening by the applicant tracking system, (2) screening by an internal recruiter, (3) 
resume review by the hiring managers, (4) interview by the hiring manager, (5) job offer 
extended, (6) background check, (7) hire completed. A candidate can drop out the process 
after any stage prior to the hire being completed. In my analyses, I focus on whether or 
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not an internal candidate received a job offer as opposed to whether or not a candidate 
was hired, as this this a better outcome for assessing which attributes (including gender) 
affect the opportunities available to internal candidates. Once a candidate receives an 
offer, they have the option of accepting or declining the offer; less than 1% of internal 
candidates fail to pass the background check, but around 10% decline to accept an offer, 
most often because they had applied to multiple jobs and chose to accept another job 
within the organization. 
In additional to creating a vector of job application variables, examining whether 
women are less likely to apply for posted jobs required me to identify the set of workers 
most likely to be at risk of applying to a particular job at a particular time. If there were 
clearly defined advancement paths within the organization, this would be a 
straightforward task; the risk set would consist of those employees located in the job 
leading to the focal job, typically the job located on rung down on the job ladder. In the 
absence of clearly defined advancement paths, I used the internal application data to 
construct the internal applicant risk set. For each posted job, I first identified which jobs 
successful internal applicants were most likely to occupy at the time of application. 
Specifically, workers were identified as at risk for applying to a posted job if they 
occupied a job that produced at least 10% of total applicants for that job (across all 
requisitions) and in which at least one candidate received an offer. I then excluded 
workers who had been in their current job for less than a year, as the data revealed that 
across all jobs, 92% of applicants receiving an offer had been in their current role for at 
least 12 months. I discussed these criteria with several recruiters at InsureCo who 
universally found these criterion to be reasonable. Nevertheless, I experimented with 
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small modifications to how the risk set was defined, such as changing the inclusion to 
criteria to include jobs that produced 5%, 15% or 20% of total applicants, including 
workers with job tenures of 8 and 10 months, and excluding candidates who ranked in the 
bottom 25% of their performance quartile, and found them all to yield qualitatively 
similar results.   
Endogeneity and omitted variables 
Hiring managers at Health Co. are able to choose whether to fill a job through 
posting or sponsorship, so a particular concern in this study is that there may be variables 
that both affect a manager’s decision of which process to use as well as the outcomes of 
interest. This is a common with non-experimental data. Although such problems can be 
solved using instrumental variables, such variables are often difficult to identify in 
practice (Hamilton & Nickerson, 2003) and were not available for this study. A strength 
of my data, though, is its level of detail which allows us me to address the concern that 
there may be certain jobs that are always posted and others that are always filled through 
sponsorship.  
The data reveal no systematic differences in the types of jobs that are filled 
through posting or sponsorship, as 99% of all internal hires made during the observation 
period involved moves into jobs that were filled by both posting and sponsorship. 
Moreover, of the limited number of jobs filled exclusively through either posting or 
sponsorship, 75% were only filled once or twice, 88% only three times, and none more 
than six times. It is therefore more likely that this is an artifact of so few hires having 
been made into those jobs rather than the fact these jobs are always filled through posting 
or sponsorship. Depending on the particular model, I nevertheless include either (a) 
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separate dummies each job filled though internal hiring during my observation period, or 
(b) separate dummies for each requisition filled during the observation period, in order to 
control for fixed propensities of different jobs to be filled by posting or sponsorship.  
Wired Searches 
A concern specific to this study is the ability to identify “wired searches” (Bielby, 
2000). While posting and sponsorship are conceptually distinct, it is possible for a 
manager to post a job having already decided whom they are going to select. Though 
these jobs are posted, they are actually filled through sponsorship. If this was a common 
occurrence and/or these instances were difficult to identify empirically, it would 
introduce measurement error that would make it difficult to interpret my results; because 
these postings would actually be sponsorships, results attributed to the former would 
actually be due to the latter and actual differences between the two would be harder to 
see. 
These so-called “wired searches” are likely to be most common in firms that 
require managers to post all jobs. Because Health Co. has established formal systems for 
filling jobs through both posting and sponsorship, managers are able to avoid posting jobs 
when they already have a candidate in mind and thereby avoid the potential negative 
consequences that emerge from other employees having felt they participated in an unfair 
selection process (Billsberry, 2007). In other words, there is no need to post a jobs when 
a manager already has a candidate in mind. 
Nevertheless it is possible that this may happen. For example, those instances 
where there was only a single internal applicant for a posted job could potentially be 
wired searches, with managers either tailoring the job description around a particular 
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candidate and/or discouraging others employees from applying. Postings which were 
open for only a week or less could potentially be wired searches as well, indicating that 
the hiring manager created the posting for a specific candidate and therefore wanted to 
limit the number of other candidates who would apply. A total of 47 posting (2.0%) meet 
one or both of these criteria, leading me to believe that wired searches are not common at 
InsureCo and are therefore unlikely to affect interpretation of my results. In unreported 
robustness checks, dropping these observations from the analyses does not substantively 
change any of the results reported below.   
METHOD & RESULTS 
Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables calculated from the 
annual personnel records. Table 3.2 provides a descriptive overview of the how these 
variables differ by gender as of the most recent month for which I have data (December 
2012). These descriptive data reveal that women are systematically more likely to occupy 
lower status and less visible jobs. For example, a much higher percentage of women 
occupy hourly jobs and job in the clinical and operations functions, which involve largely 
administrative tasks. Conversely, a much lower percentage of women occupy the higher 
status independent contributor and executive jobs and jobs in the more visible sales and 
central office functions. Table 3.3 shows the means and standard deviations of key 
variables by the different types of internal moves. Table 3.4 provides an overview of the 
33,933 internal applications submitted to 4,324 job posting (requisitions) during 2012.  
The analyses used to test Hypotheses 1, that workers in female dominated jobs are 
more likely than men to advance through posting as compared to sponsorship, are 
presented in Table 3.5. Models 1 and 2 are multinomial logit models which account for 
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the fact that in any given year, a worker may either stay in their current job (“no move”), 
advance through posting, advance through sponsorship, make a lateral transfer or exit the 
firm.  Each move (or non-move) into a new job represents a mobility event, and serves as 
my unit of analysis. Interpretation of the probabilities in a multinomial logit models rests 
on the assumption that the relative probability of two different outcomes does not depend 
on the presence of other alternatives, known as “independence of irrelevant alternatives” 
(Greene, 2003). Whether a model meets this assumption is largely a theoretical question 
(Long & Freese, 2006), though I also carried out Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests, which 
examine whether results are significantly different if alternatives are dropped from the 
analysis (Long & Freese, 2006). Those analyses were unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that IIA holds, supporting the use of multinomial logit. I cluster errors by individual to 
account for non-independence. 
The focus of my analyses is on comparing advancement through posting (in bold) 
with the base outcome, advancement through sponsorship. That is, conditional on 
advancing, what predicts advancement through posting versus sponsorship? Model 1 
includes a vector of demographic and performance variables as well as controls for year. 
The coefficient for female is positive and statistically significant, indicating that women 
are 19 percent more likely to advance through posting relative to sponsorship than 
observationally equivalent men. Model 2 includes a vector of job-level variables to 
provide more detailed insights as to the mechanisms at work. The significant negative 
coefficient for female, in combination with the results for the job-level variables, 
indicates that females are more likely to advance through posting not because of their 
gender per se, but because of the relative status of the jobs they occupy relative to men. 
102 
 
Consistent with the theoretical arguments presented earlier, the results show that workers 
in lower status jobs – using multiple indicators of relative status – are more likely to rely 
on posting to advance. Workers in jobs with a higher percentage of women and in larger 
work groups are significantly more likely to advance through posting relative to 
sponsorship. Looking at job tiers, hourly and managerial workers (which consist 
primarily of lower-level front-line supervisors) are more likely to rely on sponsorship 
than workers in higher status independent contributor and executive roles. Looking at 
functions, workers in lower status support functions (operation, clinical, and products) are 
more likely to rely on posting to advance than workers in higher status sales and central 
office functions.   
For the sake of robustness, Model 3 presents the results of logit model comparing 
advancement through posting to advancement through sponsorship including controls for 
individual jobs. This model has several benefits. First, it allows me to account for the 
fixed propensity of jobs to be filled by posting or sponsorship. Second, it allows me to 
look at gender segregation at a higher level. Because the job-level controls account for 
the gender ratio in a job, I include a measure of the percentage female at the department 
level. The results are similar to those presented in Model 2, indicating that workers in 
female dominated departments (and in larger work groups) similarly rely on posting.  In 
sum, the analysis in Table 3.5 demonstrates that the greater overall tendency of women to 
rely on posting for advancement tends to be driven by the nature of the jobs they hold. 
That is, women are more likely than men to rely on the posting process to advance 
primary because women are segregated into lower status jobs with lower visibility and 
access to high-status decision-makers, the very structural barriers which posting helps to 
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overcome. Importantly, the results in Models 2 and 3 also indicate women are less likely 
than observationally equivalent men in the same job to advance through posting, a result I 
expect is largely driven by the fact that women are less likely to apply for posted jobs, an 
explanation I explore in more detail below. 
Table 3.6 includes the analyses used to test Hypothesis 3, that women will be less 
likely than structurally and observationally equivalent men to apply for jobs posted 
internally. Because not all workers in the firms has the same likelihood of applying to a 
given job posting, this analysis required me to identify the set of workers most likely to 
consider applying to a particular job at a particular time. If there were clearly defined 
advancement paths within the organization, this would be a straightforward task; the risk 
set would consist of those employees located in the job leading to the focal job, typically 
the job located on rung down on the job ladder. In the absence of clearly defined 
advancement paths, I used the internal application data to identify the current workers 
most likely to apply for each job21. For each posted job, I first identified which jobs 
successful internal applicants were most likely to occupy at the time of application. 
Specifically, workers were identified as at risk for applying to a posted job if they 
occupied a job that produced at least 10% of total applicants for that job (across all 
requisitions) and in which at least one candidate received an offer22. I then excluded 
                                                            
21 This approach is roughly equivalent to creating a propensity score of the likelihood that a given 
worker will apply to a given job posting (e.g. Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983), though instead of 
assigning each worker a propensity score, I use the application data to create rough cutoffs based 
on job tenure and the job a worker occupies. In robustness checks, I also added cutoffs based on 
performance (see Footnote 23). 
22 The job application data allows me to identify how far along in the hiring process each 
candidate advanced. The recruitment process involves seven stages: (1) initial screening by the 
applicant tracking system, (2) screening by an internal recruiter, (3) resume review by the hiring 
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workers who had been in their current job for less than a year, as the data revealed that 
across all jobs, 92% of applicants receiving an offer had been in their current role for at 
least 12 months23. I then created a set of variables indicating whether the potential move 
would have represented a potential advancement, a move to the same department, same 
function or same state, and the job similarity between the job a candidate currently 
occupies and the job they are applying for.  
For the sake of robustness, I employ multiple analytical approaches using data 
from 2012, for which I have complete data on posted jobs, internal applications, and all 
potential candidates. Models 1 and 2 use a logit specification to test whether a potential 
internal candidate applied for a job if they were at risk the month the job was posted.  
Models 3 and 4 use a logit specification to test whether a potential internal candidate 
applied for a job if they were at risk of applying for a job at least once during the year. 
Models 5 and 6 use a negative binomial specification to analyze how many applications a 
potential candidate made controlling for the number of times they were at risk during the 
year. The results are fairly consistent across the different specifications. All models 
without job controls (Models 1, 3, 5) show that across the firm, women apply more 
frequently than men, consistent with the analyses presented in Table 3.5. Once controls 
for current job are included (Models 2, 4, 6) , however, the negative and statistically 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
managers, (4) interview by the hiring manager, (5) job offer extended, (6) background check, (7) 
hire completed. 
23 I discussed these criteria with several recruiters at InsureCo who universally found these 
criterion to be reasonable. Nevertheless, I experimented with small modifications to how the risk 
set was defined, such as changing the inclusion to criteria to include jobs that produced 5%, 15% 
or 20% of total applicants, including workers with job tenures of 8 and 10 months, and excluding 
candidates who ranked in the bottom 25% of their performance quartile, and found them all to 
yield qualitatively similar results. 
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coefficient for female indicates that among observationally equivalent workers occupying 
the same job, women are between 12 and 26 percent less likely than men to apply for an 
open job. The greater overall tendency of women to rely on posting for advancement, as 
indicated in earlier modes does to be driven by the nature of the jobs they hold.  
Table 3.7 shows the probabilities of receiving a job offer24 conditional on 
applying. The results indicate that conditional on applying, women and men applying to 
the same requisition (the term used to refer to a specific job posting) are equally likely to 
receive a job offer. I run the analyses using two different sample and two different 
modeling strategies and find similar results. Models 1 through 4 examine the likelihood 
of all applicants to a requisition receiving an offer using both fixed effects logit models 
and conditional logit models standard errors clustered by applicant25. Models 5 through 8 
replicate the same analysis but includes only those candidates who passed the initial 
screenings and whose resumes were reviewed by the eventual hiring manager (I refer to 
these in the analyses as “qualified” candidates). 
Table 3.8 includes the analyses used to test Hypothesis 4, that women internal 
applicants will have higher performance ratings than men applying to the same job. In 
this table, each row represent a different model/regression. The second column includes 
                                                            
24 A candidate can drop out the process after any stage prior to the hire being completed. In my 
analyses, I focus on whether or not an internal candidate received a job offer as opposed to 
whether or not a candidate was hired, as this this a better outcome for assessing which attributes 
(including gender) affect the opportunities available to internal candidates. Once a candidate 
receives an offer, they have the option of accepting or declining the offer; less than 1% of internal 
candidates fail to pass the background check, but around 10% decline to accept an offer, most 
often because they had applied to multiple jobs and chose to accept another job within the 
organization. 
25 7,110 candidates submitted a total of 33,933 applications.  45% of candidates submitted a 
single application, 33% submitted between 2 and 4 applications, 12% submitted between 5 and 10 
application, and 9% submitted more than 10 applications. The most applications submitted by a 
single candidate in 2012 was an astounding 257 applications.   
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the dependent variable and the reported regression coefficient is the coefficient for 
female. All but the last model includes fixed effects for the requisition. This allows me to 
compare the gender differences in various attributes among internal candidates who 
applied for the same job. The results show that among applicants to the same job, women 
are significantly more qualified on every observable dimension. They are more likely to 
be top performers relative to their peers, less likely to be low performers relative to their 
peers, have higher absolute performance ratings on all dimensions, be slightly older, have 
spent longer with the organization, and apply for jobs similar to the one they currently 
occupy (and thus are more likely to possess the relevant qualifications). 
Having examined the factors shaping advancement, I turn to the results on pay. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that any gender gap in starting salaries associated with the move 
to a new job within the firm would be lower when jobs are filled by posting as compared 
to sponsorship. The data used to test this hypothesis are presented in Table 3.9 and 
include the starting salaries associated with each of the 9,189 internal hires made during 
the observation period (advancement and lateral moves). Model 1 includes a vector of 
demographic and of performance variables and Model 3 adds a vector of mobility 
variables. All models include controls for the current and previous job, controls for year 
and are clustered by individual to account for non-independence. The significant negative 
coefficient for female in both models indicate approximately a 1 percent gender gap in 
starting salaries between men and women, with women being paid less than 
observationally equivalent men. The positive and significant interaction coefficient for 
posting in Model 2 indicates that when workers move through posting, they receive a 2 
percent higher starting salary than workers who move through posting (consisted with 
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posting premium show in Study 1). The positive and significant interaction term between 
female and posting in Model 4 indicates that the gender gap starting salary is virtually 
eliminated when a job is filled through posting as opposed to sponsorship; when 
observationally equivalent men and women enter the same job through sponsorship, men 
earn 1.8 percent more than women; when they enter the same job through posting, they 
earn the same amount. Table 3.10 presents the coefficients for all the different potential 
interactions between gender and posting/sponsorship. The results indicate that while men 
earn 1 percent more when they enter a job through posting relative to sponsorship, 
women earn nearly 3 percent more, which I attribute to the transactional nature of the 
posting process increasing women’s propensity to initiate a salary negotiation (and to 
negotiate more competitively) more than men.  
DISCUSSION 
Gender inequality within organizations represents one of the most stubborn and 
persistent problems in the field of management. Though a number of recent changes to 
employment structures and process have been successful in reducing gender inequalities 
in the workplace (Castilla, 2015; Dencker, 2009; Kalev et al., 2006; Kalev, 2009), 
women remain underrepresented at the senior levels of organizations, continue to occupy 
a disproportionate percentage of marginalized jobs, and are still paid less than men for 
similar work. Not surprisingly, scholars interested in gender and organizations have 
called for work allowing us to identify and better understand additional mechanisms with 
the potential reduce gender differences in advancement and pay (Castilla, 2008, 2012). 
This study attempts to answer this call by exploring the impact of contemporary internal 
hiring processes on the organizational careers of women.  
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The theory and results together suggest that posting – and market-based internal 
hiring process in which managers post an open job to an internal job and invite interested 
internal candidates to apply – has the potential to reduce gender inequalities in 
advancement and pay. In term of advancement, I argued that posting helps overcome 
women’s limited visibility and access to informal strategic networks – structural barriers 
imposed by segregation of women to marginalized jobs – by providing unrestricted 
access to information about potential advancement opportunities and providing a formal 
mechanism through which women can make their qualifications known to potential 
hiring managers. I found that workers in lower status, less visible jobs – 
disproportionately occupied by women – are significantly more likely to advance via the 
formal, market-oriented posting process than they are the informal, relationship-oriented 
sponsorship process. The job application data provide support for these arguments, 
revealing that women are more likely than men to use the posting system to seek out 
advancement opportunities and moves to more distant jobs (e.g. less similar jobs and jobs 
in other departments). In terms of pay, I argued that the transactional nature of the 
posting process should help to reduce within-job gender wage disparities by reducing 
women’s reluctance both to initiate salary negotiations and to negotiate competitively 
when they choose to negotiate. I found that when observationally equivalent men and 
women were hired into the same job through sponsorship, women were paid almost 2% 
less than men, but that this gender gap disappeared entirely when the job was filled 
through posting.    
However, I also argued that posting will fail to live up to its potential to reduce 
inequalities in advancement and pay because the posting process itself is implicitly 
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gendered (Acker, 1990). That is, despite appearing to be gender-neutral, the posting 
process constructed on assumptions about appropriate behavior that will discourage 
women from applying to posted jobs at the same rate as structurally and observationally 
equivalent men. The posting process requires employees to enter into a competition, 
engage in self-promotion, and make judgments about the extent to which they are 
qualified for an open job. These very attributes are likely to discourage women from 
participating the posting process because of three reinforcing gender difference in 
behaviors; women are more likely than men to avoid competition (Niederle & 
Vesterlund, 2007) and self-promotion (Rudman, 1998), and more likely than men to 
follow rules (Villalobos, 2009). Indeed, I find that a woman occupying with the same 
qualifications as a man occupying the same job is 10 and 20 percent less likely to apply 
for an open job. Though my data do not allow me to directly test the separate effects of 
each of these behavioral mechanisms, an analysis of the qualifications on internal 
candidates shows that women applicants are significantly more qualified than male 
applicants for the same job based on observable criteria, including manager ratings of 
performance and potential. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSION 
 This dissertation began by highlighting an important gap in our understanding of 
job mobility in contemporary labor markets; though internal mobility remains a key 
building block of individual careers and firm talent management strategies, surprisingly 
little work has examined the allocative processes used to facilitate internal mobility. I 
identified and described the two internal hiring processes mostly commonly used to 
generate new person-job matches within firms – posting and sponsorship. In two 
complementary empirical studies, I explored the relative effects on these different process 
on a number of outcomes of consequence to workers and firms. Taken together, these 
studies provide a more complete picture of modern job mobility and demonstrate the 
value in paying closer attention to the dynamics of internal mobility in contemporary 
organizations. 
As with all single-firm studies, it is difficult to say how generalizable the findings 
are to other organizations, in part because no previous study has explored hiring 
processes within contemporary organizations in as much detail. Examining mobility 
within firms requires tradeoffs between depth and generalizability and acquiring detailed 
internal data from multiple sites represents a substantial hurdle for conducting multi-firm 
studies. This is made even more difficult by the fact that few firms actually capture data 
on the processes by which employees move to new jobs (Strum, 2001).  
However, there are reasons to expect my results to be typical of other large 
organizations as well. InsureCo’s organizational structures and employment systems are 
similar to those of other large U.S. organizations across a range of industries (Cappelli, 
2008; Marsden & Gorman, 1999). My conversations with InsureCo officials and with 
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human resource leaders at multiple additional organizations during the course of this 
study have not revealed any reason to believe that InsureCo’s internal hiring practices are 
different from other large organizations. Moreover, the company analyzed is not atypical 
when it comes to gender disparities in advancement and wages (e.g. Barnett et al., 2000; 
Catalyst, 2014; Spilerman & Petersen, 1999). 
Despite these limitations, the results reported in this dissertation have significant 
implications for theory and practice. In highlighting the ways in which self-selection and 
formality shape managerial decision-making and negotiations, the first study adds to the 
growing insights about the benefits and limitations of bringing market mechanisms 
within firms (Zenger et al., 2011). To date this work has focused predominately on the 
ways in which the infusion of high powered incentives shapes individual behavior (Ellig, 
2001; Zenger & Hesterly, 1997; Zenger, 1992). More recently, scholars have begun to 
explore the ways in which firms are able to harness the information aggregation powers 
of the market to improve internal decision-making though the use of prediction and 
information markets, with the idea being that the widely diffused information can be 
aggregated into something akin to a price (Ellig, 2001; Felin & Zenger, 2011). The study 
complements and extends this work by showing how two less explored features of 
markets – self-selection and formality – improve decision-making in the absence of a 
price mechanism. Moreover, it shows that, contrary to what extant theory predicts about 
the role of competition in external markets, infusing competition within the firm actually 
increases prices.  In identifying the micro-level mechanisms through which these macro-
level allocative processes shape individual behaviors, this work speaks to a growing body 
of literature interested in micro-foundations of strategic organization (Felin & Foss, 2005; 
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Ployhart & Hale, 2014) as well as a more specific literature on the micro foundations of 
human capital-based competitive advantage (Coff & Kryscynski, 2011).  More generally, 
these results suggest that posting is a superior process for developing the extant talent 
within an organization, providing managers the opportunity to identify and evaluate 
talented individuals and deploy them in ways that allow workers to assemble meaningful 
internal careers while also meeting the immediate needs of the organization (Cappelli, 
2008, p. 206). 
In showing that allocative processes operating within organizations can have a 
significant impact on the organizational careers of women, the second study contributes 
to a burgeoning literature exploring whether and how recent changes to employment 
structures and processes have been successful in reducing inequality in the workplace 
(e.g. Castilla, 2012). While a long line of sociological inquiry explored how the 
bureaucratic which governed the allocation of workers to within traditional bureaucratic 
internal labor markets served to generate and sustain gender inequalities (Rosenfeld, 
1992), little to no research has examined this issue in the context of contemporary 
internal labor markets. Moreover, this work bridges sociological, social psychological, 
and behavioral economics research on gender inequalities within organizations. 
Sociological studies of gender inequality tend to emphasize gender differences in 
structural barriers to opportunities for equal advancement and pay (Barnett et al., 2000; 
Spilerman & Petersen, 1999), while research in social psychology and behavioral 
economics tends to emphasize behavioral barriers that emerge for gender differences in 
preferences and behaviors (Barron, 2003; Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Greig, 2008). The 
central argument of this study was that the extent to which the introduction new work 
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structures, policies and practices are able to remediate persistent gender inequalities 
within organizations depends on the degree to which they address both established gender 
differences in structural constraints and gender differences in preferences and behaviors. 
In doing so, this paper also calls attention to need to explore whether structures and 
processes which appear to be gender-neutral may actually be subtlety and implicitly 
gendered (Acker, 1990). 
The practical implications of these study are equally important. Both studies 
suggest that both workers and firms benefit when the market-oriented posting process is 
used to fill jobs suggesting that firms should not only adopt posting systems, but require 
managers to post jobs in lieu of filling open jobs through sponsorship. The fact that 
nearly half of jobs are not filled by posting is therefore cause for concern as well as an 
avenue for future research, as we do not yet understand what leads managers to choose 
one process over the other. We would also benefit from future work exploring whether 
there are potential downsides associated with posting that have been fully articulated 
here. For example, a particularly promising avenue for future research would be to 
explore whether posting imposes additional costs on organizations by creating a visible 
set of employees who lost out in an open competition, such as lower performance or 
increased turnover. 
While the results of the second study unambiguously demonstrate the potential of 
posting to decrease gender gaps in advancement and pay, they also indicates that filling 
more jobs through posting is not a sufficient solution. Rather, organizations also need to 
find ways to help women to overcome the behavioral barriers that lead them to avoid 
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participating in the market for open jobs.  How organizations might do this is likely to be 
source of considerable debate.  
A “fix the women” approach (Ely & Meyerson, 2000) would accept the fact that 
posting is a gendered process and encourage women to adjust their behavior accordingly. 
According to this approach, “women have not been socialized to compete successfully in 
the world of men, and so they must be taught the skills their male counterparts have 
acquired as a matter of course” (Ely, Ibarra, & Kolb, 2011, p. 475). Rather than make any 
changes to the posting process itself, solutions emerging form this approach would 
focusing on changing women’s behaviors; telling women that they need to overcome 
their reluctance to compete and self-promote and be willing to apply for jobs even if they 
are unsure whether they are qualified. That is, this approach would focus on teaching 
women how to successfully navigate the gendered posting process. 
In contrast, an “equal opportunity” approach (Ely & Meyerson, 2000) would 
bring the gendered nature of posting process is brought to the forefront, focusing on 
changing the process in ways that will encourage women’s participation. This approach 
would involve asking how, knowing what we know about gender differences in 
preferences and behaviors, organizational structures and process can be modified or 
created in ways that come closer to representing their gender-neutral ideal. Given that 
changes to organizational process tend to more effective at reducing inequalities than 
interventions aimed at changing behaviors (Kalev et al., 2006; Castilla, 2015), this 
approach seems particularly promising.   
There is reason to believe that small changes in the posting process might 
significantly increase women’s participation. One such change would involve positioning 
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posting as an important developmental opportunity. Many organizations notify 
unsuccessful internal candidates that they were not selected and offer to explain the 
selection decision. However, these conversations are typically not developmental in 
nature (Billsberry, 2007). Rather than providing candidates with feedback on how they 
could develop their skills or other jobs they might want to consider, these conversation 
instead focus on the negatives, identifying the candidate’s shortcomings in order to 
reduce concerns about unfair selection practices (Petersen & Saporta, 2004; Strum, 
2001). However, recent research in behavioral economics has demonstrated that 
providing workers with quality feedback on their performance increases high-performing 
women’s likelihood to enter future competitions to point that the gender gap is 
substantially (David Wozniak, 2012), if not fully (David Wozniak et al., 2014), reduced.  
A second change would be to provide workers with formal, impartial advice on 
which opportunities for advancement they should pursue. A recent lab study by Brandts 
et al. (Brandts et al., 2014) found that when workers received advice on whether or not to 
enter a competition, stronger-performing women were more likely to enter while weaker-
performing men were less likely to enter, significantly reducing the gender gap in 
participation. The challenge in the field, of course, is that the majority of career-related 
advice flow through the very informal networks to which women have limited access 
(Ibarra, 1995; Podolny & Baron, 1997). Investments in internal resources workers could 
turn to for career advice – internal career consultants, access to information on the career 
paths taken by other employees – might therefor deliver significant returns in terms of 
increasing women’s utilization of the posting system.   
116 
 
A third change, and perhaps the easiest, would be to make it clear that applicants 
are not expected to possess all of the qualifications included in a job description. 
Leibbrant and List (2014) found that when they simply and explicitly state that wages 
were negotiable in a job posting rather than leave it ambiguous, women were more likely 
to apply for the job and attempt to negotiate for a higher salary. Removing ambiguity 
around the selection criteria may provide a similar boost in internal application made by 
women. Another option is to limit the list only to those qualifications used to exclude 
candidates (Heller, Levin, & Goransson, 2002), such as a specific degree or knowledge of 
a technical program and instead include a robust description of the job and environment 
in which the job will be performed, allowing candidates to pursue opportunities in which 
they feel they would be successful based on the nature of the job rather than a list of 
qualifications. These and other potential modifications to the posting system represent 
significant opportunities for future work in this area. Studies examined how internal 
hiring process affect inequalities based on a range of other characteristic, including age, 
race and socioeconomic status would be welcomed. 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
  Variable n Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Posting 9318 0.41 0.49                           
2 Cont Score 9318 2.85 0.64 -0.05                         
3 Contrib Score 9318 2.55 0.52 -0.05 0.67                       
4 Top 25% 9318 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.44 0.45                     
5 Bottom 50% 9318 0.46 0.5 0.01 -0.46 -0.50 -0.59                   
6 Bottom 25% 9318 0.21 0.41 0.01 -0.40 -0.46 -0.33 0.56                 
7 Turnover (12 mo) 7484 0.02 0.14 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.03               
8 Turnover (24 mo) 4898 0.1 0.3 0.00 -0.12 -0.11 -0.09 0.09 0.08 0.53             
9 Advance (12 mo) 5086 0.13 0.33 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.01 -0.08           
10 Advance (24 mo) 3350 0.24 0.43 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 -0.07 -0.08 . -0.08 0.87         
11 Salary (ln) 9300 11.01 0.4 -0.08 0.08 0.13 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 0.02 -0.15 -0.17       
12 Job Level 9318 4.63 0.76 -0.14 0.13 0.13 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.32 -0.39 0.73     
13 Same Dept 9318 0.59 0.49 -0.37 0.17 0.17 0.10 -0.12 -0.10 -0.03 -0.12 -0.04 -0.10 -0.03 -0.02   
14 Same Function 9318 0.69 0.46 -0.13 0.03 0.09 0.05 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.02 -0.09 -0.11 0.09 0.05 0.19 
15 Advancement 9318 0.87 0.34 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 0.03 0.21 
16 Female 9318 0.64 0.48 0.00 -0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.22 -0.14 0.02 
17 White 9318 0.77 0.42 -0.02 0.07 0.05 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.02 
18 Black 9318 0.1 0.3 0.03 -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.12 -0.13 -0.04 
19 Latino 9318 0.08 0.27 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 -0.11 -0.06 0.01 
20 Asian 9318 0.03 0.18 -0.03 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.02 
21 Tenure 9318 5.45 5.2 -0.06 0.11 0.14 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 0.16 0.15 0.02 
22 Tenure (sq) 9318 56.73 121.9 -0.08 0.05 0.08 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.14 0.12 0.04 
23 Age 9318 38.62 9.91 -0.15 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.15 -0.21 0.30 0.25 0.03 
24 Peer Group Size 9318 482.12 408.17 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.07 0.11 -0.17 -0.23 0.05 
25 Prev Salary (ln) 9311 10.93 0.41 -0.17 0.09 0.14 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.13 -0.15 0.95 0.72 -0.01 
26 Prev Cont Score 8071 2.89 0.61 -0.01 0.52 0.43 0.24 -0.24 -0.20 -0.05 -0.10 0.04 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.10 
27 Prev Cont Score 8094 2.58 0.51 0.00 0.41 0.60 0.26 -0.26 -0.21 -0.04 -0.09 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.11 0.09 
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Table 2.1 cont’d: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
15 Advancement -0.17                         
16 Female -0.03 -0.01                       
17 White -0.02 -0.01 -0.02                     
18 Black 0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.61                   
19 Latino 0.00 0.00 0.02 -0.53 -0.10                 
20 Asian 0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.34 -0.06 -0.05               
21 Tenure -0.04 0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03             
22 Tenure (sq) -0.04 0.00 0.08 0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 0.92           
23 Age 0.03 -0.13 0.06 0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.02 0.28 0.29         
24 Peer Group Size 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.06 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.09       
25 Prev Salary (ln) 0.08 -0.18 -0.20 0.13 -0.12 -0.13 0.11 0.19 0.16 0.36 -0.16     
26 Prev Cont Score -0.01 0.06 -0.03 0.07 -0.11 -0.01 0.04 0.15 0.08 -0.02 0.01 0.08   
27 Prev Cont Score 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.03 -0.10 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.05 -0.01 0.12 0.67 
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Table 2.2: Performance 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
  OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit 
Variables Contribution Competency Top 25% Bottom 50% Bottom 25% 
Posting 0.0542** 0.0621** 0.129* -0.133** -0.149* 
  [0.0155] [0.0123] [0.0548] [0.0516] [0.0634] 
Same Department 0.208** 0.175** 0.392** -0.439** -0.495** 
  [0.0159] [0.0126] [0.0586] [0.0531] [0.0635] 
Same Function 0.0316* 0.0751** 0.295** -0.155** -0.152* 
  [0.0149] [0.0125] [0.0591] [0.0534] [0.0644] 
Promotion 0.00351 -0.0219 0.242** -0.0874 0.0152 
  [0.0216] [0.0168] [0.0820] [0.0718] [0.0857] 
Female 0.0026 0.0233+ 0.115* -0.108* -0.101 
  [0.0146] [0.0121] [0.0550] [0.0511] [0.0617] 
Tenure 0.0350** 0.0387** 0.0534** -0.0476** -0.0524** 
  [0.00379] [0.00345] [0.0148] [0.0129] [0.0153] 
Tenure (sq) -0.00120** -0.00132** -0.00195** 0.00157** 0.00170** 
  [0.000155] [0.000148] [0.000663] [0.000548] [0.000613] 
Age -0.00441** -0.00120+ -0.00767** 0.00663* 0.00684* 
  [0.000828] [0.000676] [0.00291] [0.00266] [0.00324] 
Peer Group Size 0.0000295 -0.000145* -0.000385** 
  [6.87e-05] [6.64e-05] [8.65e-05] 
Constant 2.956** 2.838** -1.223* 0.0529 -0.973 
  [0.118] [0.0853] [0.524] [0.508] [0.599] 
Observations 9300 9300 9289 9276 9262 
R-squared 0.136 0.154 
Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered by individual.  All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01          
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Table 2.3: Turnover, advancement and salary 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Logit Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS 
Variables Turnover12 Turnover24 Promotion24 Promotion36 Salary (ln) Salary (ln) 
Posting -0.202* -0.182* -0.0949 0.128+ 0.0383** 0.0376** 
  [0.0986] [0.0761] [0.0645] [0.0733] [0.00256] [0.00272] 
Same Department -0.0925 -0.259** 0.0402 0.0012 0.000872 0.00125 
  [0.0959] [0.0738] [0.0651] [0.0779] [0.00270] [0.00275] 
Same Function -0.0336 0.0874 -0.217** -0.0758 0.0166** 0.0152** 
  [0.0987] [0.0671] [0.0610] [0.0756] [0.00264] [0.00270] 
Advancement -0.302** 0.0791 -0.274** -0.279** 0.0960** 0.0865** 
  [0.116] [0.0954] [0.0777] [0.0892] [0.00874] [0.00890] 
Female -0.236** -0.148* -0.121* -0.123+ -0.0101** -0.00912** 
  [0.0871] [0.0648] [0.0577] [0.0666] [0.00230] [0.00235] 
Tenure -0.104** -0.0828** -0.00392 0.0333+ -0.000281 -0.0009 
  [0.0223] [0.0159] [0.0152] [0.0187] [0.000559] [0.000588] 
Tenure (sq) 0.00299** 0.00212** 0.0000181 -0.00150+ 0.00000442 0.0000266 
  [0.000912] [0.000625] [0.000653] [0.000882] [2.07e-05] [2.09e-05] 
Age -0.00115 0.0114** -0.0144** -0.0153** -0.00153+ -0.00163+ 
  [0.00523] [0.00316] [0.00319] [0.00365] [0.000829] [0.000873] 
Last salary (ln)         0.851** 0.863** 
          [0.00924] [0.00893] 
Last contribution           0.00860** 
            [0.00256] 
Last competency           0.00354 
            [0.00353] 
Constant -6.111** -2.416** 0.061 0.596 1.561** 1.342** 
  [0.757] [0.594] [0.345] [0.633] [0.117] [0.101] 
  7451 5056 5178 3302 9292 8017 
R-Squared         0.955 0.959 
Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered by individual.  All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01            
121 
 
Table 2.4: Source of internal hire 
Source of Hire  Posting Sponsorship Statistical Significance (Location of previous job within the organization) 
Different Function 40% 27% p < .01 
Different Department 64% 26% p < .01 
Different City 15% 4% p < .01 
Different Building 42% 8% p < .01 
Transfer (same job, different department) 10% 15% p < .01 
Expansion (same level, different job) 32% 43% p < .01 
Promotion (move up a level) 57% 42% p < .01 
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Table 2.5: Performance, turnover, advancement and salary within department 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
  OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit OLS 
Variables Contrib. Comp. Top 25% Bottom 50% Bottom 25% Turn12 Turn24 Prom24 Prom36 Salary (ln) 
Posting 0.0474** 0.0678** 0.160** -0.127* -0.165* -0.284* -0.151 -0.119 0.117 0.0468** 
  [0.0171] [0.0137] [0.0609] [0.0585] [0.0740] [0.123] [0.0988] [0.136] [0.150] [0.0033] 
Same Function 0.0196 0.0480** 0.261** -0.142* -0.138+ 0.145 0.0614 -0.355** 0.054 0.0106** 
  [0.0175] [0.0150] [0.0696] [0.0638] [0.0807] [0.127] [0.0868] [0.133] [0.166] [0.0034] 
Advancement 0.0392+ -0.00167 0.291** -0.104 -0.0434 -0.324* -0.0103 -0.568** -0.606** 0.0679** 
  [0.0236] [0.0185] [0.0900] [0.0800] [0.0975] [0.132] [0.114] [0.162] [0.176] [0.0171] 
Female 0.00949 0.0221+ 0.102+ -0.0849 -0.0939 -0.177+ -0.157* -0.233+ -0.124 -0.0007 
  [0.0160] [0.0133] [0.0600] [0.0570] [0.0705] [0.102] [0.0765] [0.124] [0.135] [0.0007] 
Tenure 0.0396** 0.0441** 0.0662** -0.0569** -0.0637** -0.105** -0.0875** 0.0018 0.0842* 0.0000 
  [0.00413] [0.00376] [0.0162] [0.0146] [0.0174] [0.0250] [0.0184] [0.0348] [0.0418] [2.42e-05] 
Tenure (sq) -0.0014** -0.0015** -0.0023** 0.0018** 0.002** 0.0032** 0.0024** -0.0009 -0.005* -0.0017+ 
  [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.001] [0.0007] [0.0015] [0.0021] [0.001] 
Age -0.0047** -0.0015* -0.0085** 0.0084** 0.0101** 0.0002 0.0110** -0.0311** -0.0328** 0.827** 
  [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0032] [0.003] [0.0036] [0.006] [0.0038] [0.0067] [0.0076] [0.134] 
Peer Grp Size     0.0000 -0.0001+ -0.0004**           
      [7.45e-05] [7.42e-05] [0.0001]           
Constant 2.830** 2.199** -1.486** 0.202 -0.723 -5.912** -3.468** 0.162 0.532 4460 
  [0.0877] [0.0738] [0.548] [0.528] [0.638] [1.115] [0.566] [0.746] [0.707] 0.966 
Observations 7568 7568 7559 7543 7505 5777 4044 4203 2720 7568 
R-squared 0.138 0.161                 
Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered by individual.  All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 2.6: Performance ratings robustness checks 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
2SLS 
Treatment 
2SLS 
Treatment 
Variables Contrib. Competency Contrib. Competency Contrib. Competency Contrib. Competency 
Posting 0.0542** 0.0621** 0.0393* 0.0401* 0.259** 0.271** 0.227** 0.199** 
  [0.0155] [0.0123] [0.0191] [0.0164] [0.0934] [0.0764] [0.0765] [0.0609] 
Same Department 0.208** 0.175** 0.177** 0.139** 0.296** 0.262** 0.283** 0.232** 
  [0.0159] [0.0126] [0.0223] [0.0171] [0.0422] [0.0343] [0.0353] [0.0281] 
Same Function 0.0316* 0.0751** 0.0452* 0.0720** 0.0387* 0.0871** 0.0366* 0.0824** 
  [0.0149] [0.0125] [0.0226] [0.0178] [0.0164] [0.0136] [0.0164] [0.0131] 
Promotion 0.00351 -0.0219 -0.00915 -0.00608 -0.0445 -0.0711** -0.0375 -0.0555** 
  [0.0216] [0.0168] [0.0313] [0.0234] [0.0300] [0.0237] [0.0264] [0.0211] 
Female 0.0026 0.0233+ 0.0278 0.0300* -0.00083 0.0222+ -0.000927 0.0220+ 
  [0.0146] [0.0121] [0.0194] [0.0151] [0.0150] [0.0124] [0.0143] [0.0114] 
Tenure 0.0350** 0.0387** 0.0181** 0.0258** 0.0343** 0.0387** 0.0345** 0.0391** 
  [0.00379] [0.00345] [0.00505] [0.00384] [0.00387] [0.00340] [0.00349] [0.00278] 
Tenure (sq) -0.00120** -0.00132** -0.000741** -0.000862** -0.00115** -0.00128** -0.00116** -0.00131** 
  [0.000155] [0.000148] [0.000192] [0.000147] [0.000160] [0.000144] [0.000146] [0.000117] 
Age -0.00441** -0.00120+ -0.00432** -0.00214* -0.00406** -0.00062 -0.00415** -0.000819 
  [0.000828] [0.000676] [0.00112] [0.000848] [0.000878] [0.000720] [0.000766] [0.000610] 
lambda             -0.102* -0.0793* 
              [0.0455] [0.0363] 
Constant 2.956** 2.838**         2.331** 2.061** 
  [0.118] [0.0853]         [0.194] [0.154] 
Observations 9300 9300 8811 8811 8929 8929 8929 8929 
R-squared 0.136 0.154 0.559 0.606         
Manager Fixed Effects N N Y Y N N N N 
Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered by individual.  All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01                
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Table 2.7: Relative performance robustness checks 
 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
  Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit Logit IV Probit IV Probit IV Probit 
Variables Top 25% Bottom 50% Bottom 25% Top 25% Bottom 50% Bottom 25% Top 25% Bottom 50% Bottom 25% 
Posting 0.129* -0.133** -0.149* 0.110* -0.151* -0.177* 0.305 -0.720** -0.572* 
  [0.0548] [0.0516] [0.0634] [0.0531] [0.0595] [0.0736] [0.209] [0.204] [0.227] 
Same Department 0.392** -0.439** -0.495** 0.453** -0.524** -0.570** 0.331** -0.540** -0.487** 
  [0.0586] [0.0531] [0.0635] [0.0667] [0.0621] [0.0762] [0.0938] [0.0914] [0.102] 
Same Function 0.295** -0.155** -0.152* 0.317** -0.148* -0.150* 0.192** -0.141** -0.120** 
  [0.0591] [0.0534] [0.0644] [0.0674] [0.0621] [0.0755] [0.0378] [0.0364] [0.0405] 
Promotion 0.242** -0.0874 0.0152 0.251** -0.0796 0.0205 0.088 0.083 0.108 
  [0.0820] [0.0718] [0.0857] [0.0910] [0.0818] [0.0987] [0.0656] [0.0627] [0.0694] 
Female 0.115* -0.108* -0.101 0.116* -0.111* -0.112+ 0.0726* -0.0670* -0.0577+ 
  [0.0550] [0.0511] [0.0617] [0.0588] [0.0549] [0.0666] [0.0321] [0.0311] [0.0348] 
Tenure 0.0534** -0.0476** -0.0524** 0.0554** -0.0540** -0.0626** 0.0319** -0.0271** -0.0300** 
  [0.0148] [0.0129] [0.0153] [0.0147] [0.0135] [0.0166] [0.00787] [0.00756] [0.00859] 
Tenure (sq) -0.002** 0.0016** 0.0017** -0.0019** 0.0017** 0.002** -0.0011** 0.0008* 0.0009** 
  [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Age -0.00767** 0.00663* 0.00684* -0.0102** 0.00902** 0.00961** -0.00379* 0.0023 0.00258 
  [0.00291] [0.00266] [0.00324] [0.00311] [0.00287] [0.00348] [0.00175] [0.00169] [0.00187] 
Peer Group Size 0.00003 -0.0002* -0.0004** 0.0001 -0.0002* -0.0005** -0.000 -0.000 -0.0002** 
  [6.87e-05] [6.64e-05] [8.65e-05] [7.84e-05] [7.62e-05] [9.91e-05] [4.27e-05] [4.22e-05] [4.95e-05] 
Constant -1.223* 0.0529 -0.973 -1.255* 0.0303 -1.061 -0.482 -0.0919 -0.838 
  [0.524] [0.508] [0.599] [0.595] [0.596] [0.706] [0.426] [0.491] [0.586] 
Observations 9289 9276 9262 8802 8790 8777 8925 8916 8885 
R-squared                   
Clustered s.e. Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y 
Manager Fixed Effects N N N Y Y Y N N N 
All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01                  
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Table 2.8: Turnover robustness checks 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Logit Logit Logit Logit IV Probit IV Probit 
Variables Turnover12 Turnover24 Turnover12 Turnover24 Turnover12 Turnover24 
Posting -0.202* -0.182* -0.181+ -0.227* -1.408* -0.459 
  [0.0986] [0.0761] [0.107] [0.0908] [0.637] [1.163] 
Same Dept -0.0925 -0.259** -0.0911 -0.281** -0.635* -0.37 
  [0.0959] [0.0738] [0.108] [0.0856] [0.291] [0.499] 
Same Function -0.0336 0.0874 -0.0136 0.0895 -0.0697 0.0811 
  [0.0987] [0.0671] [0.115] [0.0831] [0.111] [0.0855] 
Promotion -0.302** 0.0791 -0.310* 0.0323 -0.0374 0.157 
  [0.116] [0.0954] [0.138] [0.109] [0.191] [0.280] 
Female -0.236** -0.148* -0.237* -0.154* -0.245* -0.157* 
  [0.0871] [0.0648] [0.103] [0.0741] [0.0975] [0.0664] 
Tenure -0.104** -0.0828** -0.112** -0.0906** -0.103** -0.0782** 
  [0.0223] [0.0159] [0.0285] [0.0202] [0.0262] [0.0183] 
Tenure (sq) 0.003** 0.002** 0.003** 0.0024** 0.0028** 0.002* 
  [0.0009] [0.0006] [0.0011] [0.0008] [0.0011] [0.0008] 
Age -0.0011 0.0114** -0.0044 0.0108** -0.0046 0.0108+ 
  [0.0052] [0.0032] [0.0056] [0.0036] [0.0054] [0.006] 
Constant -6.111** -2.416** -6.63 -2.661** -0.664 -2.26 
  [0.757] [0.594] [702.3] [0.698] [0.795] [1.420] 
Observations 7451 5056 5299 4751 6415 4789 
Clustered s.e. Y Y N N Y Y 
Manager Fixed Effects N N Y Y N N 
All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01            
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Table 2.9: Subsequent advancement robustness checks 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  Logit Logit Logit Logit IV Probit IV Probit 
Variables Promotion24 Promotion36 Promotion24 Promotion36 Promotion24 Promotion36 
Posting -0.0949 0.128+ -0.15 0.351* -1.599+ 3.060+ 
  [0.0645] [0.0733] [0.138] [0.165] [0.833] [1.649] 
Same Dept 0.0402 0.0012 0.0417 -0.0216 -0.604+ 1.067+ 
  [0.0651] [0.0779] [0.144] [0.178] [0.358] [0.617] 
Same Function -0.217** -0.0758 -0.278* -0.0648 -0.291** 0.041 
  [0.0610] [0.0756] [0.136] [0.176] [0.0767] [0.120] 
Promotion -0.274** -0.279** -0.491** -0.593** 0.095 -0.795* 
  [0.0777] [0.0892] [0.172] [0.210] [0.207] [0.319] 
Female -0.121* -0.123+ -0.207+ -0.2 -0.120+ -0.114 
  [0.0577] [0.0666] [0.124] [0.147] [0.0620] [0.0836] 
Tenure -0.0039 0.0333+ -0.0063 0.0730+ 0.0000 0.0188 
  [0.0152] [0.0187] [0.0365] [0.0437] [0.0175] [0.0231] 
Tenure (sq) 0.000 -0.0015+ -0.0003 -0.0039+ -0.0004 -0.0004 
  [0.00065] [0.0008] [0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0008] [0.0011] 
Age -0.0144** -0.0153** -0.0300** -0.0316* -0.0187** -0.0005 
  [0.00319] [0.00365] [0.00714] [0.0085] [0.0048] [0.0091] 
Constant 0.061 0.596 0.14 0.726 1.448 -2.657 
  [0.345] [0.633] [0.778] [0.841] [0.934] [1.996] 
Observations 5178 3302 4864 3052 4989 3134 
Clustered s.e. Y Y N N Y Y 
Manager Fixed Effects N N Y Y N N 
All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity.       
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01            
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Table 2.10: Salary robustness checks 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
  OLS OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Variables Salary (ln) Salary (ln) Salary (ln) Salary (ln) Salary (ln) Salary (ln) 
Posting 0.0383** 0.0376** 0.0262** 0.0262** 0.0443** 0.0430** 
  [0.00256] [0.00272] [0.00291] [0.00307] [0.0157] [0.0154] 
Same Dept 0.000872 0.00125 0.00118 0.000461 0.0039 0.00368 
  [0.00270] [0.00275] [0.00339] [0.00343] [0.00732] [0.00736] 
Same Function 0.0166** 0.0152** 0.00968** 0.00949** 0.0169** 0.0155** 
  [0.00264] [0.00270] [0.00298] [0.00302] [0.00305] [0.00312] 
Promotion 0.0960** 0.0865** 0.0862** 0.0806** 0.0935** 0.0819** 
  [0.00874] [0.00890] [0.0113] [0.0113] [0.0129] [0.0133] 
Female -0.0101** -0.00912** -0.00999** -0.00744** -0.0110** -0.00958** 
  [0.00230] [0.00235] [0.00248] [0.00252] [0.00235] [0.00241] 
Tenure -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0024** -0.0028** -0.0004 -0.001+ 
  [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] 
Tenure (sq) 0.0000 0.0000 7.66e-05** 9.40e-05** 0.0000 0.0000 
  [2.07e-05] [2.09e-05] [2.26e-05] [2.23e-05] [2.14e-05] [2.22e-05] 
Age -0.0015+ -0.0016+ -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0018* -0.0018* 
  [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.001] [0.0008] [0.0008] 
Last salary (ln) 0.851** 0.863** 0.766** 0.793** 0.858** 0.866** 
  [0.00924] [0.0089] [0.0116] [0.0117] [0.00886] [0.00908] 
Last contr   0.0086**   0.00669*   0.00948** 
    [0.00256]   [0.00274]   [0.00262] 
Last comp   0.00354   0.00519   0.00243 
    [0.00353]   [0.00391]   [0.00378] 
Constant 1.561** 1.342** 2.511** 2.197** 1.406** 1.091** 
  [0.117] [0.101] [0.146] [0.155] [0.120] [0.104] 
R-Squared 0.955 0.959 0.975 0.98 0.946 0.949 
Observations 9292 8017 8802 7701 8923 7715 
Clustered s.e. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Manager Fixed Effects N N Y Y N N 
All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 2.11: Effect of external candidates 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
  OLS OLS Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS 
Variables Contribution Competency Top 25% Bottom 50% Bottom 25% Salary (ln) Salary (ln) 
External Candidates -0.039 -0.0535 -0.0588 -0.192 -0.186 -0.00683 -0.00537 
  [0.0441] [0.0377] [0.171] [0.170] [0.247] [0.00762] [0.00706] 
Same Department 0.137** 0.104** 0.577** -0.366+ -0.278 0.0155* 0.0220** 
  [0.0493] [0.0393] [0.187] [0.188] [0.282] [0.00786] [0.00775] 
Same Function 0.0165 0.0582 0.0209 0.0503 -0.420+ 0.0226** 0.0161+ 
  [0.0449] [0.0385] [0.189] [0.185] [0.250] [0.00855] [0.00878] 
Advancement 0.0173 0.0394 0.00756 0.0149 0.117 0.0187 0.0311 
  [0.0686] [0.0567] [0.267] [0.278] [0.420] [0.0408] [0.0424] 
Female 0.00303 0.0419 0.228 -0.195 -0.323 -0.0104 -0.00521 
  [0.0426] [0.0346] [0.169] [0.168] [0.241] [0.00800] [0.00832] 
Tenure 0.0481** 0.0519** 0.0541 -0.0403 -0.186** -0.00389+ -0.0044** 
  [0.0125] [0.0114] [0.0566] [0.0438] [0.0570] [0.00224] [0.00227] 
Age -0.00125 0.00112 -0.0105 -0.0085 -0.014 0.000266 0.00125 
  [0.00258] [0.00217] [0.00947] [0.00936] [0.0135] [0.00349] [0.00345] 
Peer Group Size     0.0006** -0.0006** -0.0011**     
      [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003]     
Constant 3.116** 2.265** -2.869** 2.485+ 0.991 1.568** 1.809** 
  [0.301] [0.156] [1.385] [1.332] [1.934] [0.405] [0.522] 
Observations 869 869 849 853 817 869 752 
R-squared 0.168 0.178       0.955 0.96 
Standard errors, in brackets, are clustered by individual.  All analyses include dummies for job, function, level, state, and ethnicity. 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01              
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for key variables 
Variable Name Mean S.D. 
Advancement by Posting 0.04 0.19 
Advancement by Sponsorship 0.03 0.17 
Transfer 0.05 0.22 
Firm exit 0.08 0.04 
No move 0.8 0.33 
Female 0.69 0.46 
White 0.65 0.48 
Black 0.17 0.38 
Asian 0.03 0.17 
Other 0.15 0.35 
Salary (ln) 10.79 0.46 
Age (years) 39.69 11.15 
Quartile 1 (Top 25%) 0.16 0.37 
Quartile 2 0.22 0.41 
Quartile 3 0.26 0.44 
Quartile 4 (Bottom 25%) 0.37 0.48 
Contribution 4 (Exemplary) 0.05 0.21 
Contribution 3 (Full) 0.45 0.5 
Contribution 2 (Medium) 0.31 0.46 
Contribution 1 (Low) 0.1 0.3 
Firm Tenure (ln months) 3.18 1.17 
Job Tenure (months) 18.99 12.86 
Job Tier - Hourly 0.47 0.5 
Job Tier - Independent Contributor 0.43 0.49 
Job Tier - Managerial 0.08 0.28 
Job Tier - Executive 0.01 0.11 
Function - Sales 0.15 0.36 
Function - Clinical 0.25 0.44 
Function - Central Office 0.17 0.37 
Function - Products 0.08 0.27 
Function - Operations 0.35 0.48 
Headquarters 0.31 0.46 
Group Size (ln) 4.74 1.88 
Group Female % 0.67 0.22 
Female Supervisor 0.63 0.48 
n = 68,086 person-year observations 
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Table 3.2: Key variables by gender 
  Female Male 
# of observations 23012 10601 
Salary Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Salary 55128 28487 75737 43239 
Individual Characteristics Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
White 0.65 0.48 0.70 0.46 
Black 0.18 0.38 0.11 0.31 
Asian 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.21 
Other 0.15 0.36 0.15 0.35 
Age (years) 42.55 11.36 42.20 11.76 
Quartile 1 (Top 25%) 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 
Quartile 2 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43 
Quartile 3 0.26 0.44 0.25 0.43 
Quartile 4 (Bottom 25%) 0.29 0.46 0.32 0.46 
Contribution 4 (Exemplary) 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 
Contribution 3 (Full) 0.40 0.49 0.40 0.49 
Contribution 2 (Medium) 0.18 0.39 0.20 0.40 
Contribution 1 (Low) 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 
Firm Tenure (months) 68.35 73.24 64.58 65.48 
Job Tenure (months) 20.04 16.20 20.52 16.23 
Job Characteristics Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Job Tier - Hourly 0.44 0.50 0.29 0.45 
Job Tier - Ind Contributor 0.44 0.50 0.54 0.50 
Job Tier - Managerial 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.32 
Job Tier - Executive 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.24 
Function - Sales 0.11 0.31 0.25 0.43 
Function - Clinical 0.34 0.47 0.16 0.37 
Function - Central Office 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.45 
Function - Products 0.10 0.30 0.08 0.27 
Function - Operations 0.30 0.46 0.22 0.42 
Headquarters 0.26 0.44 0.37 0.48 
Group Size (ln) 4.51 1.88 4.30 2.17 
Job Female % 0.75 0.18 0.49 0.25 
Department Female % 0.72 0.16 0.55 0.20 
Female Supervisor 0.69 0.46 0.43 0.50 
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Table 3.3: Key variables by type of internal move 
  
Advancement by 
Posting 
Advancement by 
Sponsorship Lateral Move 
# of observations 2633 2002 3610 
Internal Move Characteristics Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Move in same department 0.63 0.48 0.92 0.27 0.78 0.41 
Move in same function 0.54 0.50 0.77 0.42 0.68 0.47 
Move in same state 0.96 0.19 0.99 0.11 0.98 0.15 
Previous Salary 47684 22282 54319 30381 51393 29097 
Starting Salary 55965 27394 64093 35055 51507 30125 
% Change in pay 17.4% 22.9% 18.0% 15.4% 0.2% 3.5% 
Candidate Characteristics 
(at time of hire) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Female 0.65 0.48 0.60 0.49 0.71 0.45 
White 0.71 0.45 0.71 0.45 0.68 0.47 
Black 0.15 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.19 0.39 
Asian 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.16 
Other 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.31 
Age (years) 34.84 8.73 35.87 9.55 38.93 10.80 
Quartile 1 (Top 25%) 0.26 0.44 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.39 
Quartile 2 0.26 0.44 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.42 
Quartile 3 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 
Quartile 4 (Bottom 25%) 0.26 0.44 0.22 0.42 0.34 0.47 
Contribution 4 (Exemplary) 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31 0.05 0.21 
Contribution 3 (Full) 0.59 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.50 0.50 
Contribution 2 (Medium) 0.21 0.41 0.18 0.39 0.31 0.46 
Contribution 1 (Low) 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.21 0.07 0.25 
Firm Tenure (months) 48.46 40.42 47.91 48.44 47.41 50.61 
Job Tenure (months) 20.37 11.45 20.39 12.71 18.35 11.23 
Job Characteristics 
(previous job) Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Job Tier - Hourly 0.49 0.50 0.38 0.49 0.51 0.50 
Job Tier - Ind Contributor 0.38 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.38 0.48 
Job Tier - Managerial 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.31 
Job Tier - Executive 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.12 0.01 0.10 
Function - Sales 0.11 0.31 0.22 0.41 0.08 0.27 
Function - Clinical 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.45 
Function - Central Office 0.16 0.36 0.25 0.43 0.14 0.34 
Function - Products 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.28 
Function - Operations 0.42 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.41 0.49 
Headquarters 0.50 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.40 0.49 
Group Size (ln) 4.30 1.79 3.88 2.01 4.32 1.83 
Job Female % 0.70 0.19 0.62 0.23 0.71 0.20 
Department Female % 0.74 0.17 0.60 0.22 0.72 0.19 
Female Supervisor 0.64 0.48 0.57 0.50 0.67 0.47 
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Table 3.4: Overview of internal applications submitted during 2012 
Summary Statistics 
Requisitions 4,324 
Jobs 296 
Open only to internal candidates (%) 37.0% 
Internal Applicants 7,110 
Internal Applications 33,933 
External Applications 217,121 
 
Furthest step in the hiring process for internal applicants 
Stage 1 ‐ ATS Screening  2,868  8.5% 
Stage 2 ‐ Recruited Screening  20,219  59.6% 
Stage 3 ‐ Hiring Manager Resume Review  4,370  12.9% 
Stage 4 ‐ Hiring Manager Interview  4,045  11.9% 
Stage 5 ‐ Job Offer  174  0.5% 
Stage 6 ‐ Background Check  13  0.0% 
Stage 7 ‐ Hired  2,244  6.6% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
133 
 
Table 3.4 cont’d: Overview of internal applications submitted during 2012 
  All Internal Applicants 
Qualified Applicants   
(passed initial 
screenings) 
Variables Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Female 0.74 0.44 0.71 0.45 
White 0.58 0.49 0.64 0.48 
Black 0.31 0.46 0.24 0.43 
Asian 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.15 
Other 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29 
Age 38.04 9.89 38.54 9.81 
Salary 44397 18846 49229 22425 
Quartile 1 (Top 25%) 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.42 
Quartile 2 0.24 0.43 0.25 0.43 
Quartile 3 0.30 0.46 0.28 0.45 
Quartile 4 (Bottom 25%) 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43 
Contribution 4 (Exemplary) 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23 
Contribution 3 (Full) 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.49 
Contribution 2 (Medium) 0.35 0.48 0.30 0.46 
Contribution 1 (Low) 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.23 
Firm Tenure (ln months) 3.79 0.88 3.92 0.83 
Job Tenure (months) 21.24 12.60 21.56 12.56 
Potential Advancement 4.14 2.22 4.72 2.16 
Job Similarity 0.79 0.41 0.73 0.44 
Job Tier - Hourly 0.62 0.48 0.51 0.50 
Job Tier - Ind Contributor 0.27 0.45 0.36 0.48 
Job Tier - Managerial 0.10 0.30 0.13 0.33 
Job Tier - Executive 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.08 
HQ 0.66 0.47 0.57 0.49 
Group Size (ln) 7.23 1.64 6.97 1.69 
Group Female % 0.73 0.16 0.72 0.17 
Female Supervisor 0.69 0.46 0.67 0.47 
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Table 3.5: Gender and advancement through posting versus sponsorship 
VARIABLES Advancement via Posting No Move Lateral Move Exit 
Base category Advancement via Sponsorship 
  β se β se β se β se 
Female 0.193** [0.0625] 0.400** [0.0470] 0.439** [0.0608] 0.273 [0.194] 
Ethnicity = Black 0.199* [0.0911] 0.479** [0.0719] 0.485** [0.0852] 0.573* [0.241] 
Ethnicity = Asian -0.490* [0.192] 0.223+ [0.126] -0.00854 [0.167] -1.277 [1.014] 
Ethnicity = Other -0.0972 [0.0906] 0.245** [0.0691] -0.181* [0.0914] 0.226 [0.255] 
Age (years) -0.0194** [0.00346] 0.0457** [.00255] 0.0317** [0.00306] 0.0462** [0.00813] 
Perf Quart 1 (Top 25%) -0.230** [0.0859] -0.869** [.0652] -0.618** [0.0830] -0.771* [0.311] 
Perf Quart 2 -0.0333 [0.0866] -0.340** [0.0664] -0.218** [0.0818] -0.421 [0.296] 
Perf Quart 4 (Bottom 25%) 0.158+ [0.0894] 0.363** [0.0692] 0.306** [0.0827] 0.711** [0.244] 
Firm Tenure (ln months) 0.255** [0.0339] -0.186** [0.0279] 0.0882** [0.0322] -0.478** [0.107] 
Job Tenure (months) -0.0127** [0.00297] 0.0121** [.00232] -0.0133** [0.00292] 0.0130+ [0.00788] 
Female% (Job)                 
Female% (Department)                 
Work Group Size                 
Job Tier = Hourly                 
Job Tier = Ind Cont                 
Job Tier = Executive                 
Functional = Clinical                 
Functional = Central Off                 
Functional = Products                 
Functional = Operations                 
HQ                 
Female Supervisor                 
Constant 0.49 [0.300] 3.946** [0.235] -0.0459 [0.268] -18.21** [0.762] 
Observations 68,086 
Log pseudolikelihood -33156.498 
Degrees of freedom 56 
Robust standard errors in brackets; All observations clustered by individual worker; Includes year dummies 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 3.5 cont’d: Gender and advancement through posting versus sponsorship 
  Model 2 - Multinomial Logit Model 3 - Logit 
VARIABLES Advancement via Posting No Move Lateral Move Exit Adv. via Posting 
Base category Advancement via Sponsorship Adv.via Sponsorship 
  β se β se β se β se β se 
Female -0.188* [0.075] 0.0767 [0.058] -0.0146 [0.073] -0.173 [0.203] -0.186* [0.077] 
Ethnicity = Black -0.0427 [0.093] 0.269** [0.072] 0.261** [0.086] 0.257 [0.246] 0.00722 [0.104] 
Ethnicity = Asian -0.326+ [0.192] 0.256* [0.127] 0.0851 [0.167] -0.478 [0.743] -0.0878 [0.236] 
Ethnicity = Other -0.0568 [0.095] 0.132+ [0.073] -0.316** [0.095] 0.0493 [0.251] -0.142 [0.109] 
Age (years) -0.013** [0.004] 0.0455** [0.003] 0.0358** [0.003] 0.0504** [0.008] -0.0199** [0.004] 
Perf Quart 1 -0.222* [0.087] -0.839** [0.066] -0.644** [0.084] -0.777** [0.294] -0.420** [0.099] 
Perf Quart 2 -0.0116 [0.087] -0.323** [0.067] -0.211* [0.082] -0.484+ [0.289] -0.0665 [0.1] 
Perf Quart 4  0.208* [0.09] 0.414** [0.07] 0.385** [0.083] 0.772** [0.233] 0.269* [0.107] 
Firm Tenure  0.275** [0.034] -0.0509+ [0.028] 0.167** [0.032] -0.282** [0.101] 0.339** [0.06] 
Job Tenure -0.012** [0.003] 0.0079** [0.002] -0.0126** [0.003] 0.00675 [0.008] -0.0091* [0.004] 
Female% (Job) 1.089** [0.164] 0.430** [0.117] 0.580** [0.152] 0.249 [0.505] - - 
Female% (Dept) - - - - - - - - 1.384** [0.485] 
Work Group Size 0.111** [0.017] 0.184** [0.012] 0.0386* [0.016] 0.169** [0.054] 0.127** [0.03] 
Job Tier = Hourly -0.133 [0.113] -0.111 [0.087] 0.162 [0.107] 0.321 [0.386] - - 
Job Tier = Ind Cont -0.228* [0.100] -0.0087 [0.079] -0.0693 [0.01] -0.00598 [0.374] - - 
Job Tier = Executive -0.809* [0.369] 1.024** [0.199] 0.436+ [0.248] 2.393** [0.526] - - 
Function = Clinical 0.728** [0.115] 1.109** [0.082] 1.736** [0.113] 1.135** [0.337] - - 
Function = Cnrt Off 0.326** [0.113] 0.774** [0.075] 0.830** [0.113] 0.458 [0.383] - - 
Function = Products 0.648** [0.124] 0.497** [0.09] 0.861** [0.128] 0.431 [0.434] - - 
Function = Ops 0.864** [0.107] 1.144** [0.076] 1.509** [0.111] 1.340** [0.341] - - 
HQ 0.0209 [0.07] -0.652** [0.054] -0.286** [0.067] -0.858** [0.223] 0.0493 [0.093] 
Female Supervisor -0.0565 [0.066] -0.102* [0.049] -0.011 [0.062] -0.19 [0.199] -0.189* [0.08] 
Constant -0.998** [0.343] 2.459** [0.265] -1.598** [0.315] -18.99** [0.652] -0.66 [0.975] 
Observations 68,086 4,432 
Log pseudolikelihood -3285.834 -2597.6087 
Degrees of freedom 99 216 
Robust standard errors in brackets; All observations clustered by individual worker; Includes year dummies 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 3.6: Gender and likelihood of submitting an internal application 
  Logit Logit Negative Binomial Regression 
  Monthly observations Annual observations Annual observations 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
VARIABLES 
Submitted an 
Application 
Submitted an 
Application 
Submitted an 
Application 
Submitted an 
Appilcation # of Applications # of Applications 
β se β se β se β se β se β se 
Female 0.23** [0.06] -0.12* [0.06] 0.27** [0.06] -0.26** [0.07] 0.26** [0.05] -0.09* [0.05] 
Ethnicity = Black 0.66** [0.06] 0.44** [0.07] 0.63** [0.07] 0.3** [0.08] 0.53** [0.06] 0.32** [0.05] 
Ethnicity = Asian -0.48** [0.14] -0.03 [0.14] -0.42* [0.18] 0.11 [0.19] -0.48** [0.13] 0.07 [0.11] 
Ethnicity = Other -0.19* [0.07] 0.12 [0.08] -0.1 [0.08] 0.23* [0.10] -0.18* [0.07] -0.15* [0.06] 
Age (years) -0.03 [0.00] -0.02** [0.00] -0.03** [0.00] -0.03** [0.00] -0.03** [0.00] -0.02** [0.00] 
Perf Quart 1  0.09 [0.07] 0.07 [0.07] 0.17* [0.08] 0.14 [0.09] 0.13+ [0.07] 0.02 [0.05] 
Perf Quart 2 -0.02 [0.07] -0.00 [0.07] 0.06 [0.07] 0.06 [0.08] 0.01 [0.06] -0.05 [0.05] 
Perf Quart 4  -0.08 [0.07] 0.07 [0.08] -0.09 [0.08] 0.07 [0.09] -0.08 [0.06] -0.07 [0.05] 
Firm Tenure  -0.00** [0.00] -0.00** [0.01] -0.00 [0.00] -0.00 [0.00] -0.00** [0.00] -0.00** [0.00] 
Job Tenure  0.00 [0.00] 0.00 [0.00] 0.01** [0.00] 0.01** [0.00] 0.00* [0.00] -0.00 [0.00] 
Work Group Size     0.17** [0.03]     0.31** [0.03]     0.00 [0.02] 
Female Supervisor     -0.04 [0.06]     -0.01 [0.07]     -0.00 [0.04] 
Constant -1.14** [0.12] -2.1* [1.02] -0.82** [0.13] -1.53** [0.43] -1.17** [0.11] -0.38 [0.59] 
Ln alpha                 1.23** [0.03] 0.28** [0.05] 
Observations 64,563 64,563 11,437 11,437 11,437 11,437 
Clustered by id Yes Yes No No No No 
Job Fixed Effects? No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Log likelihood -21279 -19100 -4617 -3822 -11154 -9853 
Degrees of freedom 10 202 10 202 10 202 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; Robust standard errors in brackets 
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Table 3.7: Likelihood of receiving an offer having submitted an application 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
  Fixed Effects Logit Fixed Effects Logit Conditional Logit Conditional Logit 
  All Applicants All Applicants All Applicants All Applicants 
VARIABLES Received Offer Received Offer Received Offer Received Offer β se β se β se β se 
Female -0.099 [0.0604] -0.0699 [0.0639] -0.099 [0.135] -0.0699 [0.131] 
Ethnicity = Black -0.651** [0.0689] -0.491** [0.0724] -0.651** [0.110] -0.491** [0.103] 
Ethnicity = Asian -0.459* [0.181] -0.570** [0.191] -0.459* [0.225] -0.570** [0.215] 
Ethnicity = Other -0.331** [0.105] -0.258* [0.111] -0.331+ [0.184] -0.258 [0.175] 
Age (years) -0.0265** [0.00307] -0.0286** [0.00326] -0.0265 [0.0163] -0.0286+ [0.0158] 
Perf Quart 1 (Top 25%) 0.527** [0.0701] 0.591** [0.0744] 0.527** [0.142] 0.591** [0.153] 
Perf Quart 2 0.260** [0.0701] 0.289** [0.0742] 0.260* [0.132] 0.289* [0.139] 
Perf Quart 4 (Bottom 25%) -0.0845 [0.0743] -0.0895 [0.0784] -0.0845 [0.157] -0.0895 [0.162] 
Firm Tenure (ln months) 0.00460** [0.000498] 0.00353** [0.000547] 0.786 [0.724] 0.701 [0.664] 
Job Tenure (months) -0.00442* [0.00211] 0.000929 [0.00221] 1.175 [0.754] 1.103 [0.704] 
Same Function     0.376** [0.0859]     0.376+ [0.225] 
Job Similarity     0.512** [0.0337]     0.512** [0.126] 
Same Pod     1.014** [0.0708]     1.014** [0.139] 
Same State     0.660** [0.105]     0.66 [0.467] 
Potential Advancement     -0.0912 [0.0946]     -0.0912 [0.447] 
Observations 20,694 20,694 20,694 20,694 
# Groups (Requisitions) 1,697 1,697 1,697 1,697 
Errors clustered by worker No No Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -4023.3499 -3586.1031     
Degrees of freedom 10 15     
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; Robust standard errors in brackets 
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Table 3.7 cont’d: Likelihood of receiving an offer having submitted an application 
  Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
  Fixed Effects Logit Fixed Effects Logit Conditional Logit Conditional Logit 
  Qualified Applicants Qualified Applicants Qualified Applicants Qualified Applicants 
VARIABLES Received Offer Received Offer Received Offer Received Offer β se β se β se β se 
Female -0.0172 [0.0766] 0.00937 [0.0791] -0.0172 [0.128] 0.00937 [0.131] 
Ethnicity = Black -0.433** [0.0880] -0.361** [0.0903] -0.433** [0.124] -0.361** [0.120] 
Ethnicity = Asian -0.448+ [0.243] -0.523* [0.247] -0.448+ [0.266] -0.523* [0.253] 
Ethnicity = Other -0.355** [0.136] -0.352* [0.140] -0.355+ [0.190] -0.352+ [0.190] 
Age (years) -0.0336** [0.00407] -0.0347** [0.00418] -0.0336+ [0.0183] -0.0347+ [0.0178] 
Perf Quart 1 0.366** [0.0903] 0.422** [0.0931] 0.366* [0.151] 0.422* [0.165] 
Perf Quart 2 0.148+ [0.0893] 0.168+ [0.0916] 0.148 [0.137] 0.168 [0.140] 
Perf Quart 4  -0.069 [0.0944] -0.0795 [0.0974] -0.069 [0.167] -0.0795 [0.168] 
Firm Tenure  0.00291** [0.000675] 0.00226** [0.000709] 0.418 [0.773] 0.385 [0.790] 
Job Tenure  -0.00541* [0.00270] -0.00186 [0.00277] 0.858 [0.819] 0.833 [0.833] 
Same Function     0.287** [0.110]     0.287 [0.269] 
Job Similarity     0.292** [0.0435]     0.292* [0.136] 
Same Pod     0.627** [0.0921]     0.627** [0.178] 
Same State     0.506** [0.140]     0.506 [0.560] 
Potential 
Advancement     -0.0952 [0.119]     -0.0952 [0.493] 
Observations 6,935 6,935 6,935 6,935 
# Groups 
(Requisitions) 1,179 1,179 1,179 1,179 
Errors clustered by 
worker No No Yes Yes 
Log likelihood -2083.534 -1982.6794     
Degrees of freedom 10 15     
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; Robust standard errors in brackets 
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Table 3.8: Attributes of internal applications 
      All Applicants Qualified Applicants   
Model 
# Dependent Variables 
Model 
Type β (female) se β (female) se 
Includes Req 
Fixed Effects
1 Ranked in Top 10% of perfomance cohort logit 0.28** [0.06] 0.34** [0.1] Yes 
2 Ranked in Top 25% of perfomance cohort logit 0.32** [0.04] 0.39** [0.07] Yes 
3 Ranked in Top 50% of performance cohort logit 0.4** [0.03] 0.45** [0.06] Yes 
4 Ranked in Bottom 50% of performance cohort logit -0.4** [0.03] -0.45** [0.06] Yes 
5 Ranked in Bottom 25% of performance cohort logit -0.2** [0.03] -0.26** [0.06] Yes 
6 Ranked in Bottom 10% of performance cohort logit -0.4** [0.05] -0.35** [0.09 Yes 
7 Contribution Score in current job OLS 0.04** [0.01] 0.07** [0.02] Yes 
8 Competency Score in current job OLS 0.07** [0.01] 0.09** [0.01] Yes 
9 Combined Score in current job OLS 0.05** [0.01] 0.08** [0.01] Yes 
10 Age OLS 0.6** [0.13] 1.44** [0.24] Yes 
11 Job tenure OLS 0.09+ [0.17] 0.68* [0.33] Yes 
12 Firm tenure OLS 11.16** [0.7] 16.37** [1.35] Yes 
13 Applying for a different job (overall similarity) OLS -0.13** [0.02] -0.06 [0.04] Yes 
14 Applying for a job requiring different skills OLS -0.07** [0.01] -0.03 [0.02] Yes 
15 Applying for a job in a different function logit -0.02 [0.04] 0.01 [0.07] Yes 
16 Applying for an advancement opportunity logit 0.17** [0.05] 0.22** [0.08 Yes 
17 Submitted multiple applications logit 0.2** [0.04] 0.19** [0.06] No 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; Robust standard errors in brackets 
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Table 3.9: Starting salary 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
  OLS OLS OLS 
VARIABLES 
Salary(ln) Salary(ln) Salary(ln) 
β se β se β se 
Female -0.011** [0.00] -0.011** [0.00] -0.018** [0.00] 
Ethnicity = Black 0.005 [0.00] 0.004 [0.00] 0.004 [0.00] 
Ethnicity = Asian 0.049** [0.01] 0.049** [0.01] 0.050** [0.01] 
Ethnicity = Other -0.033** [0.01] -0.032** [0.01] -0.032** [0.01] 
Age (years) 0.002** [0.00] 0.002** [0.00] 0.002** [0.00] 
Perf Quart 1 0.029** [0.01] 0.031** [0.01] 0.031** [0.01] 
Perf Quart 2 0.018** [0.00] 0.018** [0.00] 0.018** [0.00] 
Perf Quart 4 0.002 [0.01] 0.002 [0.01] 0.002 [0.01] 
Firm Tenure 0.007** [0.00] 0.006** [0.00] 0.006** [0.00] 
Job Tenure 0.001** [0.00] 0.001** [0.00] 0.001** [0.00] 
Posting     0.022** [0.00] 0.010* [0.00] 
Advancement     -0.008+ [0.00] -0.008+ [0.00] 
Same Function     0.003 [0.00] 0.003 [0.00] 
Same Pod     -0.005 [0.00] -0.005 [0.00] 
Female*Posting         0.018** [0.01] 
Constant 10.75** [0.04] 10.75** [0.04] 10.75** [0.04] 
New job controls  Yes Yes Yes 
Prev job controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9189 9189 9189 
R-squared 0.932 0.933 0.933 
Adjusted R-
squared 0.927 0.928 0.928 
Robust standard errors in brackets; All observations clustered by individual worker; Includes year 
dummies 
+ p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01  
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Table 3.10: Starting salary interaction terms 
DV = Salary (ln) 
Detailed Interaction Terms β se 
Male Posting v. Male Sponsorship 0.00957* [0.005] 
Female Posting v. Female Sponsorship 0.0276** [0.003] 
Female Sponsorship v. Male Sponsorship -0.0182** [0.005] 
Female Posting v. Male Posting -0.000161 [0.004] 
Includes all variable in Model 2, Table 3.9; Robust standard errors in brackets 
+ p < 0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01      
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